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ABSTRACT 
 
BRENDAN R. WATSON: Is Twitter a Counter Public?: Comparing Individual and 
Community Forces that Shaped Local Twitter and  
Newspaper Coverage of the BP Oil Spill 
(Under the direction of Daniel Riffe) 
  
If society is to avoid another disaster like the 2010 BP oil spill, the U.S. must 
reexamine its future energy policies and government regulations of industry. In the wake 
of such disasters, the news media should fulfill a surveillance function and raise these 
critical issues. But an analysis of 164 Gulf Coast newspaper reporters’ coverage of the 
BP oil spill showed that these journalists largely failed to do so. This dissertation 
examines individual and community-level variables that prevented the journalists from 
raising more critical questions in the aftermath of the oil spill, and compares their 
coverage and the forces that shaped it to the Tweets of 240 “most-followed” Gulf Coast 
Twitter users. This dissertation seeks to answer whether, in the context of the BP oil spill, 
Twitter might have served as a counter-public, which challenged the social, political, and 
economic forces that constrained journalists’ coverage. This study found a striking degree 
of similarity in journalists’ and Twitter users’ coverage of the oil spill, raising questions 
about whether Twitter is an alternative medium, and whether media-centric or more 
general sociological theories are most fruitful for understanding the similarities between 
these media.     
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 On April 20, 2010, a fiery explosion aboard the BP-leased Deep Water Horizon 
oil rig anchored approximately 50 miles off the Gulf Coast started what became one of 
the, if not the, worst environmental disasters in United States history (Freudenburg & 
Gramling, 2011; Lehner & Deans, 2011). Though 115 workers escaped the inferno, 11 
workers’ bodies were never recovered (Achenbach, 2011). On April 22, 2010, the 40th 
anniversary of Earth Day, established in the wake of the 1969 Santa Barbara oil disaster, 
the Deep Water Horizon sank to the sea floor.  
 The blowout preventer, designed to seal the well in such a scenario, and 
considered “fail safe” in industry parlance, failed and the Macando well spewed oil for 87 
days. Nearly 5 million barrels (200 million gallons) of oil polluted the Gulf waters 
(Lehner & Deans, 2011). Along with the oil, which contaminated Louisiana’s delicate 
wetlands and beaches along the Gulf Coast, several hundred threatened or endangered sea 
turtles washed up dead, along with hundreds of mammals, thousands of seabirds, and 
untold scores of fish (Freudenburg & Gramling, 2011). The oil brought fishing to a halt 
and put a damper on the summer Gulf tourism season, costing local businesses their 
livelihoods. The long-term effects of the oil spill are still unknown. 
Narratives, Texts, and Publics 
 This dissertation examines Gulf Coast newspaper journalists’ narratives about this 
disaster. Narratives play an important role in how society makes sense of such incidents. 
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As sociologist Lee Clarke (2006) wrote: “When things go wrong, especially when they 
go very badly wrong, we need to find a way to talk about it. We need to make up a story 
that puts characters in their places, makes sense of the actions, and lets us walk away 
feeling safer or more superior” (p. 121). There are private narratives that individuals use 
to make sense of crises in their own minds, and there are shared narratives – including 
those provided by journalists – that become part of the public discourse that shapes how 
society responds to public issues, including disasters. Journalists’ coverage potentially 
played a significant role in how Americans made sense of the BP disaster. According to 
the Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism (2010), the BP oil spill 
was the top news story for 14 weeks following the Deepwater explosion, and the 
percentage of Americans who said they were closely following the BP disaster remained 
between 43% and 59%.  Thus, evaluating journalists’ coverage of the BP oil spill is more 
than an intellectual exercise. 
 One reason so many Americans tuned in to coverage of the BP oil spill, is that in 
a large, complex modern society, the media are the primary arenas in which important 
public issues are debated, thus playing a central role in the public sphere (Curran, 1991).  
Habermas (1962/1989) popularized the liberal democratic notion of the public sphere as 
the forum between the state and civil society where citizens deliberate about public 
issues.  He conceived of the public sphere as influencing the state both through formal 
elections and via the dynamics of public opinion. As Fraser (1990) argued, there is little 
disagreement as to the importance of the basic concept of the public sphere to democratic 
theory and practice. Habermas’s public sphere, however, is criticized due to his reading 
of the bourgeois public sphere on which his ideal of the deliberative public is modeled. 
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Among other problems with Habermas’s interpretation of the bourgeois public sphere is 
that, according to Fraser (1990), he glosses over the exclusion of some participants based 
on gender and social and economic status. Thus, there is a gap between Habermas’s ideal 
public sphere and what Fraser called our “actual existing democracy” (Fraser, 1990, p. 
57). One can accept, however, the centrality of the concept of a deliberative public to 
understanding how society makes sense of, and responds to, public issues in a liberal 
democracy without resolving the tension between the theory and “actual existing 
democracy.” One can also accept that the media play an important role in the public 
sphere by providing information needed for deliberation, serving as a forum for public 
debate, and helping to communicate public opinion to state policy makers, while one can 
remain skeptical of whether “actual existing media” always live up to the democratic 
ideal (Curran, 1991). 
 However, to understand the centrality of journalists’ narratives of the BP oil spill 
to the public discourse following the disaster, it is useful to reconsider how a public is 
formed. According to Warner (2002), most liberal democratic theories posit that the 
citizenry already exist as “co-present interlocutors,” ready to “deliberate and decide” (p. 
421). Warner argued, however, that in reality publics are made up of otherwise unknown 
strangers, who are constituted into a public by their attention to a common public “text,” 
be it a written text, a speech, or a visual text, such as a photograph or movie, etc., which 
has been addressed to the public – for example, a publically circulated newspaper. When 
these texts are circulated publically, according to Warner (2002), they say “not only, ‘Let 
a public exist,’ but ‘Let it have this character, speak this way, see the world in this way’” 
(p. 422). Thus, these public texts, including journalistic narratives, are an important 
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object of study for examining a public that forms around an issue and how that public 
might make sense of that issue. Given the importance of journalists’ narratives of the BP 
disaster, this dissertation seeks not only to describe journalists’ coverage, but examine 
those individual and community level social, economic, and political forces that shaped 
their coverage. 
Causes Of the BP Oil Spill 
 Before examining these forces, however, one must have at least a rudimentary 
understanding of the underlying causes of the BP oil spill. BP leased the Deep Water 
Horizon rig from Transocean at a cost of $525,000 a day. After totaling up operating 
expenses, BP had a daily operating tab of more than $1 million (Achenbach, 2011). By 
April 20, 2010, the Macando well project was more than five weeks behind schedule and 
$20 million over budget (Freudenburg & Gramling, 2011). A series of cost-cutting 
decisions initiated by BP caused the catastrophe (Achenbach, 2011; Freudenburg & 
Gramling, 2011; The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and 
Enforcement, 2011). Among BP executives’ fateful decisions was foregoing a critical 
pressure test, which would have indicated unsafe levels of pressure from dangerous gases 
building in the well just before the explosion (Freudenburg & Gramling, 2011). That 
decision was a costly gamble. The test itself would have cost BP $128,000; the 
company’s tab for the Gulf oil spill could reach $60 billion (BP was self-insured).  
 It is natural to want to focus in on BP as the single villain in the disaster, as the 
government’s official report on the causes of the oil spill largely did (it also faulted the 
BP contractor Haliburton and Transocean, owner of the oil drilling rig) (The Bureau of 
Ocean energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, 2011). As Clarke (2006) 
5 
 
wrote, “If we locate the bad guys, the evildoers, or the miscreant then the fix is easy. Just 
replace the bad guys with good guys. However, if the problem is the system itself – an 
organization, a technology, a program – then it is harder to fix. Social and technical 
systems are more complex, so it’s harder to map out where the problem is” (p. 123). 
There are, however, systemic problems that contributed to the BP oil spill, which are 
overlooked by this single-villain narrative of the disaster.  
For example, BP is not alone in wagering safety, environmental sustainability, 
and sound energy policy to meet the United States’ insatiable appetite for oil 
(Freudenburg & Gramling, 2011; The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation 
and Enforcement, 2011). The U.S. currently consumes more than 18 million barrels of oil 
daily, more than all European Union Countries combined, and three times more than 
China, whose oil consumption ranks second in the world (Central Intelligence Agency, 
2011; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2011a). Since oil shortages and calls for 
“energy independence” started a domestic energy exploration boom in the 1970s, U.S. 
consumption of foreign oil imports has continued to increase, while domestic oil 
production has steadily decreased since its peak in the mid-1980s (it did increase slightly 
in 2009 and 2010) (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2011b). One of the 
problems that domestic oil production is facing is that the country’s most accessible oil 
reserves – on land and in shallow water – were put into production in the 1970s and 
1980s. But these reserves are not bottomless. And as those oil fields have yielded less oil, 
the politically-motivated promise of energy independence (impossible given the United 
States’ level of consumption (Gertz, 2008)) has set the U.S. on a collision course 
involving increasingly high stake gambles to reach increasingly inaccessible oil reserves. 
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These gambles included drilling miles below the sea floor in order to access limited 
reserves of petroleum
1
 with minimal regard for the consequences. Americans’ energy 
consumption and the country’s energy policies are contributing factors to the BP disaster 
(Freudenburg & Gramling, 2011). 
Journalism’s Surveillance Function 
What made the oil spill disaster so spectacular was not the fiery inferno that killed 
the 11 BP workers, or even that the blowout preventer failed. It was BP’s and the 
government’s lack of emergency response plans to cope with a drilling accident. 
Sociologist Karen A. Cerulo (2006) suggested that the lack of planning for disasters is a 
result of a cultural inability to imagine worst-case scenarios. She blamed cognitive and 
cultural factors that contribute to “positive asymmetry” in the way individuals view the 
world. Cognitively, people process information by grouping pieces of information into 
mental categories based on common characteristics. The brain compares new information 
to prototypes – existing examples that best represent a mental category – and categorizes 
information against these existing categories. Worst-case examples are not part of the 
brain’s active processing. Culturally, society also “define(s) the best people, places, 
objects, and events as highly relevant, highly important, and worthy of intense focus,” 
while relegating “the worst to a remote position of little or no importance or relevance” 
(p. 12). This positive asymmetry, Cerulo (2006) argued, is why society’s reaction to 
disaster is frequently, “I never saw it coming,” which may explain the BP and 
government inability to respond quickly to the disaster. 
                                                 
1
 In 2009, the Deep Water Horizon oil rig set the record for the deepest underwater oil well: a total of 
35,050 feet deep, below 4,132 feet of ocean water (Freudenburg & Gramling, 2011). 
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In contrast to this positive asymmetry, journalism is often criticized for its 
negative asymmetry. The media tend to focus on bad news, and in some instances create 
unreasonable fears of potential disasters (Clarke, 2006, p. 104). Some of this criticism is 
valid, though it is precisely because most people are not going around thinking about the 
bad things that could happen, the news media in particular do have a role — Lasswell 
(1948) described it as a surveillance function — in alerting society to potential problems.  
 There are critical questions that one could ask about how well the media fulfilled 
their surveillance function prior to the BP oil spill: Did journalists adequately cover BP’s 
abysmal safety record? Should journalists have more aggressively investigated the cozy 
relationship between the Minerals Management Service (MMS) and the industry it was 
supposed to be regulating? This dissertation, however, focuses instead on coverage 
following the BP oil spill and whether the media are raising critical questions that might 
help avoid future accidents.  
Freudenburg and Gramling (2011) argue that in order to ensure that an accident 
similar to the BP disaster does not repeat itself, the BP oil spill should not be understood 
as an isolated accident. Rather, society must start to ask broad questions about the U.S.’s 
dependence on increasingly scarce oil; about energy policies that encourage the pursuit of 
oil in increasingly risky (and environmentally sensitive) locations; about the cultural 
assumptions that lead us to believe that any such operation could be “fail safe”; and about 
the regulatory frameworks that are supposed to oversee the oil industry. These are the 
types of questions the media should raise if they are fulfilling their surveillance function.  
Thus, this dissertation examines the extent to which the disaster was treated in 
journalists’ narratives not as an individual, episodic event, but as a thematic story. Did 
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the media link their coverage to broader questions, such as critical examination of health, 
environmental, and economic impacts of the spill; U.S. energy and environmental policy; 
oil industry corporate responsibility; and government regulation and oversight? The 
dissertation will also explore the extent to which sources outside of the oil industry and 
government, who are more likely to be critical of BP and the government response to the 
disaster, were quoted in the coverage. 
Social Forces Framing Disaster 
Technological developments have increased many risks. Huge airliners, nuclear 
power plants, and oil platforms capable of drilling miles below the ocean’s surface, have 
all increased the potential consequences of a system failure (Perrow, 1984). Generally, 
though, society has embraced technology because it has helped individuals lead longer, 
more comfortable lives (Clarke, 2006). However, the public still expects that dangers 
associated with technological development are controlled according to a risk-benefit 
analysis. “Acceptable risks,” are those where the benefits of a particular action outweigh 
the risks (Clarke, 1989). This risk-benefit analysis assumes that future risks can be known 
and their probability of occurring can be scientifically calculated. Part of this analysis 
also assumes that the probability of accidents occurring can be reduced by implementing 
organizational protocols, having technological redundancies, enacting regulations, and 
having effective government oversight (Perrow, 1984). Risk analysis also assumes that 
benefits can be objectively measured.  
 However, Clarke (2006; 1989) and Perrow (1984) argued that risk analysis is not 
an objective process. It relies on cultural values that define acceptable benefits and 
subjective questions, such as “how much is a human life worth?” which are used to 
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quantify risks. Clarke (2006; 1989) and Perrow (1984) also pointed out that there are 
inherent social imbalances in this process. Access to risk analysis data is not shared 
equally, so decision makers can select data that support their preferred position. 
Additionally, benefits and costs associated with risks are not shared equally – wealthier 
individuals frequently share in more of the benefits, while poorer individuals shoulder 
more of the costs (though the distribution of costs and benefits is not part of the risk-
analysis equation). As a result, risk analyses are not objective calculations. Rather, they 
reflect cultural values and social relations and structural constraints that shape how risk is 
defined — and thus, define how society responds to risk.  
Though it often purports to be objective, journalism also reveals and mirrors 
similar underlying social forces. Rather than serving as independent “watchdogs,” 
according to Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien (1980), the media are part of an 
interdependent social, political, and economic system, and tend to operate as guard dogs 
for the dominant social structure in which they are embedded (Donohue, Tichenor, and 
Olien, 1995). In smaller, more heterogeneous communities, social power is more likely to 
be concentrated among a small group of residents. When problems arise in the 
community, they are more likely to be dealt with through interpersonal communication, 
and Tichenor et al.’s (1980) work showed that the media reinforce this social 
arrangement by downplaying social conflict. But in larger, more heterogeneous 
communities, social power is more likely to be dispersed among a more diverse set of 
religious and ethnic groups, trade unions, political factions, etc., and society is more 
dependent on the media to communicate among and coordinate the competing interests of 
these diverse groups of people. Tichenor et al. (1980) found that in these communities, 
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media are more likely to cover social conflict. In addition to Tichenor et al.’s (1980) 
work, Griffin and Dunwoody (1995, 1997) have shown that critical framing of polluting 
industries not only varies according to the potential distribution of social power (i.e., 
structural pluralism) in a community, but that the coverage also varied according to a 
community’s economic reliance on manufacturing (Griffin & Dunwoody, 1995, 1997). 
Thus, this study focuses on media coverage of the BP oil spill in 65 communities in the 
five Gulf Coast states, which either have oil drilling off their coasts, or in the case of 
Florida, where whether to allow oil drilling off the state’s coast has been a prominent 
political issue.  
This dissertation examines the influence that these Gulf Cost communities’ 
community structure, specifically their degree of structural pluralism and their economic 
reliance on the oil industry, had on how media framed the BP disaster. Framing refers to 
the process by which journalists select some aspects of what they observe and make them 
more prominent in their coverage, while downplaying or ignoring others (Entman, 1993). 
Framing is an inevitable process given that journalists are assigned the task of condensing 
and simplifying complex subjects (Kim, Scheufele, & Shanahan, 2002). It is the central 
thesis of this dissertation, however, that journalists’ judgments about what aspects of an 
incident should be most prominent are not made based on objective criteria that define 
newsworthiness. Rather, these decisions are shaped by social, economic, and political 
factors (Griffin & Dunwoody, 1995, 1997; Patterson & Donsbach, 1996; Tichenor et al., 
1980). Thus, this dissertation tests the general hypothesis that newspaper journalists in 
less pluralistic, more oil-dependent communities in the Gulf Coast states, will be less 
likely to frame coverage of the BP spill critically (i.e., they will have a less critical tone, 
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be less likely to use thematic frames, or will use critical unofficial characters) than 
colleagues in more pluralistic, less oil-dependent communities.  
How Does Community Structure Affect the News? 
This dissertation also seeks to make a contribution to the community structure 
literature, complementing content analysis data with data gathered from a survey of 
journalists. These data are used to test a model exploring how community structure 
variables enter the newsgathering process — that is, by first influencing journalists’ 
attitudes toward an issue, which in turn influence the stories journalists write. In addition 
to testing how those attitudes might lead to “structural bias” in journalists’ coverage of 
the BP oil spill, the effects of more commonly studied ideological bias in journalists’ 
coverage of the BP oil spill are also estimated. Typically, it is political ideology that bias 
researchers are interested in (D’Alessio & Allen, 2000; Entman, 2007; Patterson & 
Donsbach, 1996), but this study also examines environmental ideology. Americans’ 
attitudes toward the spill were highly partisan and also reflected their environmental 
attitudes (Pew Research Center for the People & The Press, 2010) and it is hypothesized 
that journalists’ attitudes following the oil spill will reflect similar biases: more 
conservative, more anthropocentric journalists will hold more favorable attitudes toward 
the oil industry, which will in turn affect the favorability of their framing of the oil spill.  
Of course, based on the literature on the “routinization” of journalistic work, 
which predicts relatively standard coverage from one newsroom to the next (Tuchman, 
1973/1997), the individual-level ideological effects and community-level effects are not 
expected to be particularly large. However, studying the BP oil spill, when the off-shore 
oil drilling industry and its government regulators were under the most intense fire and 
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when future energy and environmental policy was most contested, provides an ideal 
situation in which to observe how journalists’ coverage may be shaped based on 
variations in local community structure, forces which in more normal times can be 
obscured by patterns of routine coverage, standardized across communities. As 
sociologists have noted, periods of conflict are characterized by “an excessiveness which 
allows us better to perceive the facts than in those places where, although no less 
essential, they still remain small-scale and involuted” (Marcel Mauss, as cited in 
Klinenberg, 2002, p. 23).  
To explore the effect of community structure variables — structural pluralism and 
economic dependency — and personal ideology on journalists’ coverage of the BP oil 
spill, this dissertation complements survey data previously collected as part of a study of 
journalists’ attitudes toward the oil industry following the BP disaster (Watson, in press) 
with a content analysis of respondents’ newspaper stories. Watson (in press) revealed that 
Gulf Coast journalists’ attitudes toward the oil industry following the spill were 
significantly influenced by both journalists’ environmental and political ideologies, as 
well as to a lesser, but still significant extent, by their communities’ economic reliance on 
the oil industry (Watson, in press). That study, in short, measured factors that influenced 
attitudes. The unanswered question that this dissertation will answer is how effective are 
journalists at keeping their personal attitudes out of their coverage of the oil spill? 
Twitter as a Counter Public 
Because of the lack of literature on how community structure might influence 
online media, Twitter specifically, this dissertation firsts tests hypotheses about 
newspaper coverage of the BP oil spill. Social media, however, also potentially played an 
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important role in shaping public understanding of the disaster. According to the Pew 
Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism (2010) the BP disaster was the 
top social media story for five weeks following the Deepwater Horizon explosion. Thus, 
this dissertation compares newspaper coverage of the BP oil spill to Twitter, the fastest-
growing social networking site in the U.S. in 2010 (Nielson, 2010), and asks whether 
Tweets about the spill might represent a “counter public,” challenging those forces that 
are hypothesized to limit debate in the mainstream media. Like other online media, 
Twitter’s potential to challenge the economic, social, and political forces that limit debate 
in the mainstream media come not only from the fact that its users are freed from the 
professional constraints of mainstream journalism, but that anyone can instantly set up a 
Twitter account that is instantly available to millions, freeing alternative voices of the 
prior production constraints of commercial media; social media’s networked nature also 
presents new opportunities for political organizing and action (Dahlberg, 2007a; 2007b; 
Downey & Fenton, 2003). 
Habermas (1962/1989) believed that having a single public sphere was essential 
so that society could reach consensus on important public issues. Fraser (1990), though, 
argued that multiple publics were vital to ensuring truly inclusive, democratic 
deliberation, particularly in stratified societies that are reflected in our “actually existing 
democracies.” That is because, as she wrote, “arrangements that accommodate 
contestation among a plurality of competing publics better promote the ideal of 
participatory parity than does a single, comprehensive, overarching public” (p. 66).  
 Twitter does represent a separate public from the mainstream news media, 
delineated simply, according to Warner’s (2002) text-based approach, by different 
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“speech genres, idioms, stylistic markers, address, temporality, mise en scène, citational 
field, interlocutory protocols, lexicon, and so on” (p. 422). A counter public, however, is 
not simply differentiated by being a different medium, but by challenging the 
monopolizing social, political, and economic forces that limit democratic deliberation in 
a dominant public (Fraser, 1990; Warner, 2002). 
Some have suggested that the Internet generally, and social media in particular, 
are alternative, perhaps even revolutionary, public spheres (Dahlberg, 2007a; Downey & 
Fenton, 2003). Dahlberg (2005) asserted, however, that the Internet has been “colonized” 
by some of those same forces, particularly commercial forces, that limit debate in the 
mainstream public sphere. The Internet is large and diverse enough that one can likely 
find evidence to support either hypothesis about the Internet’s contribution, or lack 
thereof, as an alternative public sphere. However, one of these visions is more likely to 
dominate the online public sphere. According to Wu, Hoffman, Mason, and Watts (2011) 
a small group of users  — only 20,000 — produce the majority of Tweets read on the 
social network. They also found that these users resemble those who dominate the 
traditional public sphere — celebrities, media personalities, and large corporations. Thus, 
this dissertation examines only those Tweets by the most followed Gulf Coast Twitter 
users, a potentially influential group of users who are most likely to dominate and serve 
as opinion leaders of discussions of issues on the social networking site. 
If Twitter does represent an alternative public sphere or counter public, as Fraser 
(1990) and Warner (2002) defined it, not only should there be significant differences in 
the points of view and subjects represented in these authors’ Tweets about the oil spill, 
but they should be more independent of the community-level effects (i.e., structural 
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pluralism and economic dependence on the oil industry) that shape mainstream 
newspaper coverage. 
This current study also addresses the question of whether or not Twitter is an 
alternative sphere by matching previously collected survey data of Gulf Coast Twitter 
users attitudes toward the oil industry following the BP oil spill with a content analysis of 
their Tweets, and comparing it to the same data on journalists’ attitudes and coverage. To 
ensure that this comparison is based on similar communities, the sample of Twitter users 
and journalists are drawn from the same list of Gulf Coast communities.  
Riffe, Lacy, and Fico (2005) make an argument for the “centrality” of media 
content — that is, media content can be viewed both in terms of “antecedent conditions,” 
including both individual psychological variables and social, political, and economic 
contextual factors that shape media messages, as well as in terms of potential media 
effects. Further, they argue that content analyses that examine media content either in the 
context of its antecedents or effects have the greatest potential for contributing to 
theoretical understanding of communication processes. By combining community 
structure measures and surveys of media producers’ attitudes (antecedent conditions) 
with content analysis data, this dissertation contributes to the theoretical understanding of 
individual and community-level factors that may shape media content (particularly if 
some of the forces that have been theorized to shape mainstream media coverage are also 
found to shape Twitter, a “new” media form). Furthermore, because of the centrality of 
journalistic narratives to the formation of deliberative publics, this dissertation 
contributes to understanding the social, economic, and political forces that likely shaped 
larger energy and environmental policy debates following the BP oil spill. 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Journalism & Information Control 
 Rather than viewing the media as strong, independent watchdogs, i.e., the “fourth 
estate” (Schultz, 1998), this dissertation builds upon a sociological theory of the media, 
which holds that they are part of an interdependent social, political, and economic 
system, and that the media play an important social control function (Beniger, 1986; 
Janowitz, 1991; Lasswell, 1948; Olien, Donohue, and Tichenor, 1995; Park, 1939/1961; 
Sapir, 1931/1961). The concept of social control is a matter of some controversy within 
sociology (Meier, 1982), but generally it does not imply overt coercion. Rather, it refers 
to the ability of society to maintain functional cohesion through shared norms and social 
goals (Janowitz, 1991). In small, pastoral communities, norms can be shared through an 
oral tradition. But in a large, pluralistic urban setting, mass communication helps 
socialize residents — particularly new residents — into existing social norms and social 
institutions, including by communicating existing sources of social power and one’s 
relative standing in society. The media, however, also facilitate a process of 
acculturation, permitting increasingly diverse groups to have some knowledge of one 
another so that they may arrive at a degree of mutual understanding and accommodation 
(Park, 1939/1961). While the socialization process largely reinforces existing norms and 
institutions, the acculturation process serves as a regulatory/feedback mechanism that
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allows existing norms and institutions to change gradually over time with shifts in a 
community’s population. 
Donohue, Tichenor, and Olien (1973; Tichenor, Donohue, & Olien, 1980; Olien, 
Donohue, & Tichenor, 1995) theorized that the mass media fulfill these functions primary 
through two types of information control: distribution control (system-maintenance) and 
feedback control (regulation). Distribution control involves the selective dissemination 
(or withholding) of information, which is often expressed in routine “news judgment” 
decisions about what should and should not be covered. Feedback control refers to the 
media’s role in covering potentially destabilizing social problems or conflicts, such as 
labor disputes, social protests, crime, etc., which need to be resolved in order to maintain 
social order.  
It is worth noting, however, that the media rarely cover social problems and 
conflicts as emblematic of systemic problems — for example, covering the BP oil spill as 
an outgrowth of the United States’ dependence on petroleum. Rather, social problems are 
typically covered as aberrations involving individual rogue actors (i.e., BP) within the 
system (Olien et al., 1995). Thus, problems that arise are dealt with primarily by 
sanctioning individual actors, maintaining the overall social system.  
 Tichenor et al. (1980) hypothesized that newspapers’ control functions vary based 
on the degree of structural pluralism within a community, which they defined as “the 
degree of differentiation in the social system along institutional and specialized interest 
group lines, in a way that determines the potential sources of organized power” (p. 16, 
emphasis added). In smaller, more homogenous communities, power is more likely to be 
concentrated among a small group of elite actors. Due to the communities’ small size and 
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the concentration of social power, problems can be primarily resolved via interpersonal 
communication. The community is less reliant on the media’s feedback function, and 
local media instead maintain the local social order by exercising distribution control, 
downplaying local conflicts in their coverage.  
Larger, more pluralistic communities, however, are characterized by the presence 
of diverse, specialized interest groups — different classes of workers represented by 
different labor unions, diverse religious groups, greater racial diversity, a greater variety 
of social and political organizations, etc. — each of which is competing for prestige, 
influence, and access to limited public resources (Olien et al., 1995). A more pluralistic 
community is more reliant on media’s feedback function to communicate among and 
coordinate interests among these diverse groups. Thus, conflicts that arise are covered 
more openly in the press. This coverage serves a pressure release valve function, which 
allows groups to air grievances (and perhaps they receive nominal concessions), while 
not threatening the overall social system. 
Journalistic Routines: Frames and Sources 
 Tichenor et al.’s (1980) theory of local variance in media coverage, however, is 
somewhat at odds with what we know about the “routinization” of media work: 
journalism in particular is defined by professional norms that result in a relatively high 
degree of standardization of patterns in routine news coverage from one paper to the next 
(Schudson, 2003; Tuchman, 1973/1997). Donohue, Tichenor, and Olien’s (1985) own 
data support the standardization thesis: they found that as Minnesota’s labor force 
became increasingly specialized and individual communities more interconnected in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, the effects of local community structure on news coverage 
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diminished. That is, as communities became more interdependent, news coverage was 
more standardized across the communities. 
Thus, before examining the effects of local community structure, it makes sense 
to make some more general observations about journalists’ coverage of issues involving 
conflict: specifically, how the media tend to frame environmental conflict, and what types 
of sources most frequently have access to the media in order to define these frames. Both 
of these elements of the media’s coverage illustrate generally how media coverage tends 
to serve a general system maintenance function. 
Framing 
 Robert Entman (1993) provides perhaps the most relevant definition of framing: 
“To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in 
a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item 
described” (p. 2). Framing is particularly prominent in journalistic coverage, because 
journalists are given the task of condensing and simplifying complex subjects so that they 
have easily comprehended, coherent meaning for their audiences (Kim, Scheufele, & 
Shanahan, 2002). As Gamson (1989) argued, “Facts have no intrinsic meaning. They take 
on their meaning by being embedded in a frame or story line that organizes them and 
gives them coherence, selecting certain ones to emphasize while ignoring others” (p. 
157). The story lines the media emphasize are significant because frames can affect 
audiences’ interpretations of social conflicts and policy proposals to resolve those 
conflicts (Kim et al., 2002; McLeod and Detenber, 1999; Hart, 2010).  
 A weakness of framing research is that there is no common understanding among 
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researchers as to the story attributes that define a frame (Entman, 1993). Several articles 
examining the news media’s framing of environmental contamination can illustrate this 
point, highlighting the diverse story attributes that are used by different researchers to 
define news frames. MacKendrick (2010), for example, studied Canadian newspapers’ 
coverage of environmental toxins and their effects on human health. She primarily 
examined whether the newspapers framed toxins as being emblematic of a social problem 
(e.g., needing stricter regulations on chemicals) or an individual problem (e.g., needing to 
change one’s diet to avoid toxins). The latter dominated coverage, which she suggested 
detracted from environmental quality as a social issue.  
Castelló (2010) examined the Spanish press’s coverage of chemical 
manufacturers, which simultaneously support the local economy, while also contributing 
to environmental and health problems. He examined the relative use of frames that 
focused on the industry’s positive impacts (e.g., economic benefits) versus those focusing 
on the industry’s negative impacts (e.g., environmental contamination). The latter were 
much more common in the papers’ coverage.  
Lastly, Gandy, Kopp, Hands, Frazer, and Phillips (1997) examined American 
newspapers’ use of discrimination frames in reporting on issues of differences between 
white and black residents’ exposure to environmental risks. Specifically, they examined 
whether newspapers attributed disparities in risk exposure to racism. Only 11.2% of 
stories used a discrimination frame, which may contribute to the perception that 
discrimination is not a major factor that affects racial minorities’ disproportionate 
exposure to environmental contaminants, despite strong evidence to the contrary (Brulle 
and Pellow, 2006; Ringquist, 2005). 
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 Though each of these articles defined frames differently, there are also similarities 
among them. All three articles focus on attribution of responsibility for the problem of 
environmental risk, and MacKendrick (2010) and Castelló (2010) focus explicitly on who 
has access to the media to define media frames  (i.e., which sources media favor in their 
coverage). MacKendrick (2010) found that the Canadian newspapers were most likely to 
use academic scientists, government scientists, and heads of environmental organizations 
as sources (these findings are an interesting contrast to studies that have suggested that 
U.S. journalists rely most heavily on government officials and marginalize university 
scientists in their coverage (Steele, 1995)). Castelló (2010) on the other hand, found that 
corporate representatives and government officials collectively constituted 80% of 
journalists’ sources. This focus on what MacKendrick (2010) calls the “primary definers” 
is implicit in Gandy et al.’s (1997) exploration of racial disparities in framing of 
environmental risk (i.e., in general, blacks lack status as “definers,” which causes their 
concerns of racial discrimination to be underrepresented in media coverage).  This 
dissertation builds on these thematic commonalities, focusing on those frames that play a 
role in attributing responsibility for the BP disaster and those sources that had access to 
the media to define these frames. 
Episodic versus thematic frames. Iyengar (1991) demonstrated that episodic and 
thematic frames result in very different attribution of responsibility. An episodic frame 
treats a news event as an isolated story; a thematic frame explores larger causes and 
consequences underlying a particular issue (Iyengar, 1990; 1991; 1996). To illustrate the 
differences between these frames, an episodic frame of the BP disaster would, for 
example, focus on those immediate decisions and events that led to the explosion aboard 
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the Deep Water Horizon oil platform, including the decision to skip the crucial pressure 
test. A thematic frame, however, would put the disaster in the context of BP’s overall 
safety record, the government’s inspection record of the platform, etc. The latter is more 
likely to raise those critical questions that Freudenburg and Gramling (2011) suggest 
need to be raised in the aftermath of the BP disaster. 
 Iyengar’s research, which helped define episodic and thematic frames, focused on 
the framing of social problems, for example, poverty and homelessness (Iyengar, 1990; 
1991; 1996). His data showed that not only are the media more likely to use episodic 
frames in their coverage of social and political issues, but also that episodic and thematic 
frames result in distinct effects on audiences’ attribution of responsibility for these 
problems. Episodic stories result in responsibility for problems being attributed to 
individuals featured in that story (for example, blaming individual homeless people for 
the substance abuse that contributed to their circumstances). Thematic stories, however, 
result in attribution of societal responsibility (for example, attributing homelessness to the 
lack of public support for treatment of mental health issues, which often go hand-in-hand 
with substance abuse in contributing to homelessness). Iyengar (1996) ties the dominance 
of episodic frames back to the media’s system-maintenance function, writing that the 
ultimate effect of these frames is to “protect elected officials from policy failures or 
controversies and thus strengthen their legitimacy” (p. 15).  
 Thematic frames may also influence individuals’ willingness to hold industry 
responsible for environmental problems. Hart (2010) found that experimental participants 
exposed to thematic framing of climate change’s effects on polar bears were more likely 
to support additional regulations of and taxes on greenhouse gas-emitting industries. 
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 Iyengar’s (1990; 1991; 1996) research focused primarily on television framing, 
but similar patterns have been demonstrated regarding newspaper framing of societal 
problems, including environmental contamination. Again highlighting the absence of 
shared frame definitions, Kensicki (2004) does not reference Iyengar’s episodic/thematic 
typology. However, her study of the framing of three social issues — pollution, poverty, 
and incarceration — in a sample of 300 news articles from 1995 to 2000 also examined 
the extent to which newspaper coverage focuses attention on the underlying causes and 
consequences of a given problem. Her study examined the frequency with which 
newspaper coverage explicitly identified a cause of a given problem; identified those 
individuals or groups most affected by it; and identified who has responsibility for 
rectifying the problem.  
 Kensicki found that whereas a majority of the stories about environmental 
pollution (N = 100) from the New York Times and Los Angeles Times mentioned the 
cause of the pollution — industry most frequently being framed as the culprit — the 
majority of stories failed to mention any effects of the pollution. Additionally, the 
government, not industry, was most frequently portrayed as being the party responsible 
for addressing the problem.  
Media Sources & Characters 
Kensicki’s (2004) study hints at why the media end up holding government, not 
industry, more responsible for addressing environmental problems. More than three 
fourths of the newspaper articles Kensicki (2004) studied did not mention the word 
“environmentalist” or mention a local or national environmental advocacy organization. 
Yet these are the individuals and groups most likely to raise critical questions about the 
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effects of environmental pollution, and hold the source of the problem — industry — 
fully accountable for ameliorating it.  
The individuals or organizations mentioned in a story are the ones that have the 
agency to shape the narrative. In news stories those individuals and organizations that 
journalists rely on to provide information for their stories — their news sources — are the 
most important agents in a story. However, other media, for example, prime-time 
television (Glasscock, 2003; Mastro & Stern, 2003; Oliver, 1994; Signorielli & Bacue, 
1999; Tedesco, 1974), magazine advertisements (Frith, Shaw, & Cheng, 2006), or feature 
films (Behm-Morawitz & Mastro, 2008; Powers, Rothman, & Rothman, 1993), do not 
rely on primary sources in the same way journalists do. Yet the individuals and 
organizations mentioned in these media — the media’s characters — similarly drive 
those media’s narratives. Because this dissertation is focused on coverage of a public 
affairs issue, it relies primarily on the literature on previous content analyses of news 
sources used in coverage of similar issues (studies of characters’ use in other types of 
media have mostly focused on portrayals of race, gender, or both (Behm-Morawitz & 
Mastro, 2008; Frith et al., 2006; Glasscock, 2003; Mastro & Stern, 2003; Oliver, 1994; 
Powers et al., 1993; Signorielli & Bacue, 1999; Tedesco, 1974)). However, because this 
dissertation compares newspaper to Twitter coverage, the latter, which does not rely on 
primary sources as journalists do, this study uses characters and not news sources as the 
unit of analysis.  
Where a news source is an individual or organization cited as providing the 
journalist with information, a character is any individual or organization who is central to 
the narrative and is mentioned in a news story or Tweet. News sources and characters are 
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not synonymous — a source, for example, a BP protester, who has the opportunity to 
speak to the reasons why he/she is protesting, has a greater agency to shape a narrative 
than a protester who might have his/her motives explained by someone else, for example 
the police. Nonetheless, if a character is deemed important enough to be mentioned at all, 
it reflects the fact that he/she is shaping the public discourse to some degree. 
Additionally, the use of sources and characters in the different media follow similar 
patterns — for example, women and racial minorities tend to be similarly marginalized as 
both news sources and characters in the various media (Brown, Bybee, Weardon, & 
Straughan, 1987; Freedman, Fico, & Durisin, 2010; Glasscock, 2003; Mastro & Stern, 
2003; Oliver, 1994; Signorielli & Bacue, 1999; Tedesco, 1974; Zeldes, Fico, & Arvind, 
2007). Thus, while the concepts are not perfectly synonymous with one another, in the 
context of theorizing how characters might be used in Twitter and newspaper coverage of 
the BP oil spill, one can think of characters and sources as being interchangeable.  
  In Smith’s (1993) study of newspaper journalists’ use of sources in coverage of 
the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill, he found that government and oil industry officials made up 
60% of sources quoted in these newspapers’ coverage (scientists, who ranked third, made 
up only 8.3%; environmentalists ranked fourth at 7.8%). Additionally, government and 
oil industry sources were the most likely to say that the crisis had been overblown, and 
rate Exxon’s response to the crisis favorably.  Those who have the most access to the 
media — government and industry officials — have the power to frame the news 
coverage in a manner favorable to their interests. 
 Entman and Rojecki (1993) found similar patterns in their study of national media 
coverage of the nuclear freeze movement, a grassroots effort to force U.S. nuclear 
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disarmament. Representatives of the movement were quoted in only 12% of the stories 
about the nuclear freeze movement; government officials were quoted in 88% of the 
stories. This marginalization of the protesters is significant because Entman and 
Rojecki’s data showed that two thirds of articles expressing concern over nuclear 
weapons attributed that concern to non-elite actors. Fewer than a third of articles quoting 
elite sources — including government officials and expert sources — expressed concern 
over nuclear weapons. This is a vivid illustration of the fact that those sources the media 
rely on most heavily are least likely to raise critical questions about potential 
environmental problems.  
Entman and Rojecki (1993) also found that protesters’ concerns were further 
marginalized in coverage of the movement’s protests. Coverage of these events focused 
not on the protesters’ substantive concerns but on the spectacle and logistics of the 
protests, such as assembling a crowd of 750,000 at a Central Park rally. When the 
protesters’ concerns were mentioned in the coverage, they were typically portrayed as 
being extreme and emotional as opposed to rational. Entman and Rojecki (1993) 
concluded that the media’s “freezing out” the nuclear protesters illustrates the media’s 
system-maintenance function, reducing “the pressure elites feel to act favorably on the 
proposal, providing political cover for a symbolic rather than concrete government 
response” (p. 155). 
 This system-maintenance function is particularly pronounced in media coverage 
of social protests, which frequently conform to a protest paradigm: the media focus on 
protests as spectacle, emphasize protesters’ criminal actions instead of their social 
criticisms, and focus on protesters’ conflicts with police instead of the protests’ intended 
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targets (McLeod & Detenber, 1999).  
Protesters, however, are not the only group routinely marginalized as news 
sources. Journalists rely on “expert” sources partially to buttress journalists’ claims of 
legitimacy, specifically claims that their work represents an “objective truth” (Steele, 
1995). Ironically, though, these experts are often called upon to offer opinions, rather 
than factual information. Thus, think tank pundits are favored over university experts, 
who might offer a more fact-based assessment of a situation.  
In her study of “expert” sources during the Gulf War, Steele (1995) found that 
fewer than 16% were independent university experts; 30% were from think tanks, and 
another 30% were former government or military officials. The last two groups together 
make up the Washington “power elite,” who were 60% of the total sources (p. 799). 
According to Steele (1995), journalists’ use of experts also becomes part of a reinforcing 
cycle: the more a given source is cited by the media as an “expert,” the more sought out 
that person is by other media for “expert” opinion.  
Thus, the media’s use of “expert” sources both reinforces and amplifies the 
existing power structure, marginalizing those groups that fall outside of it. These outsider 
groups also include other important groups of individuals, such as racial minorities and 
women (Brown, Bybee, Weardon, & Straughan, 1987; Freedman, Fico, & Durisin, 2010; 
Zeldes, Fico, & Arvind, 2007). However, the media’s sidelining of environmental groups 
(Kensicki, 2004), protesters (Entman & Rojecki, 1993; McLeod & Detenber, 1999), and 
independent experts (Steele, 1995) as news sources — or characters — is more 
immediately relevant to studying media coverage in the wake of the BP disaster. 
Stages of Crisis Coverage 
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 Thus far one might offer two hypotheses based on the journalistic routines 
described above: journalists will be more likely to frame the BP spill as an episodic 
event; and they will also favor “official” characters — including government and industry 
representatives — over environmental groups, university experts, and other independent 
characters most likely to raise critical questions following the spill. The spill, though, was 
not routine: it was a disaster – by definition, an unexpected event. As such, it is possible 
that such an event may — at least temporarily — dislodge routine coverage. 
 Graber (2009) suggested that there are three discernible stages of crisis coverage: 
Stage One, just before and immediately after a crisis has occurred, when chaos abounds 
and journalists scramble to collect the facts and authoritative analysis; Stage Two, when 
the dominant interpretation begins to emerge, the media attempt to correct any previous 
errors in their reporting, and they put the crisis into perspective; and Stage Three, during 
which the media put the crisis into even longer-term perspective and attempt to help the 
audience cope with the crisis’ aftermath.  
 Graber, who based her three-stage model of crisis reporting more on anecdotal 
observation than on empirical evidence, views the chaos in the first stage as a weakness 
of media coverage.  She portrays the media as reporting inaccurate information and 
rumors, in part because the media are desperate for sources in this chaotic phase, and in a 
break with their routine practice, often end up relying on what she calls “non-
authoritative” sources. 
 This first stage, however, before authorities begin to converge on a common 
interpretation of the crisis, may represent a positive opportunity for some groups that are 
typically marginalized in routine coverage to have their concerns heard. Tichenor et al. 
29 
 
(1980) suggest three phases of conflict (p. 110-113), the second two which roughly 
correspond to Graber’s stages of media coverage (Tichenor et al.’s (1980) first stage of 
crisis reporting occurs out of public view). In Tichenor et al.’s (1980) public phase (the 
second phase), which corresponds most closely with Graber’s first stage of disaster 
coverage, the conflict moves beyond basic definition. Diverse groups within the 
community recognize a problem and give it their own interpretations. According to 
Tichenor et al. (1980), it is during this stage that the conflict is most open to diverse, 
potentially competing interpretations.   
 Thus, while Graber (2009) saw this period of uncertainty negatively, Tichenor et 
al. (1980) framed it more positively in terms of it serving as a time of open democratic 
debate. That journalists rely on sources traditionally seen as less “authoritative” may 
indicate that media coverage during this stage accommodates more non-government, 
non-establishment perspectives that are part of an open (and sometimes messy) 
democratic debate.  
 Graber’s second and third stages, however, cover what Tichenor et al. (1980) term 
the “legitimization” phase, when “incumbents label the issue, or some aspect of it, as 
worthy in terms of basic norms and values of the community” (p. 112). Thus, while it is 
difficult to pinpoint where one stage ends and the next begins, it is expected that 
following the Deep Water Horizon explosion, there will be an initial period of coverage 
marked by inclusion of more independent sources and critical frames, before the relative 
proportion of these frames drops off markedly, in correspondence to a single, or perhaps 
a series, of “legitimizing” events that narrow what is accepted as a legitimate 
interpretation of the crisis. 
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Structural Pluralism 
While newspapers share some standardized routines, Tichenor et al. (1980) 
argued that they are also responsive to the particular local community structure in which 
they are embedded. According to Tichenor et al. (1980)  
Social environments of people are determined by the nature of the communities in 
which they live, work, and interact with others. Work opportunities, commercial 
centers, leisure time facilities, and public services may differ sharply according to 
the size of the community, its location, and the way that it is structured. It follows 
that the availability of information about the public life of the community may 
vary according to the same characteristics. (p. 16)  
Tichenor et al. (1980) theorized specifically that the amount of coverage local 
media give issues involving conflict varies according to a community’s degree of 
structural pluralism. They found strong support for their thesis in a study of seven 
environmental conflicts in Minnesota: newspapers in less-pluralistic communities 
reported almost exclusively on conflicts involving actors from outside the community, 
whereas newspapers in more pluralistic communities gave more coverage to stories about 
both conflicts involving insiders and outsiders. Subsequent studies have demonstrated 
that the effects of structural pluralism extend not only to the amount of coverage media 
give to issues involving conflict, but the sources and dominant frames media use in their 
coverage of conflicts, including environmental conflicts (Griffin & Dunwoody, 1995; 
1997; Hindman, Littlefield, Preston, & Neumann, 1999; McCluskey, Stein, Boyle, & 
McCleod, 2009). 
In their original study, Tichenor et al. (1980) ranked the 19 Minnesota 
communities they studied based on five measures of structural pluralism: population, 
number of businesses in a community, number of voluntary groups, number of churches, 
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and number of schools and education centers. The last four measures were collected from 
local telephone books.  
In a second study comparing coverage in 1965 and 1979 in 83 Minnesota 
newspapers, Donohue, Olien, and Tichenor (1985) replaced data from the telephone book 
previously used to operationalize structural pluralism with U.S. Census Bureau data, 
which would become the most common method of measuring structural pluralism in 
subsequent studies. Donohue et al.’s (1985) census measures of structural pluralism 
included a community’s population, per capita income, percent of proprietors’ income 
from manufacturing, and percent of proprietors’ income from farming. They found that 
newspapers in more pluralistic communities contained more coverage of conflict 
involving the local government, as well as general issues involving conflict. They also 
found, however, that the effects of structural pluralism declined as the communities grew 
in size and their workforces became more specialized (i.e., moving from farming to 
manufacturing).  
Since Tichenor et al.’s (1980) study, which popularized this research approach, 
the structural pluralism literature has expanded significantly to explore other aspects of 
newspaper coverage. There has been little focus, however, on applying that framework to 
studies of other media or attributes of those media. Demers’ (1994a; 1994b) work is one 
of the exceptions. He studied the relationship between total national advertising 
expenditures and changes in structural pluralism from 1850 to 1990. His time-series 
analysis showed that during that period, a 1% change in structural pluralism — which he 
measured as an additive index of standardized measures including total population, 
number of individuals employed in non-agricultural jobs, and the number of cities with 
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populations over 100,000 people — produced a 25% increase in advertising expenditures 
(Demers, 1994a). Demers (1994b) also showed that the growth in structural pluralism 
from 1900 to 1994 — this time operationalized as an additive index of measures from 
U.S. Census data including population, number of urban areas with populations greater 
than 100,000, total number of people in the workforce, and total number of businesses  —  
also predicts growth in overall media competition and growth of corporate-owned 
newspapers; that is, as structural pluralism increases, organizational complexity also 
increases.  
Watson and Riffe (2011) applied a structural pluralism framework to a study of 
online media. They tested whether structural pluralism could predict the presence of 
public affairs blogs in U.S. cities with populations between 100,000 and 400,000. They 
found that structural pluralism performed poorly in predicting the presence of these 
blogs, but the presence of these blogs was related to local community structure. Blogs 
were more likely in communities with higher amounts of crime, poverty, and physical 
decay (namely aging homes), which were part of a competing “community stress” model. 
They suggest that these blogs may be an important outlet for residents to write about and 
cope with community problems. 
Though Watson and Riffe (2011) examined the presence of blogs, not their 
content, their study illustrates two important points about community structure’s effect on 
local media: Tichenor et al.’s (1980) general thesis that information about local public 
life should vary according to local community structure also applies to aspects of 
community structure other than pluralism and also to local online information. This last 
point is particularly important because it challenges claims that, based on the global 
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nature of the Internet, it “overrides geography” (Reese, Rutigliano, Hyun, & Jeong, 
2007). To the contrary, Watson and Riffe’s (2011) data suggest that local community 
structure is an important factor in shaping the availability of local online information 
about public life.  
The majority of the literature on the effect of community structure on mass 
communication, however, has examined its effects on newspaper coverage. There are two 
consistent findings relevant to the exploration of sources and frames used in coverage of 
the BP disaster: newspapers in more pluralistic communities are more likely to cite 
sources outside of traditional power establishments (Armstrong, 2002, 2006; Hindman, 
Littlefield, Preston, & Neumann, 1999; McCluskey, Stein, Boyle, & McLeod, 2009); and 
they are more likely to use frames critical of industry when covering local environmental 
contamination (Griffin Dunwoody, 1995; Griffin and Dunwoody, 1997; Griffin, 
Dunwoody & Gehrmann, 1995; Rossow & Dunwoody, 1991). 
Structural pluralism and sources.  Hindman et al. (1999) studied the effect of 
structural pluralism on the frequency with which Midwestern community newspaper 
editors listed ethnic minorities, among those categories of sources typically marginalized 
by the media (Freedman et al., 2010; Zeldes et al., 2007), either among their lists of local 
influential people or important news sources. Hindman et al. (1999) measured structural 
pluralism as an additive index of standardized measures of city and county population, 
number of residents with a college degree or higher education, county per capita income, 
and the percentage of workers in non-agricultural, forestry, or fishing occupations. These 
measures closely followed those used by Tichenor et al. (1985).  
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Hindman et al. (1999) found that structural pluralism was positively, albeit 
weakly, associated with editors listing ethnic minorities among the paper’s important 
sources. Structural pluralism was not significantly associated with listing ethnic 
minorities among influentials in the community. 
Hindman et al. (1999) also included a measure of what they termed “ethnic 
pluralism,” operationalized as the percentage of the community that was classified in the 
1990 U.S. Census as Black, American Indian/Eskimo/Aleutian Islander, Asian/Pacific 
Islander, Other, and Whites of Latino/Hispanic heritage. Notably, Hindman et al. (1999) 
fault scholars for not including ethnic pluralism in previous operationalizations of 
structural pluralism. However, their criticism fails to consider that measures of structural 
pluralism have a particular historic and geographic context. Tichenor et al.’s (1980) study 
was conducted in Minnesota, which according to the U.S. Census, was 96.6% white in 
1980 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1980). It would have made little sense for Tichenor et al. 
(1980) to include ethnic pluralism as a measure of overall structural pluralism in their 
study.  
Similarly, it makes little sense for contemporary studies to replicate all of 
Tichenor et al.’s (1980) original measures, including the percentage of the workforce 
employed in farming, as McCluskey et al. (2009) did. Tichenor et al.’s (1980) study 
collected data from 1965 to 1979. According to the 1960 U.S. Census, 14.5% of 
Minnesota’s population had agricultural occupations, though that percentage was quickly 
declining (U.S. Census Bureau, 1960; 1970). In 2009, .7% of Minnesota’s population had 
agricultural occupations (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010); in 2009, 1% of workers had 
agricultural occupations in Wisconsin, where McCluskey et al. (2009) conducted their 
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study. Thus, it made little sense for McCluskey et al. (2009) to include the percentage of 
the workforce employed in farming as a current measure of structural pluralism. 
Ethnic pluralism, however, is an important measure of contemporary structural 
pluralism in most U.S. communities. In their study, Hindman et al. (1999) found that 
ethnic pluralism was a significant predictor of whether newspaper editors listed ethnic 
minorities among the papers’ important sources and among influential individuals in the 
community. Armstrong (2002) also found, in a study of women sources in 18 American 
newspapers, that structural and ethnic pluralism were positively correlated with the use of 
female sources in news coverage. 
These findings also extend to newspapers’ coverage of another neglected category 
of sources: social protesters. McCluskey et al. (2009) examined the effects of structural 
pluralism on use of the protest paradigm in Wisconsin newspapers’ coverage of social 
protests. They hypothesized that the protest paradigm would be particularly pronounced 
in more homogeneous communities. McCluskey et al. (2009) examined four decades of 
coverage of protests in Wisconsin related to the civil rights movement and anti-Vietnam 
War protests in the 1960s, the women’s movement in the 1970s, anti-Apartheid protests 
in the 1980s, and the free trade and anti-globalization movements of the 1990s. Four 
Wisconsin newspapers were ranked based on city population, county population, county 
per-capita income, labor force not in agriculture, and distance from a major metropolitan 
area.  Consistent with their hypotheses, the researchers found a significant difference 
between the newspapers’ coverage of social protests: newspapers in more pluralistic 
communities were both significantly more likely to cite protesters as sources compared to 
newspapers in less pluralistic communities, and the tone of their articles about social 
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protests were significantly more positive, particularly when the target of the protests was 
the local government.  
Structural pluralism and coverage of the environment. In addition to affecting 
the tone of a story, structural pluralism has also been shown to influence how news 
coverage is framed. Dunwoody and colleagues conducted a series of studies that 
examined the effects of structural pluralism on framing of environmental contamination 
(Griffin & Dunwoody, 1995; Griffin & Dunwoody, 1997; Griffin, Dunwoody, & 
Gehrmann, 1995; Rossow & Dunwoody, 1991). For example, Griffin and Dunwoody 
(1997) examined the effects of structural pluralism on how 19 newspapers, primarily in 
Wisconsin, framed news coverage about environmental contaminants known to cause 
human health risks. Coverage was analyzed for whether it contained a science frame —
 that is, the coverage focused on scientific evidence and evaluation of contaminants  —  
or a government linkage — focusing primarily on government response to contaminants. 
They also analyzed whether contaminants were linked to threats to human health (i.e., 
contained a “health linkage”). Griffin and Dunwoody (1997) operationalized structural 
pluralism as an additive index of a community’s population, proportion of the school 
children in grades kindergarten through grade 12 who are racial minorities or attend 
private schools, the number of religious denominations, and the number of voluntary 
service organizations.  
Griffin and Dunwoody (1997) found that, in general, newspapers were more 
likely to use government than scientific frames, which one might expect based on 
journalists’ reliance on government sources (Steele, 1995). But newspapers in more 
pluralistic communities were more likely to use science frames and link contaminants to 
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risks to human health, particularly when the source of the environmental contamination 
was a local industry, than were newspapers in less pluralistic communities. 
 These findings largely confirmed those of an earlier study (Griffin, Dunwoody, & 
Gehrmann, 1995), which used identical measures of structural pluralism and found that 
newspapers in more pluralistic communities are also more likely to use thematic frames 
in coverage of environmental risk. Rossow and Dunwoody (1991) found that newspapers 
in more pluralistic communities were more likely to include “enabling information” in 
their coverage, telling residents how they could publicly voice their concerns about the 
controversy surrounding the siting of a nuclear waste facility. 
Economic Reliance on Industry  
Griffin and Dunwoody (1995), however, found that a local community’s 
economic reliance on manufacturing was stronger than structural pluralism as a predictor 
of how 373 U.S. newspapers covered a report on toxic releases from local industry. 
Structural pluralism measures were identical to those used in Griffin and Dunwoody 
(1997). Reliance on manufacturing was measured as the percentage of residents within a 
community employed in manufacturing, based on U.S. Census Bureau data.  
Griffin and Dunwoody (1995) analyzed in the coverage how likely a newspaper 
was to use a “risk headline,” a headline that signaled a possible threat to health (e.g., by 
using the word “toxic”). Newspapers in more pluralistic communities were more likely to 
use a risk headline than newspapers in less pluralistic communities. However, even those 
newspapers in more pluralistic communities were less likely to use a risk headline if the 
community was more reliant on manufacturing for its economic base. They concluded 
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that, even in more pluralistic communities, the press’ willingness to raise controversy is 
tempered by economic sensitivities (p. 281). 
How Structural Pluralism Affects the News 
 The question not addressed in previous studies of structural pluralism is how these 
community-level effects enter the news gathering process: is it through a top-down, 
coercive force (i.e., a newspaper publisher reinforcing elite interests), a bottom-up 
process (i.e., routine interactions with local sources socialize journalists into the dominant 
social structures of the communities they cover), or some combination of both 
simultaneously? This dissertation tests a model that proposes a bottom-up process, by 
which community-level variables shape journalists’ attitudes toward the BP oil spill, 
which in turn shape journalists’ coverage. One might term this a “social structure bias” 
model; that is, journalists’ work is shaped by their personal biases that are shaped by and 
reinforced by the dominant social structure of the community where they work (i.e., 
journalists in communities that are more economically dependent on the oil industry will 
hold more positive attitudes toward the oil industry, which causes them to write more 
positive stories about the BP oil spill). 
Community structure, however, is not the only possible explanation linking 
journalists’ attitudes and the content they produce. Based on existing literature, it is more 
plausible to suggest that journalists’ political and environmental ideologies influence the 
types of stories that they write. Thus, the effects of journalists’ political attitudes on their 
coverage will be simultaneously modeled in the test of how community structure 
variables enter the news gathering process.  
Journalists’ Political Ideologies & Bias 
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According to social psychologists, ideologies “describe or interpret the world as it 
is — by making assertions or assumptions about human nature, historical events, present 
realities, and future possibilities — and envision the world as it should be, specifying 
acceptable means of attaining social, economic, and political ideals” (Jost, Federico, & 
Napier
 
, 2009).  This dissertation examines two types of ideology, political ideology and 
environmental ideology, which are correlated yet distinct from one another. Generally, 
though, according to Jost et al.’s (2009) review of previous studies of political ideology, 
liberals are more likely to seek new experiences, tolerate ambiguity, prefer progress and 
equality, and have more pro-environmental beliefs, whereas conservatives favor 
dogmatism, order, and structure, even if it means accepting inequality for the sake of 
stability, and tend to prioritize economic growth, property rights, etc., over environmental 
concerns (Jost et al., 2009).  
To give some indication of the partisanship reflected in attitudes toward the 
environment, in a nation-wide, post-oil spill survey, the Pew Research Center for the 
People & The Press (2010) found that 56% of Democrats opposed increasing off-shore 
oil drilling (38% favored), while 74% of Republicans favored expanding off-shore oil 
drilling (22% opposed). 
Typically, journalists’ political ideologies skew left of center (Weaver, Beam, 
Brownlee, Voakes, & Wilhoit, 2007), from which is often inferred a liberal media bias 
(Entman, 2007). Empirical evidence of a liberal media bias, however, is mixed. In a 
quasi-experimental design, Patterson and Donsbach (1996) found that in a hypothetical 
decision-making task, which presented journalists with different options as to how to 
present a conflict between environmental regulators and the chemical industry over new 
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regulations to curb pollution, there was a correlation between journalists’ political 
ideology and news decisions in 68% of the cases.  
In a meta-analysis of content analyses of actual news content, however, D’Alessio 
and Allen (2000) concluded that there is not a consistent pattern of political bias in 
overall coverage in newspapers, television, and news magazines (they found a small 
liberal bias in television campaign coverage). None of the studies that D’Alessio and 
Allen studied, however, matched individual journalists’ beliefs with data about the 
coverage those journalists produced. Thus, it is possible that individual bias does affect 
journalists’ work, but at the aggregate level liberal journalists simply cancel out 
conservative journalists. 
Hence this dissertation will match individual journalists’ responses to a survey 
about their political and environmental beliefs to a content analysis of the stories they 
wrote, to examine the extent to which journalists represent “supernatural observers,” who 
can coolly separate facts from values (as Schudson (2001) defines the “objective 
reporter”). Or conversely, this study may provide evidence of the extent to which 
journalists’ opinions about an issue they cover — the Gulf oil spill — mirrors the 
American public’s partisan attitudes.  
While it was previously proposed that journalists’ attitudes reflect a social 
structural bias, it is more realistic that just as journalists are not completely independent, 
they are not completely captive to the community structure in which they are embedded, 
either. Thus, if there is evidence of journalistic bias, it is likely to reflect both social 
structural and individual ideological (both political and environmental) biases, which 
may even conflict with one another (e.g., a liberal, pro-environmental journalist, whose 
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anti-BP attitudes and coverage is tempered by a recognition of his/her community’s – and 
newspaper’s – economic reliance on the industry). 
The Internet as a Counter Public 
 There has been little research into the relationship of “new” media to the social, 
economic, and political forces described above (Watson & Riffe, 2011), so there is little 
empirical evidence on which to base hypotheses about the effect of community structure 
on Tweets about the oil spill. Previous scholars have, however, suggested that the Internet 
has the broad potential to be a counter public, with the capacity to challenge those social 
forces describe above, which limit debate in mainstream media coverage (Downey & 
Fenton, 2003; Dahlberg, 2001; Dahlgren, 2005).  
If the media are to live up to the deliberative democratic ideals of the public 
sphere, the media, according to Curran (1991), should ideally represent all significant 
social interests, and should encourage broad, unfettered public debate and participation in 
shaping public policy. The media — at least the mainstream commercial media — have, 
however, been broadly critiqued for falling short of these ideals. Critics of the mass 
media claim that commercialization has limited the range of voices represented; 
corporate interests have affected the range of ideologies debated; and media trivialization 
and sensationalism of public issues has undermined deliberative participation (Dahlgren, 
2001). The structural pluralism literature reviewed above illustrates more specifically 
how the media fall short of serving as a forum for unfettered debate. Rather, it suggests 
that coverage of important issues, including the BP oil spill, is likely to be limited by the 
potential distribution of social power and the economic interests of the community in 
which it is embedded (Tichenor et al., 1980; Griffin & Dunwoody, 1995, 1997).  
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While Habermas (1962/1989) argued for a single public sphere so that the 
deliberative public could reach consensus on public issues, Fraser (1990) argued instead 
that   promoting “counter publics” is the best way to ensure inclusive, democratic debate 
given the structural limitations of discourse within the dominant public. Based on 
Warner’s (2002) text-based approach to understanding publics, Twitter could be 
considered a separate public simply as a function of adhering to a very different style of 
discourse. Twitter and newspapers also have demographically distinct audiences 
(Edmonds, Guskin, & Rosenstiel, 2011; Smith, 2011). The existence of a counter public, 
however, does not just imply a distinct public, but one that represents a different 
worldview, which challenges the monopolizing social, political, and economic forces that 
limit the range of discourse in a dominant public (Fraser, 1990; Warner, 2002). 
According to both Fraser (1990) and Warner (2002), a counter public is also not 
an enclave, but rather its goal is to participate in a wider public dialogue. But what has 
befallen many alternative media conceived of as filling the role of a counter public in the 
past is that they have been enclaved, albeit involuntarily. Alternative media are defined as 
having alternative content, content which challenges dominant power structures and 
social norms, and content which is shaped by different production forces — less 
hierarchical, more participatory, and less commercial (Atkinson, 2010; Atton, 2002). 
However, precisely because they have less commercial support to support their 
production and circulation, alternative media have traditionally had a very marginal 
existence within the larger political discourse.  
The Internet, however, has been touted for having the potential to revolutionize 
alternative media. Anyone can cheaply set-up a website instantly available to millions of 
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people, erasing the financial pressures on alternative media and far exceeding the 
potential audience of any home-produced newsletter. As Downey and Fenton (2003) 
wrote, the Internet affords counter-publics the potential of reaching beyond the “radical 
ghetto” to affect mainstream political decision making (p. 199). 
Others contend, however, that the realities of the Internet have fallen far short of 
these radical potentials and that alternative voices have been enclaved, even online 
(Dahlgren & Sparks, 2001; Dahlberg, 2005). Dahlberg (2005) wrote about the “corporate 
colonization” of the Internet. He highlighted data that show that despite the diversity of 
content from non-commercial sites, American Internet users spend the vast majority of 
their time on mainstream commercial websites. He also pointed to a study by the Pew 
Internet and American Life Project, which found that among those who used the Internet 
to access information about the Iraq War, only 17% felt the news and point of views they 
received online were any different from what they got from mainstream newspaper and 
television coverage (Fox, Rainie, & Fallows, 2003). Dahlberg (2005) concluded that, 
“This situation goes against the vision of the Internet operating as an alternative medium 
to the mass media, as a space where positions and critique excluded offline are 
foregrounded” (p. 172). 
So there are two visions of the Internet: one that is inclusive and radical, and one 
that is “colonized” by mainstream corporate interests. Which one is “correct?” The 
Internet is large and diverse enough that they perhaps both are. As Dahlgren and Sparks 
(2001) wrote, “One can certainly find on the Internet information and opinions that 
transgress the limits of the bourgeois public sphere. One can certainly see in the 
electronic activities of political and social groups the dim outlines of a new agora. But 
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these are the minority usages at present” (p. 92). Thus, while acknowledging that they are 
not representative of Twitter as a whole, this dissertation focuses on those users with the 
greatest number of followers, who are most likely to act as opinion leaders of and 
dominate the public discourse on Twitter.  
Twitter, which allows users to post 140-character status updates, has been 
credited with playing a role in toppling Tunisia’s dictatorship (Zuckerman, 2011), and the 
analysis of sentiment expressed by users of Twitter has been shown to be able to predict 
election outcomes (Tumasjan, Sprenger, Sandner, & Welpe, 2010), daily fluctuations in 
the stock market (Bollen, Mao, & Zeng, 2011), and even movie box office sales (Asur 
and Huberman, 2010), perhaps preciously because of the opinion-leader role Twitter’s 
most dominant users play. But there have not been studies comparing how Twitter 
conversations differ from mainstream news coverage of these topics or other important 
social issues.  
As of September, 2011, Twitter boasted having more than 100 million active 
users (Hachman, 2011). Yet Wu, Hofman, Mason, and Watts (2011) analyzed a total of 5 
billion Tweets gathered between July 28, 2009, and March 8, 2010, and found that more 
than half of Tweets consumed by other Twitter users are produced by just 20,000 “elite” 
users. These elite users are a relatively small number of celebrities, such as Ashton 
Kusher, Lady Gaga, and Oprah; media, such as CNN, the New York Times, Time 
magazine; popular – some might even say mainstream – bloggers, such as authors of the 
popular tech blog Mashable.com; and large corporations, such as Google and Starbucks. 
Interestingly, two international corporations – Asahi, a leading Japanese newspaper, and 
KT (Korean Telecom) — are also among the most-followed elite Twitter users, which 
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perhaps suggests a slight broadening of the public discourse, though one cannot tell from 
Wu et al.’s (2011) data if followers of these companies cross geographic boundaries, or if 
there exists different “Twitterverses” in the U.S., Japan, and Korea.  
Wu et al. (2011) concluded that “while attention that was formally restricted to 
mass media channels is now shared amongst other ‘elites,’ information flows have not 
become egalitarian by any means” (p. 6). Thus, instead of searching Twitter broadly for 
mention of the BP oil spill, this study will examine Tweets authored by the most-
followed users in cities that correspond with newspaper communities that are also part of 
this research. Journalists’ coverage and Tweets about the spill within the affected areas 
will be compared to examine if Twitter represents a potential counter public, or if it 
presents similar viewpoints that are shaped by the same social, economic, and political 
forces and mainstream news coverage. 
CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESES & RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This dissertation explores the extent to which the media – traditional and 
alternative – fulfilled their surveillance function in the wake of the 2010 BP oil spill 
disaster by raising critical questions about industry responsibility, government oversight, 
and future energy and environmental policies. More specifically, the study examines 
primarily what effect community-level variables, including structural pluralism and 
economic reliance on the oil industry, have in determining the extent to which either 
newspaper journalists or Twitter users in the Gulf Coast states raised critical questions in 
the aftermath of the Deep Water Horizon explosion.  
Because of the lack of literature exploring the effects of these community-level 
variables on social media, Twitter in particular, this dissertation first sets up a series of 
hypotheses and research questions about mainstream media coverage. These findings are 
then used to answer the primary research question guiding the comparison of traditional 
and social media coverage of the BP oil spill: does Twitter represent a counter public? Or 
do Tweets about the spill follow similar patterns as mainstream news coverage, including 
being shaped by the same social, economic, and political forces that limit discussion of 
critical issues in the mainstream media?  
Professional journalism, however, tends to follow certain standardized patterns 
from one newsroom to the next (Schudson, 2003; Tuchman, 1973/1997). Thus, before 
testing for local variation in coverage of the BP oil spill, the dissertation first explores the 
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general patterns of how the media assign responsibility for the disaster, how they frame 
the disaster, and the characters that drive their narratives. Again, while content analyses 
of news coverage primarily analyze news sources, this study uses the more general 
concept of “characters” in order to make a valid comparison with Tweets, which do not 
rely on primary sources in a similar fashion as news media do. 
Kensicki’s (2004) study of newspaper coverage of pollution found that while 
industry was primarily framed as the culprit that caused the problem, government was 
overwhelmingly framed as having responsibility for cleaning up the oil spill. Thus, it is 
expected that in the aftermath of the BP oil spill, journalists’ stories about the disaster 
will focus more on the government’s response to the disaster than on BP’s role in the 
crisis. Thus: 
H1: Newspaper coverage after the BP oil spill will focus more on the 
government’s, rather than BP’s, role in the oil spill disaster. 
Beyond assigning responsibility for the spill, according to Kensicki’s (2004) 
article, journalists’ coverage also plays an important role in identifying the causes and 
effects associated with a particular problem. Thus, this study probes what social, 
environmental, economic issues, etc., journalists link to the BP oil spill. 
R1: Beyond the spill itself, what larger environmental, policy, and economic 
issues were raised in newspaper coverage of the BP oil spill?  
How journalists frame the BP oil spill is also likely to determine whether 
coverage results in the public critically examining systematic shortcomings underlying 
the BP oil spill. Castelló (2010) found that though the Spanish oil refining industry had 
suffered several high-profile chemical accidents and lapses in safety protocols, journalists 
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there were much more likely to focus on the industry’s positive impacts on the local 
economy, rather than the industry’s negative impacts on the local environment and 
residents’ health. While Castelló’s (2010) study is based on data from Spain, one would 
expect similar patterns given the system-maintenance function the domestic press fulfill 
(Tichenor et al., 1980). Given the shortage of positive news in the immediate aftermath of 
the BP oil spill, it would be unreasonable to expect the majority of journalists’ coverage 
of the BP oil spill to be framed positively. Nonetheless, one might expect journalists to be 
more hesitant to focus on negative news related to the oil spill than the facts of the crisis 
might otherwise dictate. Thus, this study explores what proportion of journalists’ 
coverage was framed negatively, defined as focusing on negative outcomes related to the 
oil spill. 
 R2: To what extent was newspaper coverage of the BP oil spill framed 
negatively?  
It is not enough, however, that journalists simply cover negative outcomes of the 
oil spill. If journalists are to fulfill their surveillance function, the negative outcomes of 
the oil spill should also be treated as symptoms of larger systemic problems, rather than 
as isolated problems. According to Iyengar (1990; 1991; 1996), thematic frames are more 
likely result in readers assigning responsibility for a problem to systematic, societal 
problems, rather than to individual actors. However, based on Iyengar’s work that 
examined television framing of social issues, as well as Kensicki’s (2004) work exploring 
newspaper framing of social issues, including environmental pollution, it is hypothesized 
that newspapers will use more episodic frames than thematic frames.  
H2: Episodic frames will be more frequent than thematic frames in newspaper 
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coverage of the BP oil spill.  
Exploring which characters journalists featured most frequently in their coverage 
of the spill is also important because these “primary definers” play a role in determining 
which frames the media will use to frame an issue (MacKendrick, 2010).  
According to Entman and Rojecki’s (1993) study of the anti-nuclear weapons 
movement, non-governmental, non-expert sources are the most likely to raise critical 
questions about potential environmental/health consequences in newspaper coverage, but 
these are also the sources most likely to be marginalized as sources in press coverage 
(McCluskey, 2009; McLeod & Detenber, 1999; Steele, 1995). Journalists instead are 
more likely to rely on “official” sources, including government and industry 
representatives (Steele, 1995). Because the use of sources and characters across different 
media typically follows similar patterns (Brown, Bybee, Weardon, & Straughan, 1987; 
Freedman, Fico, & Durisin, 2010; Glasscock, 2003; Mastro & Stern, 2003; Oliver, 1994; 
Signorielli & Bacue, 1999; Tedesco, 1974; Zeldes, Fico, & Arvind, 2007), and based on 
these previous studies of news sources, it is hypothesized that journalists will also be 
more likely to rely on “official” characters than on “non-official” characters, such as 
independent scientists, environmental advocates, Gulf fishermen, etc. 
H3:  “Official” characters will be more prominent than “unofficial” characters in 
newspaper coverage of the BP oil spill. 
It is possible, however, that there are different stages of crisis coverage that affect 
the frequency with which the media rely on unofficial characters. Graber (2009) 
suggested that in the initial stage of crisis coverage the media scramble for sources and 
often quote less authoritative sources. She viewed this period as a low point for accuracy 
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in reporting, but Tichenor et al. (1980) framed the initial phase of crisis coverage more 
positively, suggesting that it is a period of freer and more open debate. Graber (2009) and 
Tichenor et al. (1980) agree, though, that this initial period of uncertainty and competing 
interpretations of the crisis is followed by a “conflict definition” phase, when those in 
power begin to converge on an official interpretation of the crisis, narrowing those 
perspectives that are viewed as being legitimate. Thus, this study seeks to identify 
discernible stages of crisis coverage, marked by an initial stage in which unofficial 
characters and critical frames are used more freely, followed by a “legitimization” phase, 
which narrows the interpretation of the crisis and the variety of characters and frames 
used. 
R3: Are there discernible stages of coverage of the BP disaster, the first marked 
by frequent use of non-official characters and critical frames, followed by a narrowing of 
those perspectives seen as being legitimate and those characters and frames used?   
These hypotheses and research questions are guided by assumptions and 
observations about standard practices across newsrooms regardless of local or community 
character. Based on these journalistic routines, it is expected that these community-level 
effects will be relatively modest. However, though Donohue et al. (1985) found that the 
effects of structural pluralism declined as society has generally become more pluralistic, 
other studies still find significant variation in media content based on local community 
structure (Griffin & Dunwoody, 1995, 1997; McCluskey et al., 2009; Watson, in press). 
More specifically, Griffin and Dunwoody (1997) found that coverage of environmental 
contamination is more likely to be linked to industry and be more critical of industry in 
communities with a greater number of potential sources of organized social influence 
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(i.e., greater levels of structural pluralism). Thus, it is hypothesized that coverage of the 
BP oil spill will also differ based on a community’s degree of structural pluralism. 
While the following hypotheses and research questions could be presented as 
more general statements of community structure’s effects on coverage, they will be 
answered empirically using a path model (see Figure 1 for an illustration of the model). 
Thus, they are expressed here in terms of individual hypothesized paths. Common 
numerical subscripts, however, indicate sub-hypotheses that could be grouped into more 
general statements. 
 H4a: The degree of structural pluralism in the community where a newspaper is 
based will positively predict whether journalists focus on BP’s role in the disaster.  
H4b: The degree of structural pluralism in the community where a newspaper is 
based will positively predict journalists’ use of thematic frames. 
H4c: The degree of structural pluralism in the community where a newspaper is 
based will positively predict the negative tone of journalists’ stories about the BP oil 
spill.  
H4d: The degree of structural pluralism in the community where a newspaper is 
based will positively predict journalists’ use of unofficial characters.  
In addition to examining whether community structure affects the frequency with 
which journalists link their coverage to BP, this study also examines if structural 
pluralism affects whether journalists assign responsibility for responding to the oil spill to 
government, by focusing their coverage on the government’s role in the crisis. 
R4: Will the degree of structural pluralism in the community where a newspaper 
is based affect the frequency with which journalists focus their coverage of the oil spill 
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on the government’s role in the crisis?  
While Griffin and Dunwoody (1997) attributed differences in local reporting 
primarily to differences in communities’ degrees of structural pluralism, Griffin and 
Dunwoody (1995) found that a community’s reliance on manufacturing for employment 
was a stronger predictor of newspapers’ coverage of local environmental contamination 
from that industry. They found that even in more pluralistic communities, newspapers in 
communities that relied on manufacturing for a greater percentage of local employment 
were less likely to link local environmental contamination to local industry and frame 
that coverage critically. Thus, it is hypothesized that newspaper coverage in communities 
that rely on the oil industry more heavily for local employment will be less likely to link 
the crisis to BP and to frame coverage critically. Critical coverage is defined as focusing 
on negative outcomes of the oil spill; using thematic frames, which are more likely to 
result in the responsibility for negative outcomes being assigned to systematic 
shortcomings, rather than isolated problems; and using a greater number of unofficial 
characters, who are more likely to be critical of the oil industry.  
H5a: The degree to which the community where a newspaper is based relies on the 
oil industry for its economic base will negatively predict whether journalists focus their 
coverage of the oil spill on BP’s role in the disaster.  
H5b: The degree to which the community where a newspaper is based relies on 
the oil industry for its economic base will negatively predict journalists’ use of thematic 
frames.  
H5c: The degree to which the community where a newspaper is based relies on the 
oil industry for its economic base will negatively predict the tone of journalists’ stories 
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about the BP oil spill.  
H5d: The degree to which the community where a newspaper is based relies on 
the oil industry for its economic base will negatively predict journalists’ use of unofficial 
characters.  
In addition to examining whether communities’ economic reliance on the oil 
industry affects the frequency with which journalists link their coverage to BP, this study 
also probes whether economic reliance on the oil industry affects whether journalists 
assign responsibility for responding to the oil spill to government, focusing their 
coverage on the government’s role in the crisis. 
R5: Will the degree to which the community where a newspaper is based relies on 
the oil industry for its economic base affect the frequency with which journalists focus 
their coverage of the oil spill on the government’s role in the crisis? 
Additionally, though previous scholars have not tested it, this dissertation tests the 
hypothesis that community-level variables enter the news process by shaping the attitudes 
of individual journalists and in turn shaping the stories these journalists write. Thus, it is 
hypothesized that journalists’ positive attitudes toward the oil industry will be negatively 
related to the degree of structural pluralism in a community and positively related to a 
community’s degree of economic reliance on the oil industry. It is also hypothesized that 
journalists’ attitudes toward the oil industry will be positively related to their positive 
coverage of the BP oil industry (i.e., fewer thematic stories, fewer negative stories, and 
less use of unofficial characters). That is, in addition to having direct effects on coverage, 
structural pluralism and economic reliance on the oil industry will have indirect effects 
on coverage by shaping journalists’ attitudes, which in turn shape the stories they write, 
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reflecting what could be termed as “structural bias” in journalists’ work. 
Community structure, however, is not wholly responsible for journalists’ attitudes 
toward the oil industry. Based on previous studies of potential bias in journalists’ work 
(Patterson & Donsbach, 1996; D’Alessio & Allen, 2000), and the highly partisan 
assessments of the BP oil spill within the general American population (Pew Research 
Center for the People & The Press, 2010), it is hypothesized that journalists’ political and 
environmental ideologies will also shape their attitudes toward the oil industry, and in 
turn shape the stories they write.  
H6a: The degree of structural pluralism in the community where a newspaper is 
based will negatively predict journalists’ positive attitudes toward the oil industry; 
journalists in more pluralistic communities will be more critical of the oil industry.  
H6b: The degree to which the community where a newspaper is based relies on 
the oil industry for its economic base will positively predict journalists’ positive attitudes 
toward the oil industry; journalists in communities that are more economically dependent 
on oil drilling will hold more positive attitudes toward the industry. 
H7: Journalists’ political conservatism will positively predict their attitudes 
toward the oil industry: more conservative reporters will have more favorable attitudes 
toward the oil industry. 
 H8: Journalists’ environmental ideologies will negatively predict journalists’ 
attitudes toward the oil industry: most pro-environmental reporters will be more critical 
toward the oil industry.  
H9a: Journalists’ positive attitudes toward the oil industry will negatively predict 
whether journalists focus their coverage of the oil spill on BP’s role in the disaster. 
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H9b: Journalists’ attitudes toward the oil industry will negatively predict 
journalists’ use of thematic frames. 
H9c: Journalists’ attitudes toward the oil industry will negatively predict the tone 
of journalists’ stories about the BP oil spill. 
H8d: Journalists’ attitudes toward the oil industry will negatively predict 
journalists’ use of unofficial characters. 
R6: Will journalists’ attitudes toward the oil industry affect the frequency with 
which journalists focus their coverage of the oil spill on the government’s role in the 
crisis? 
H10: The indirect effects — via journalists’ positive attitudes toward the oil 
industry — of community structure on journalists’ coverage of the BP oil spill will be 
stronger than community structure’s direct effects. 
Lastly, the dissertation poses a series of research question to determine if Twitter 
can be considered a “counter public” in the context of the BP oil spill, or if Twitter 
reflects similar viewpoints and is shaped by similar social, economic, and political forces, 
as mainstream journalism coverage.  
R7: Is there a significant difference between Twitter users’ and journalists’ 
attitudes toward the oil spill? 
R8: Are there significant differences between Twitter users’ and journalists’ 
coverage of the oil spill? 
R9: Are there significant differences in the social, economic, and political factors 
that shape Twitter users’ and journalists’ attitudes toward, and coverage of, the BP oil 
spill?  
CHAPTER 4 
METHODS 
 This dissertation combines data from three sources. Gulf Coast journalists and 
Twitter users who wrote about the BP disaster were surveyed about their attitudes toward 
the oil industry immediately following the BP disaster. These survey responses were then 
matched with data from a content analysis of the individual journalists’ stories and 
Twitter users’ Tweets. Lastly, these data were matched with measures from the U.S. 
Census Bureau of structural pluralism and oil-industry employment in the communities 
where journalists work and Twitter users live.  
 Data were matched starting with a list of the journalists and Twitter users who 
replied to the survey. Then a list of all of the newspaper stories (N = 1,829) and Tweets 
(N = 6,437) these respondents wrote on the BP oil spill was generated. Lastly, 1,000 of 
these newspaper stories and 1,000 of these Tweets were randomly sampled for inclusion 
in the final analysis (for the sake of multi-group path analyses, one wants roughly equal-
sized groups (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007)). These 2,000 newspaper stories and Tweets 
were used as unique cases in the final data set; survey and community data were assigned 
to these cases by matching the story/Tweet author’s name and the name of the 
community with the survey responses and census data.  
 The individual stories/Tweets were used as the cases because there was a great 
range in the number of stories/Tweets individual authors wrote: journalists wrote from 1 
to 82 stories; Twitter users wrote from 1 to 107 Tweets. It would be very difficult to
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 devise a summary measure of each individual’s coverage with such variation in the 
number of stories. For example, how would one come up with a valid comparison 
between a journalist who wrote one story that used thematic frames 100% of the time, 
and another journalist who wrote 20 stories with thematic frames, but wrote a total of 63 
stories (i.e., only 31.7% of their stories were thematic)? One option would be to drop 
those cases where a journalist or Twitter user wrote too few stories to create a meaningful 
average score of his/her coverage – say less than five stories/Tweets. Doing so, however, 
would have resulted in the loss of 25% of the Twitter sample and 45% of the journalist 
sample. Thus, each story was treated as an individual case.  
Assigning journalists’ and Twitter users’ personal and community characteristics 
to multiple cases (i.e., stories/Tweets) violates the statistical assumption that each case 
represents an independent observation. However, as will be described in the analysis 
section, the multivariate analysis controlled for violation of this statistical assumption by 
grouping the individual newspaper stories and Tweets into clusters based on unique 
authors. The final data set included 404 clusters: 164 unique journalists and 204 unique 
Twitter users.  
It is also possible that because data were matched based on a random selection of 
stories/Tweets, not a random sample of survey responses, that these journalists/Twitter 
users in the final data set differ significantly from those individuals in the original survey 
data set. Thus, independent sample t-Tests were run to see if there were any significant 
differences in survey responses, community characteristics, and the number of 
stories/Tweets individual authors wrote, between those initial survey respondents who 
were and were not included in the final data set. There was only one significant 
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difference: journalists in the final data set represented communities with a significantly 
greater percentage of the workforce employed in the oil industry (M = .010, SD = .010) 
than did those journalists who responded to the survey but were not in the final sample 
(M = .004, SD = .007) (t(26.148) = -2.819, P = .009, equal variances not-assumed). It is 
likely this difference is due to the fact that the BP oil spill had more salience for those 
communities that relied more heavily on the oil industry for local employment. This 
increased salience did not result in a significant difference in the number of stories 
individual journalists wrote; however, it could have resulted in newspapers in those 
communities assigning a greater number of reporters to cover the oil spill, which would 
explain why those communities for which the oil spill had more salience are perhaps 
slightly overrepresented in the final data set. However, because there are no significant 
individual differences between the different data sets, as the data are described in this 
study, only the characteristics of those individuals and communities in the final data set 
are reported, except to report the surveys’ response rates.        
Surveys 
Journalists and Twitter users were surveyed separately as the dissertation project 
developed, as soon after the oil spill as possible. Journalists were surveyed from Nov. 10, 
2011, to Dec. 10, 2010; Twitter users from April 20, 2011, to Aug. 20, 2011. Because of 
the time that had elapsed since the explosion of the Deep Water Horizon on April 20, 
2010, it is unlikely that these surveys captured the initial shock to public opinion 
immediately following the disaster. According to data from the Pew Research Center 
(2011), from February 2010 to June 2010, support for expanding off-shore oil drilling fell 
from 63% of Americans to 44%. However, within a couple of months those numbers 
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started to rebound: in October 2010, 51% of Americans favored expanding off-shore oil 
drilling, and by March 2011 that number was back up to 57%. Thus, the survey data 
collected for this study likely do not capture this shock to opinions about off-shore oil 
drilling immediately following the disaster, which is problematic in that this dissertation 
is most interested in this period of the media’s coverage.  
However, the study’s hypotheses are based less on absolute support for oil drilling 
than on respondents’ attitudes relative to one another (i.e., journalists with more positive 
attitudes toward the oil industry will be less likely to use critical frames in their coverage 
of the BP disaster). Relative differences, for example, between Republicans’ and 
Democrats’ attitudes toward off-shore oil drilling appear to have remained relatively 
consistent throughout the crisis (Pew Research Center for the People & The Press, 2011). 
Thus, the timing of these surveys, while worth noting, is not likely to affect inferences 
based on relative differences in attitudes.  
Survey of journalists. Gulf Coast journalists who covered the BP oil spill were 
identified by searching the America’s News database from April 20, 2010, the day of the 
Deep Water Horizon explosion, until Sept. 20, 2010, the day after BP sealed the leaking 
oil well. The following keywords were used to search Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, 
Louisiana, and Texas newspapers: BP, oil spill, and Deep Water Horizon. Headlines and 
stories’ lead paragraphs were read to determine if the story was about the Gulf oil spill. 
Stories primarily about another subject, but containing substantial discussion of the spill 
(e.g., a coastal real estate prices story mentioning fears that the spill would depress 
prices), were included. Both news and opinion articles were included in order to capture 
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an overall picture of the impression a given newspaper’s coverage is likely to have on a 
reader (McCluskey et al., 2009). 
Reporters’ email addresses and their newspapers’ mailing addresses were found at 
the bottom of the relevant stories and on newspapers’ websites. Six hundred and eighty-
eight unique bylines and valid email addresses were identified: 379 in Florida, 142 in 
Texas, 80 in Alabama, 59 in Louisiana, and 34 in Mississippi.  
 A pre-notification letter was mailed to journalists on Nov. 5, 2010. Newspapers 
returned 11 letters as undeliverable. These journalists were removed from the sample, 
presumably because they no longer worked at these papers. A link to the web-based 
survey, which had been reviewed and approved by the university’s Institutional Review 
Board (IRB), was then emailed to the remaining 682 journalists on Nov. 10, 2010, 
followed by six reminder emails.  
 A total of 220 journalists completed the survey, for a response rate of 32.3%. 
Given the generally low response rates on web surveys — especially when surveying a 
professional population (Cook, Heath, & Thompson, 2000) — and the sensitive nature of 
asking journalists to disclose their personal opinions on issues they cover and about their 
political beliefs, the response rate is probably as good as one could anticipate. 
Survey of Twitter users. Studying Tweets presents a significant challenge 
because at the time data were first collected for this study, Twitter allowed users only to 
search Tweets that were up to four days old (Twitter, 2011a). Thus, in order to have 
access to Tweets that are more than four days old, a researcher must device a method for 
collecting the Tweets of interest into some type of custom database. There are a number 
of methods for collecting “live” Tweets if one is prepared to begin collecting data as an 
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event unfolds. Data collection for this current study, however, was not started until 
October 2010, which again means that Twitter’s search function could not be used to 
access Tweets about that BP disaster for the period immediately following the spill. 
However, these Tweets were available on the individual Twitter profile pages of the 
authors who wrote the Tweets. Thus, a computer programmer was hired to help build a 
custom database of Tweets that was built by first identifying authors of interest, and then 
downloading Tweets from their profile pages using Twitter’s application programing 
interface, or API. An API is a set of computer code, which various websites make 
available to independent programmers, granting these programmers limited access to 
these websites databases for the purposes of building third-party applications. For 
example, the various applications that allow one to Tweet from a mobile phone, iPad, or 
desktop computer without visiting Twitter’s site directly are built by third-party 
companies using the API provided by Twitter. 
The focus of this study is those most-followed Gulf Coast Twitter users, who 
were most likely to serve as opinion leaders and dominate discussion of issues in their 
communities (Wu et al., 2011). Twitter’s API allows programmers to access and 
download up to 2,500 Tweets from individuals’ accounts that are not password-protected. 
Data collection started on Oct. 22, 2010. In the time that elapsed since April 20, 2010, it 
seemed unlikely that most users would have written more than 2,500 Tweets. Thus, if one 
could identify the most-followed users in a given community, all of their Tweets for the 
period following the BP disaster could be downloaded into a custom database which 
could be searched by keyword. 
62 
 
Because this study ultimately examines community-level factors that shaped 
journalists’ attitudes and coverage compared to those community-level factors that 
shaped Twitter users’ attitudes and Tweets, journalists’ and Twitter users’ communities 
should not be significantly different from one another (e.g., one would not want to 
compare only rural journalists to urban Twitter users). Thus, the first step of this part of 
the study was to generate a list of Gulf Coast communities with a newspaper included in 
the America’s Newspaper database. A computer programmer hired for this research 
project then built a program that used this list of cities and data from the website 
Twitaholic.com, which tracks the most-followed Twitter users in a given community, to 
identify the 250 most-followed users in a given community. Some communities had 
fewer than 250 users on Twitaholic.com, which only had data for users that identify their 
city in their Twitter profile.   
The 2,500 most recent Tweets from each of these users were then downloaded. 
The final database included more than 14.2 million Tweets. This database was then 
searched using keywords identical to those used to search newspaper coverage: BP, oil 
spill, and Deep Water Horizon. This generated a list of 25,501 Tweets that used these 
keywords. This list of Tweets was then used to identify individual Twitter users who had 
Tweeted about the BP oil spill, which yielded a list of 4,396 unique authors in 110 cities. 
Because the only contact information available for these users were their Twitter 
names, these authors were invited to participate in the survey by sending 140-character 
Twitter messages to each user (Twitter limits all messages to 140 characters): “@{user’s 
name} Read your Tweets about the BP oil spill. Can you take 5 mins. to take short survey 
for university study? {survey link}.”  
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To streamline this process, a second computer programmer was hired to create a 
program that automatically sent a standard message to each author containing a link to 
the web-based survey, which had been reviewed and approved by the university’s 
Institutional Review Board (IRB). Twitter limits the number of messages a user can send 
within a given period, so initially the program was calibrated to send out five messages 
every minute. Identical invitation messages were sent out sequentially starting with the 
first user on April 22, 2011, and continuing until the program reached the end of the list 
of users. The start date of this research is somewhat problematic given the period of time 
that had elapsed since the Deep Water Horizon explosion a year earlier, but respondents 
were asked to recall back to the fall of 2010, shortly after BP had capped the leaking 
well, in answering relevant questions. 
Despite efforts to follow Twitter’s guidelines for posting messages, the Twitter 
account used to send the messages was suspended for “spamming” users with a large 
volume of unsolicited messages within a couple of hours of the first batch of messages 
being sent. Twitter issued a warning and eventually re-opened the account, though the 
company will not divulge guidelines as to how one can conduct such a project without 
being flagged as a “spammer,” lest one use this information to game the system. The 
program was recalibrated, however, to send out only one message every five minutes; 
additionally, messages were sent only from 7 a.m. to 9 p.m., and not on weekends. Still, 
the Twitter account used to send messages was suspended twice more, though quickly 
reopened after emails were sent to the Twitter help desk explaining the project and more 
warnings against “spamming” were issued by Twitter.  
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To reduce the perception that the survey invitation was spam, personalized reply 
messages were manually sent to individuals who replied to the initial invitation. Some 
respondents were clearly testing whether the survey invitation was sent by a legitimate 
researcher, and not a “spam bot”; after these skeptical participants received a personal 
reply, most completed the survey. Twitter users who had not yet responded to the survey 
received two reminder Tweets, the last of which was sent on June 10, 2011.  
A total of 731 users completed the survey for a response rate of 16.6%. Because 
the purpose of the survey is to match users’ responses on the survey to their Tweets, 28 
users who did not give their user names in the survey and thus could not be matched with 
the other data in the study, or who were accidently sent the initial invitation, were 
eliminated from the analysis (the process described above accidently identified some 
users in Paris, France, instead of Paris, Texas, and Birmingham, England, instead of 
Birmingham, Alabama). The final data set included 703 Twitter users.  
Survey measures. The survey of journalists contained additional questions about 
journalists’ preferred professional roles, their interactions with BP and Coast Guard 
public relations staff, and their use of the web for reporting on the disaster (the data on 
journalists’ preferred professional roles were reported in Watson, in press; data on 
journalists’ interaction with BP public relations professionals were reported in Watson, 
2012). Because this dissertation focuses on a comparison of journalists and Twitter users, 
this study will report only on those items that the two surveys had in common. 
Descriptive statistics for these measures are contained in Tables 1 and 2. These 
tables report the descriptive statistics for the entire sample, as well as by group (i.e., 
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journalist or Twitter user). Statistics in the following descriptions of the survey measures 
represent the entire sample. 
Political ideology. Political ideology was measured using a single item, adapted 
from Patterson and Donsbach (1996): “How would you characterize your political 
ideology, from left to right?” This question was chosen because it was believed that the 
journalists in the study might have reacted more negatively to a more direct question that 
asked them to identify their preferred political party (M = 3.61, SD = 1.362). 
 Environmental ideology. Environmental ideology was measured using the four 
highest-loading items from the New Environmental Paradigm scale (Dunlap, Van Liere, 
Mertig, & Jones, 2000): “Humans are severely abusing the environment”; “The balance 
of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations”; “The 
so-called ‘environmental crisis’ has been greatly exaggerated”; and “Humans will 
eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to control it.”  (Cronbach’s α 
= .749, M = 3.795, SD = .755). 
 Attitudes toward oil drilling. This portion of the survey adapted 13 questions from 
public opinion surveys about oil drilling (CBS News, 2010), energy policy and 
government regulation, (Bolson & Cook, 2008) and industry responsibility (Miller & 
Sinclair, 2009) (see Table 1 for question wording and descriptive statistics). (α = .912, M 
= 2.675, SD = .746). 
Demographics. The survey also collected a series of demographic questions. All 
respondents were asked their age, race, and income. Journalists were asked whether they 
held a journalism degree, how many years they have been a journalist, their tenure at 
their current newspaper, their primary job function (reporting, commentary, or editing), 
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what beat they are assigned to, and whether they had any special training in covering 
environmental or energy issues.  
Twitter users were asked how long they had used Twitter and what industry they 
worked in, specifically if they worked in the oil, tourism, or fishing industries, which 
were particularly impacted by the BP oil spill, or whether they were a professional 
journalist. Journalists on Twitter were not eliminated from the study because they are 
among those most-followed influential users that are likely to shape discussions about the 
BP oil spill on Twitter.  
Content Analysis 
For the content analysis portion of the study, newspaper stories were identified by 
searching the author field of the America’s News database for the names of the 220 
reporters who completed the survey and the initial keywords used to identify newspaper 
stories (BP, oil spill, Deep Water Horizon) between April 20, 2011, the day of the Deep 
Water Horizon explosion, and Sept. 20, 2010, the day after the Macando well was 
permanently sealed. These journalists wrote a total of 1,829 stories, each which was 
assigned a random number and then sorted by ascending order. The first 1,000 stories 
were selected and coded.  
The 703 Twitter users who responded to the survey authored a total of 6,437 
Tweets (Tweets that were clearly a reply to another message – denoted by using the at 
sign (@) followed by another Twitter users’ name – were eliminated from the data set 
because they represent one side of a conversation, and therefore would be difficult to 
code). These Tweets were similarly assigned a random number and sorted by ascending 
order. The first 1,000 Tweets were also coded. 
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Content analysis protocol. A challenge in this content analysis is to develop a 
straightforward protocol, which produces coding rules that can be applied equivalently to 
two very different media, so that valid conclusions can be drawn based on a comparison 
of journalists’ and Twitter users’ coverage of the oil spill. Thus, the coding protocol is 
based on manifest attributes of the content that are not unique to either media (see 
Appendix). 
The purpose of the content analysis is to discern whether the BP disaster was 
covered as an isolated, episodic accident, or tied to larger, thematic questions concerning 
the environmental, health, and economic impacts of the oil spill; corporate responsibility, 
of both BP and the entire oil industry; government oversight and regulation; and future 
environmental and energy policy.  
The protocol for coding news stories focused on the first four paragraphs of a 
story substantially about the oil spill (Tweets were coded in their entirety), a commonly-
used coding strategy (see Griffin & Dunwoody 1995, 1997). It is assumed that the first 
paragraphs of a story contain both the story’s “lead,” typically a one-sentence 
introduction that states the main purpose of the story, as well as the story’s “nut graf,” a 
longer summary of the story’s main points (see Yopp, McAdams, and Thornburg, 2010, 
for a discussion of these key elements of a news story). Not all stories that made 
substantial mention of the oil spill were only about the oil spill. The spill, for example, 
occurred during political campaigning in the run-up to the 2010 mid-term elections. Thus, 
there were many campaign stories in which the oil spill was one of several issues that 
candidates discussed — and not necessarily the first issue they discussed. In such 
instances, coders were instructed to code up to the first four consecutive paragraphs 
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substantially about the oil spill. Not every story contained four consecutive paragraphs 
about the oil spill; thus in some instances coders coded one, two, or three paragraphs. 
The challenge with coding Twitter is not condensing the content into digestible 
units of analysis, but rather inferring the author’s intention from 140-character status 
updates. The coding of these messages, however, was based only on the manifest content 
of the messages themselves, rather than efforts to infer the author’s intentions by also 
coding content linked to in the Tweet. 
Episodic/thematic frames. The primary variable of interest is whether journalists 
and Twitter users framed the BP oil spill as an episodic or thematic story, using the 
typology originally developed by Iyengar (1991). Iyengar defined an episodic frame as 
focusing on a single event, where a thematic frame examines broader trends and 
implications beyond an isolated incident. Only the first mention of either an episodic or 
thematic frame was coded present/absent. 
Linkages. In addition to simply coding if a story used a frame that connects a 
story to larger thematic concerns, this study catalogued which broader concerns were 
raised in the coverage. Griffin and Dunwoody (1995) coded whether or not a newspaper 
story contained a “risk linkage,” that is, whether an issue involving contamination was 
connected in the coverage to issues of human health. This study builds upon Griffin and 
Dunwoody’s (1995) idea of linkages, though it includes a larger list of potential linkages. 
They include whether the story focuses on BP’s role in the spill, or the spill’s effect on 
BP (such as the effects of the spill on the company’s share prices); whether the story 
contains an “other” oil industry link, such as the effect of the spill on off-shore oil drilling 
generally; whether the story focuses on governmental regulation or oversight, either in 
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terms of its role prior to the BP disaster, or government regulations, including the 
moratorium on off-shore oil drilling, following the Deep Water Horizon explosion; 
whether the story links the spill to potential environmental or health impacts, such as the 
effects on wildlife, or the mental health impacts of the spill on Gulf Coast fishermen; 
whether the story mentions implications for energy and environmental policies, such as 
the effects of the spill on the future of alternative sources of energy; or whether the story 
discusses economic links, which discuss the spill in terms of its impacts on businesses, 
stock prices, the general economy, etc.  
Evaluative tone. Evaluative tone is used to measure the degree to which the media 
framed the BP oil spill negatively. While this study is not an agenda-setting study, this 
portion of the coding protocol is closely related to second-level agenda-setting: the idea 
that the media indicate not only what to think about (first level agenda setting), but how 
people should view those events covered in the news (Hester & Gibson, 2003; Kiousis, 
2004; Sheafer, 2007). Evaluative tone – whether news coverage of an issue is positive, 
negative, or neutral –  is one story attribute that is the focus of second-level agenda 
setting studies (Kiousis, 2004; Sheafer, 2007). 
In the case of the BP oil disaster it might be hard to imagine the media framing 
the crisis positively. However, Hester and Gibson’s (2003) study of the media’s second-
level agenda setting effect on consumers’ economic evaluations raises the possibility that 
there might be such as thing as “good bad news.” They evaluated the tone of the media’s 
coverage not in terms of whether the media emphasized market expansions or 
contractions, but rather whether a particular change in the market was portrayed as being 
desirable or undesirable. Thus, “good bad news” occurs when the market contracts, but 
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media coverage focuses on the fact that the markets did not contract as much as expected, 
or that despite the contraction the market still outperformed analysts’ expectations. 
Applying this same “good bad news” concept to analyzing the evaluative tone of 
media framing of the BP oil spill, positive frames are those that emphasize desirable 
outcomes. Desirable outcomes include BP making progress on capping the well, the fact 
that the ecological effects of the oil spill were not as bad as they could have been, etc. 
Negative frames are those that emphasize negative outcomes — setbacks for BP’s efforts 
to cap the well, ecological impacts of the oil spill on Louisiana’s fragile wetlands, etc. 
Neutral frames either did not mention either positive or negative outcomes, or mentioned 
both simultaneously.    
Characters. Lastly, coders recorded whether different “official” and “unofficial” 
characters were used in newspaper and Twitter coverage of the BP oil spill. Characters 
are any individual or organization mentioned in a Tweet or the first four paragraphs of a 
news story substantially about the BP oil spill. If both an organization, for example, the 
U.S. Congress, and more specific members of that organization, for example, individual 
congressmen, were mentioned, only the more specific individuals were coded.  
Official characters included BP and other oil industry representatives (including 
representatives of industry lobbying organizations); elected officials; government 
officials that are part of an environmental or health agency, such as the Environmental 
Protection Agency; regulatory and/or enforcement officials, such as officials with the 
Minerals Management Service; other government officials, such as those serving with the 
Coast Guard; and other characters that have some sort of official involvement 
with/jurisdiction over some aspect of the oil spill and response, including organizations 
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such as local chambers of commerce who were regularly called on to offer official 
comment on the economic impacts of the spill.  
Unofficial characters include environmental or health organizations and 
individual environmental activists; characters affiliated with other non-governmental 
agencies, such as local food banks, which provided assistance to families struggling with 
the economic impacts of the spill; those who volunteered to participate in the clean-up 
effort; independent scientists and other academics commenting on scientific or social-
scientific research related to the spill; other independent experts, such as legal experts 
commenting on BP’s legal liabilities; individual fishermen, local business and oil 
industry employees (who were not commenting officially on behalf on an oil company) 
and other local citizens and visitors who were used for “man-on-the-street” commentary.  
Each category of character was coded as being either present or absent. 
Inter and intracoder reliability. While the content analysis was conducted by a 
single coder (Coder 1), a second individual (Coder 2) coded a randomly-selected sample 
of 10% (N = 100) of the newspapers stories and 10% (N = 100) of the Tweets in order to 
establish intercoder reliability. Coder 1 also re-coded the sample of newspaper stories and 
Tweets at the end of the study and measured intracoder reliability at Time 1 and Time 2 
to make sure that the application of the coding protocol had remained consistent.  
Coding reliability was measured based on simple-agreement and Krippendorf’s 
alpha, which is perhaps the most robust, widely accepted measure of coding reliability 
(Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999; Hayes & Krippendorf, 2007). The latter takes into 
account the variables’ levels of measurement and controls for chance agreement between 
the coders in calculating reliability. An alpha of .80 or above is typically considered an 
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acceptable level of coder agreement; alphas .70 and above are considered by some to be 
acceptable for exploratory studies (Neuendorf, 2002). Tables 3 and 4 display the 
intercoder and intracoder reliability results respectively. Originally, characters within 
each category were going to be recorded as a ratio-level measure. However, most Tweets 
only had a single character in a given category (and often only one character total) due to 
the 140-character limit on Tweets. For the sake of a valid comparison between Tweets 
and news stories, it also makes sense to use a dichotomous present/absent variable for 
coding characters in news stories.  
To improve reliability, several categories of characters were also collapsed: local 
business employee/owner, fishermen, and oil industry employees were originally coded 
as separate categories. However, there was ambiguity, for example, as to whether to code 
a charter fishing boat captain as a fisherman or a local business owner. There was also 
some ambiguity in coding the difference between local businesses, which might include 
businesses that serve the oil industry, and oil industry employees (this category was also 
infrequent). Thus, local business employee/owners, fishermen, and oil industry 
employees were collapsed into a single category. With these adjustments, intercoder 
reliability exceeded the .80 category for all of the variables that are used to answer the 
research questions and test hypotheses (see Table 3). Further conclusions about the data 
based on variables that failed to meet the .80 cut-off should be interpreted cautiously. 
Intracoder reliability exceeded the .80 cut-off for all variables (see Table 4).  
Measuring Structural Pluralism 
Despite the wide use of, and support for, Tichenor et al.’s (1980) structural 
pluralism framework (Donohue et al., 1985; Griffin & Dunwoody, 1995, 1997; Hindman 
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et al., 1999; McCluskey et al., 2009), it has also come under some poignant, though 
underdeveloped criticism (Gandy, 1999). The criticism perhaps stems from the fact that 
Tichenor et al. (1980) originally defined structural pluralism in terms of the “potential 
sources of organized social power” (p. 16, emphasis added). Yet, later studies have 
tended to gloss over the subtle, but important distinction between real and potential 
power. Griffin and Dunwoody (1995), for example, assert that “Scholars have used the 
concept ‘community pluralism’ to represent the distribution of power in a community” 
(p. 253). The problem with this statement is that the U.S. Census data Griffin and 
Dunwoody (1995) used to measure structural pluralism cannot capture the distribution of 
social power. As Gandy (1999) points out, for example, the mere presence of black 
people does not guarantee their proportional representation in positions of power, such as 
city councils (though Gandy (1999) did find that there is a relationship between the 
proportion of black residents and the probability of electing a black mayor). Thus, 
measuring the percentage of minority residents in a community cannot represent the 
distribution of social power in that community. With slight modifications, however, U.S. 
Census data can be used as Tichenor et al. (1980) suggested to represent “potential 
sources of organized social power” (p. 16, emphasis added).  
There may be more direct ways to measure the actual distribution of social power 
within a community. Armstrong (2006), for example, designed a complicated survey 
method to attempt to capture the relative representation of racial minorities among non-
political leaders (she also measured blacks’ relative political power by measuring their 
representation on city councils). She surveyed informants in local mayors’ offices, 
chambers of commerce, the United Way, schools superintendents’ offices, and a 
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randomly-chosen hospital in a given community. She asked these individuals to name 
five influential groups in the community based on three factors: competence, social 
networking capability, and strong personality traits. Those groups named by the 
informants were then contacted to tabulate the percentage of the groups’ officers and 
boards of directors who were black. This method produces a more direct measure of 
blacks’ relative social power, but such methods are not practical for larger-scale 
comparative studies of community structure’s effect on media content, which are made 
feasible by the use of U.S. Census Data and other widely available data. Arguably, 
Armstrong’s (2006) method also does not capture the distribution of power, which is at 
the heart of the structural pluralism concept: communities with city councils that are 
completely black are no more pluralistic than those with city councils that are completely 
white. 
A common shortcoming of the different methods used to operationalize structural 
pluralism is that the authors rarely have paused even to elaborate on the face validity of 
the measures that they use to represent the underlying construct (Griffin & Dunwoody, 
1995, 1997; Hindman et al., 1999; McCluskey et al., 2009). Tichenor et al. (1980) at least 
provided some data that showed their operationalization of the construct based on the size 
of a community’s population and data from the telephone book. This data had some 
convergent validity; their operationalization correlated with theoretically related 
concepts.   
Tichenor et al. (1980) asked residents in four communities, three of which were 
low in pluralism and one which was a larger urban community, about their perceptions of 
how a decision would be made affecting water quality “around here.” Those living in the 
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less pluralistic communities were more likely to expect that a small number of 
individuals would take part in making the decision and that only one or two organizations 
or government agencies would have a hand in the decision (i.e., these residents perceived 
that power was more concentrated among a small group of elite actors, as Tichenor et al. 
(1980) theorized it would be in a less pluralistic community). Residents in the most 
pluralistic community were more likely to believe that “much attention” would be given 
to public opinion before a decision was reached. They also asked residents of one large 
and one small community about the distribution of scientific information concerning 
local contamination. Residents in the larger community were significantly more 
supportive of distributing scientific information and having a public debate about 
environmental issues, even if it would lead to additional conflict within their community. 
Griffin and Dunwoody (1999) also asserted that their measures of structural 
pluralism based on U.S. Census data have face validity, though they offer no explanation. 
To the contrary, one might argue that their data lacked face validity. Measures of 
structural pluralism, based on Tichenor et al.’s (1980) definition, should capture the 
extent to which there are multiple sources of potential organized power. Yet, scholars, 
including Tichenor et al. (1980), have frequently measured structural pluralism as the 
presence of a single group, such as the percentage of black residents (Hindman et al., 
1999). Yet, there are communities, particularly in the American south, where the majority 
of residents are black. These communities are no more pluralistic than those communities 
where the majority of residents are white; there cannot be multiple potential sources of 
social power if there is only a single group.  
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Additional research needs to be conducted to establish the construct validity of 
structural pluralism measures. Such a project is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
However, it is possible to at least operationalize structural pluralism in such a way that it 
has additional face validity. First, in addition to clarifying that a structural pluralism 
measure reflects only the potential sources of social power, structural pluralism should be 
measured in relation to the presence of multiple groups (i.e., multiple sources of potential 
social power). Again, the presence of multiple groups does not guarantee that those 
groups share social power equally. However, social power cannot be distributed if there 
is only one group in the population. With at least two groups, however, social power has 
the potential to be distributed within the community.  
Given this logic, Blau’s (1975, 1977) diversity index ( 


R
i
iPDiversity
1
21 , 
where Pi is the proportion of the population in a given category/group) can be used as a 
measure of the potential sources of organized social power in a community. The index 
measures the probability, on a 0 to 1 scale, that two individuals in the population, drawn 
at random (with replacement), are from two different groups. It is a measure of the 
distribution of the population across different social groups; the higher the Blau index 
value, the greater the potential distribution of social power. 
 A second potential problem with current measures of structural pluralism as 
applied to journalistic dependent variables is the role of population. As Demers (1994b) 
argues, population is a good measure of structural pluralism in the U.S., more specifically 
the specialization of labor and social and cultural heterogeneity. Indeed, Tichenor et al. 
(1980) reported that the correlation between population and the other structural pluralism 
measures is r = .75. That is problematic when applied to journalism, because population 
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can have effects on the dependent variables that are theoretically unrelated to the 
differentiation in the potential sources of organized power in a community.  
 For example, population is strongly correlated with circulation (according to 
Tichenor et al. (1980), as high as r = .84), and circulation is in turn strongly correlated 
with reporting resources. Demers (1994b) cited studies that found that the correlation 
between circulation and number of editorial employees is as high as r = .94, which is in 
turn correlated with the dependent measures of some structural pluralism studies.  
 For example, Griffin and Dunwoody (1997) found a positive relationship between 
newspaper circulation and whether or not a newspaper covered environmental 
contamination using a science frame. They suggest that this is because the use of science 
frames requires the allocation of more reporting resources. Thus, one could question if 
effects attributed to structural pluralism really are due to the differentiation in the 
potential sources of organized power in a community, or if newspapers in more pluralistic 
communities report more on conflict simply because they have more resources and report 
more on everything. 
Population is, however, an important component of structural pluralism. Thus, 
one would not want to drop it completely from one’s measure of structural pluralism. In 
this study, to preserve the easily comprehended 0-1 scale of the Blau index, population 
was calculated as a percentage of Houston, Texas’s population, the largest city in the 
sample.  
The indicators of structural pluralism used in the final index, which have also 
been used in previous structural pluralism studies, include population (Demers, 1994a; 
1994b; Donohue et al., 1985; Griffin & Dunwoody, 1995, 1997; Hindman et al., 1999; 
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McCluskey et al., 2009; Tichenor et al., 1980), race (Armstrong, 2002; Griffin & 
Dunwoody, 1995, 1997; Hindman et al., 1999), educational attainment (Hindman et al., 
1999), income (Donohue et al., 1985; Hindman et al., 1999; McCluskey et al., 2009), and 
major industry sectors (Donohue et al., 1985; McCluskey et al., 2009). These measures 
were taken from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-Year Estimates, 
which were used because they cover communities of all sizes, meaning there are no 
missing data (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Data were collected based on the counties 
where journalists work and Twitter users live, because the county is a better geographic 
representation of a media market than an individual city. 
Other than population, each of these measures was broken into discrete groupings 
and then Blau’s index was used to measure the distribution of the population across these 
groups. Race was divided into white and non-white. Educational attainment was broken 
down into less than high school, high school graduate, some college (including 
associate’s degree), college graduate, and advanced degree (master’s, J.D., Ph.D. etc.). 
Income was broken down roughly based on the quintile distribution of the median U.S. 
household income: less than $19,999; $20,000-34,999; $35,000-49,000; $50,000-74,999; 
and over $75,000. The percentage of the population employed in different industry 
sectors was broken down according to classification of major industry sectors used by the 
federal Bureau of Labor Statistics (2011): Goods-producing (construction and 
manufacturing), services-producing (information services, transportation, retail trade, 
wholesale trade, etc.), and agriculture.  
To make sure that those communities that end up ranking highest in their degree 
of structural pluralism are not simply the largest, but also rank highly on other indicators 
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of the distribution of potential social power, instead of simply adding the structural 
pluralism measures together to create a single structural pluralism index as others have 
done (Tichenor et al., 1980; McCluskey et al., 2009), the measures were added and then 
divided by the total number of items in the scale (5) to give each pluralism measure equal 
weight in the final index (M =.399, SD =.067). 
Economic Reliance on the Oil Industry 
 Following Griffin and Dunwoody (1995), economic reliance on the oil industry 
was measured as the percentage of the local workforce employed in “mining, quarrying, 
and oil and gas extraction” industries, according to the ACS (M = .006, SD = .014) (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2010). This measure covers a broader swath of employment outside the 
oil industry. However, the oil industry is dominant in the Gulf Coast region. Thus, the oil 
industry will comprise a majority of those employed in this larger category. For the sake 
of  brevity, this measure is referred to as the percentage of the workforce employed in the 
oil industry for the remainder of the dissertation. 
 A more direct measure of the economic impact of the oil industry on the local 
economy — such as the percentage of the economy’s GDP contributed by the oil 
industry, which is likely to be much greater than the percentage of the workforce 
employed in the oil industry — would be a preferred measure of a community’s 
economic reliance on the oil industry. This information is available from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) at larger geographic levels (i.e., for individual states), but the 
BEA has an agreement to restrict the availability of this data at smaller geographic levels 
in order to protect data on individual companies (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2011).  
Data Screening & Transformations 
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Prior to conducting the data analysis, the data were screened for any data entry 
errors; large numbers of missing data; non-linearity in the pairwise plots; and normal 
distributions of the continuous variables (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, for data 
screening recommendations). There were no obvious data entry errors, nor were there 
large numbers of missing data. There were no missing data for the community-level 
demographic variables, or the content analysis variables.  
There were 15 cases (3 newspaper stories and 12) that were missing data for the 
survey measures. None of the variables, however, were missing for more than 5% of the 
cases. With such a small number of missing cases, the most conservative approach to 
dealing with these cases is to delete them before performing multivariate analyses 
(Tabacknick & Fidell, 2007). Thus, the multivariate analysis included 997 newspaper 
stories and 988 Tweets. 
With the exception of the percentage of the local workforce employed in the oil 
industry (skewness = 6.477, SE = .121, kurtosis = 56.227, SE = .242) and a community’s 
degree of structural pluralism (skewness =1.395, SE = .121 kurtosis=1.847, SE = .242), 
the continuous variables were normally distributed.  
Frequently census measures are non-normal. In this instance, structural pluralism 
is not severely skewed or kurtotic. However, a secondary problem with census measures 
is that the error associated with these variables is also positively correlated with the size 
of the variable (i.e., the larger a city’s population, the greater the error in the estimate of 
the population). Log-transforming census measures can address both their non-normal 
distribution, and their correlated measurement errors (see Tabacknick and Fidell, 2007, 
pp. 88-86, for a discussion of commonly-used data transformations). Log-transformations 
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improve the normality of a positively skewed variable; the error term of a log-
transformed variable also becomes a constant percentage of the measure. Thus, both the 
percentage of the local workforce employed in the oil industry and communities’ degree 
of structural pluralism were log-transformed prior to conducting multivariate analyses. 
Because one cannot take the log of zero, and some communities in the sample had zero 
percent of their workforce employed in the oil industry, a constant of .0001 was added to 
the score before it was log-transformed. 
CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
 Journalists’ and Twitter users’ coverage of the BP oil spill is summarized as part 
of the study’s exploration of the formal research questions and tests of the hypotheses 
(see also Table 5). However, before presenting these results, it is worthwhile to explore 
some key characteristics of the individual journalists and Twitter users, as well as their 
communities, which may help illuminate why the crisis was covered by both groups in 
the manner it was.   
The average journalist in the final sample is a white (83.5%, N = 137) male 
(54.3%, N = 89) reporter (76.8%; N = 126), who is 43 years old and leans slightly left 
politically (M = 3.410/7, SD = 1.090). He holds a bachelor’s degree in journalism 
(69.5%, N = 114) and has been a reporter for 20 years, and has worked at his current 
newspaper for 11. He makes between $40,000 and $50,0000 a year. This profile is very 
similar to Weaver et al.’s (2007) national survey of journalists. 
Among those reporters who covered the BP oil spill, 26% had specialized training 
in covering either energy (N = 17) or environmental (N = 25) issues; fewer than 13% 
were energy (N = 6), environmental (N = 12) or outdoor reporters (N = 3). The majority 
(55%) of reporters who covered the oil spill were political (N = 26), general assignment 
(N = 25), business (N = 22), and “cops and court” reporters (N = 17).  
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As shown in Tables 1 and 2, these reporters had a mild degree of concern for the 
state of the environment (M = 3.767, SD = .570). They had little affinity for the oil 
industry following the BP oil spill (M = 2.681, SD = .563).  
The 164 journalists in the sample represented 45 newspapers in 44 different Gulf 
Coast communities. For those 33 newspapers for which data were available in the 2009 
Editor and Publisher’s yearbook, the newspapers’ weekday circulations ranged from 
9,872 to 507,437 (M = 123184.550, SD = 115867.230). Thus, this study likely over-
represents large newspapers, though data are primarily missing for smaller newspapers in 
the sample, which suggests that small-circulation newspapers may be represented to a 
greater extent in the data than the mean suggests.  
 The majority of Twitter users in the sample were also male (57.7, N = 138) and 
white (82.4%, N = 196). The Twitter users, however, are significantly younger than the 
journalists (journalists: M = 43.42, SD = 13.275; Twitter users: M = 39.46, SD = 10.423, 
t(283.995) = 3.145, P = .002, equal variances not assumed). They also earned 
significantly more money than the journalists, with an average annual income in the 
$50,000 to $60,000 range, the largest difference between the two groups being the 
number who made more than $80,000 annually. While only 10.6% (N = 16) of the 
journalists were in the highest income category, 35.4% (N = 75) of Twitter users made 
more than $80,000. The most frequent occupations among the Twitter users were 
advertising/marketing/public relations (26.1%, N = 62), journalism/media/publishing 
(11.7%, N = 28), and IT/technology/software development (10.8%, N = 26). Only 16.7% 
(N = 40) of Twitter users worked in non-professional occupations, including creative 
occupations (music/art/design, etc.) (5%, N = 11), tourism/hospitality (2%, N = 5), and 
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“other” non-professional occupations (10%, N = 24). Only three of the Twitter users 
worked in the oil industry. 
Like journalists, Twitter users also leaned slightly left, albeit significantly less so 
than the journalists (M = 3.75/7, SD = 1.508, t(400.697) = -2.561, P = .011). There were 
no significant differences in the two groups’ attitudes toward the environment, or their 
support for the oil industry following the BP oil spill. However, it is worth noting that 
even where journalists and Twitter users did not differ significantly, the statistics for the 
Twitter users had significantly larger standard deviations, which suggests that the Twitter 
users represent a more diverse group, though that diversity primarily reflects more cases 
at either extreme of a measure. That is, Twitter users were more polarized (as an 
example, Figure 3 shows the distribution of journalists’ political ideologies compared to 
those of Twitter users). 
 The Twitter users in the sample had an average of 3,589 followers (range = 34, 
119,420, SD = 11920.168) on the social networking website. The 240 Twitter users in the 
sample represented 51 unique Gulf Coast communities (both samples together 
represented 65 unique communities). Twitter users’ and journalists’ communities did not 
differ significantly from one another, either based on the percentage of the local 
workforce employed in the oil industry (journalists: M = .006, SD = .011; Twitter users: 
M = .007, SD = .025; t(402)= -.729, P =.466) or in terms of the communities’ degree of 
structural pluralism (journalists: M = .395, SD = .074; Twitter users: M = .401, SD = 
.061; t(305.684)= -.745, P = .457).   
Hypotheses & Research Questions 
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H1 predicted that newspaper coverage of the BP oil spill would be more likely to 
focus on the government’s, rather than BP’s, role in the oil spill. As shown in Table 5, of 
1,000 newspaper stories, 31.8% (N = 318) focused primarily on the government’s role in 
the disaster; 15.5% (N = 155) focused primarily on BP. A chi-square test was used to test 
whether the frequency of stories that did and did not have a government linkage matched 
the expected frequency if government linkages were equally frequent in the newspaper 
coverage of the BP oil spill as BP linkages. The chi-square test revealed that journalists 
were significantly more likely to focus on the government’s, rather than BP’s, role in the 
disaster (χ2(1, N = 1000) = 202.856, P < .001). Thus, H1 is supported. 
R1 asked what larger issues were raised in newspaper coverage of the BP oil spill. 
Table 5 shows the number of stories in each subject category. The four most common 
“linkages” were to government regulation/oversight (31.8%; N = 318); 
environmental/health risks (18.9%; N = 189); “other”2 (16.7%; N = 167); and BP (15.5%; 
N = 155). The least frequent linkage was to “environmental/energy policy” (1.3%; N = 
13), which illustrates the lack of coverage of the critical energy policy questions 
Freudenburg and Gramling (2011) suggested should be asked in the wake of the BP oil 
spill. 
R2 asked to what extent was newspaper coverage of the BP oil spill framed 
negatively. Given that the oil spill was one of the worst environmental disasters in U.S. 
history – and that journalists are sometimes accused of overemphasizing negative news – 
it is perhaps surprising that only 49.9% (N = 499) of stories were framed negatively, 
                                                 
2
 “Other” stories were primarily about the summer hurricane season, including frequent updates about how 
specific storms could change where the oil washed ashore and affect the effort to cap the leaking well, 
particularly during Hurricane Alex, June 25-July 2, 2010, and Tropical Storm Bonnie, July 22-July 24, 
2010. 
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36.8% (N = 338) were neutral, and 13.3% (N = 133) focused on positive developments 
related to the oil spill (see Table 5). 
H2 predicted that episodic frames would be more frequent than thematic frames in 
newspaper coverage of the BP oil spill. As shown in Table 5, of 1,000 newspaper stories, 
94.1% (N = 941) were framed episodically; only 5.9% (N = 59) were framed 
thematically. According to a chi-square test, which was based on the expectation that the 
frames were used equally as frequently, journalists did use a significantly greater number 
of episodic frames in their coverage of the BP oil spill (χ2(1, N = 1000) = 774.40, P < 
.001). Thus, H2 is supported. 
H3 predicted that official characters would be more prominent than unofficial 
characters in newspaper coverage of the BP oil spill. As shown in Table 5, 77.4% (N = 
774) of stories mentioned at least one official character. Only 38.6% (N = 386) of stories 
mentioned an unofficial character. A chi-square test was used to test whether the 
frequency of stories that did and did not mention an official character matched the 
expected frequency if official characters were equally frequent in the newspaper coverage 
of the BP oil spill as unofficial characters. The chi-square test revealed that journalists 
were significantly more likely to mention official than unofficial characters in their 
coverage (χ2(1, N = 1000) = 635.196 , P < .001). 
R3 asked if there were discernible stages in the coverage of the BP spill, the first 
marked by greater reliance on unofficial characters and critical frames, and the second by 
the emerging of an official interpretation of the crisis and a narrowing of those critical 
perspectives that are now viewed as being less legitimate. To answer this question, first it 
is necessary to divide the coverage into two periods. There is no theoretical guidance on 
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which to base such a division, but one would expect that President Obama’s Oval Office 
address to the nation — the first in his presidency — on the BP oil spill would be 
significant in giving shape to the emerging official interpretation of the crisis. Thus, the 
events of the BP oil spill were divided into two periods, prior to the June 15, 2010 speech 
and afterward. Then chi-square tests were used to test whether the frequency of stories 
citing at least one unofficial source and stories focusing on negative events differed 
significantly before and after this speech.  
As shown in Table 6, a significantly greater proportion of stories (44.8%; N=91) 
mentioned at least one unofficial character prior to President Obama’s Oval Office 
address than afterward (37.0%, N = 295) (χ2(1, N = 1000) = 4.168, P = .041). As shown 
in Table 7, the proportion of stories that focused on negative events prior to June 15, 
2010 (59.6%, N = 121) was also significantly greater than the proportion of stories that 
focused on negative events afterward (47.4%, N = 378) (χ2(1, N = 1000) = 9.598, P = 
.002).   
Interpreting the shift in tone within the context of the coalescing official 
interpretation of the oil spill, however, should be done cautiously. A change in tone may 
also be caused by the progress BP made in capping the well after June 15, 2010, and the 
fact that as the crisis dragged on, it became clearer that the early worst-case fears about 
the oil spill’s impacts would never materialize. However, it should be noted that as shown 
in Table 7, while there were significant differences in the proportion of negative stories 
before and after President Obama’s speech, there were not corresponding significant 
shifts in the proportions of positive (χ2(1, N = 1000) = 3.640, P = .056) or neutral stories 
(χ2 (1, N = 1000) = 3.43, P = .064) before and after June 15, 2010. 
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There were no significant changes in the use of thematic frames in coverage of the 
BP oil spill before and after President Obama’s Oval Office address (χ2(1, N = 1000) = 
1.802, P = .179);  the proportion of stories that focused on the government’s role in the 
disaster (χ2(1, N = 1000) = .186, P = .666); or in the proportion of stories focusing on 
BP’s role in the oil spill (χ2 (1, N = 1000) = .287, P = .592). 
Path analyses. The remaining hypotheses and research questions were tested by 
conducting path analyses in MPlus (version 6). Path analysis has the advantage of being 
able to test multiple regression models with more than one dependent variable with a 
single test of statistical significance. To test similar relationships using more basic 
regression methods would necessitate multiple regression models, which would 
compound the probability of committing a Type I error. Using MPlus also has distinct 
advantages: It can handle categorical dependent variables (i.e., BP linkage, government 
linkage, tone, thematic frames, and unofficial characters) and the user is able to group 
non-independent observations – in this instance more than one story or Tweet written by 
the same author – into clusters. Creating these clusters controls for the non-independence 
of the observations, producing robust standard errors (MPlus’s process for estimating 
robust standard errors for non-independent observations is described in Asparouhov and 
Muthen, 2006).  
Before analyzing the data in MPlus, the 15 cases with missing variables were 
deleted. Thus, the path analyses included 997 newspaper stories and 988 Tweets. A 
“cluster” variable was also created, which assigned a unique ID to each of the 164 
journalists and 240 Twitter users. Designating a cluster variable in MPlus did not 
significantly change the size of the model’s path coefficients, but it did result in smaller 
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standard errors and more conservative estimates of the coefficients’ statistical 
significance; the clusters also significantly improved the model’s overall fit.     
The hypothesized paths are shown in Figure 1. To answer the remaining 
hypotheses, this model was first fitted to the journalists’ data. Then the model was fitted 
to the Twitter users’ data to test if the model fit both groups; lastly it was fitted to both 
groups simultaneously in order to test for invariance of means/thresholds and path 
coefficients. This last step answers whether there are statistically significant differences 
between journalists’ and Twitter users’ attitudes toward the oil industry following the BP 
oil spill; their coverage of the spill; and those individual and community-level variables 
that shaped their attitudes and coverage. 
The proposed model was a good fit for the journalists’ data, χ2(14) = 11.173, P = 
.672, root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA] = .000, comparative fit index 
[CFI] = 1.000, Tucker-Lewis index [TLI] = 1.033. A non-significant chi-square indicates 
a good model fit, as does an RMSEA value of less than .05 and CFI and TLI values 
greater than .90 (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Hu & Bentler, 1999). Table 9 displays the 
path coefficients for the model fitted to the journalists’ data; Figure 2 shows the 
significant paths. It should be noted that the while the model was an acceptable fit, it did 
not explain a large proportion of the variance in journalists’ use of government links (R2 = 
.004), BP links (R
2 
= .046), thematic frames (R
2 
= .026), the tone of their stories (R
2 
= 
.036), or their use of unofficial characters (R
2 
= .008). The model did explain a much 
larger proportion of the variance in journalists’ attitudes toward the oil industry (R2 = 
.416). 
H4a predicted that the degree of structural pluralism in the community where a 
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newspaper is based would positively predict whether journalists focused their coverage 
on BP’s role in the disaster. The path from structural pluralism to BP linkage was 
significant and positive (β = .150, P = .011); journalists in more structurally pluralistic 
communities were more likely to focus on BP’s role in the oil spill disaster. Thus, H4a is 
supported. 
H4b predicted that the degree of structural pluralism in the community where a 
newspaper is based would positively predict journalists’ use of thematic frames. The path 
from structural pluralism to thematic frames was not significant (β = -.057, P = .313). 
Thus, H4b is not supported. 
H4c predicted that the degree of structural pluralism in the community where a 
newspaper is based would negatively predict the tone of journalists’ stories. The path 
from structural pluralism to story tone was significant and negative: journalists in more 
pluralistic communities wrote more negative stories about the BP oil spill (β = -.128, P = 
.031). Thus, H4c is supported. 
H4d predicted that the degree of structural pluralism in the community where a 
newspaper is based would positively predict newspapers’ use of unofficial characters. 
The path from structural pluralism to unofficial characters was non-significant (β = .035, 
P = .608). Thus, H4d is not supported.  
R4 asked whether the degree of structural pluralism in the community where a 
newspaper is based would affect the frequency with which journalists’ coverage focused 
on the government’s role in the disaster. The path from structural pluralism to 
government linkage was not significant (β = -.066, P = .258); structural pluralism did not 
significantly affect whether journalists focused on the government’s role in the crisis. 
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H5a predicted that the degree to which the community where a newspaper is based 
relies on the oil industry for its economic base would negatively predict whether 
journalists linked their coverage of the oil spill to BP. The path from the percentage of 
the local workforce employed in the oil industry was not significant (β = .121, P = .064). 
Thus, H5a is not supported. 
H5b predicted that the degree to which the community a newspaper is based relies 
on the oil industry for its economic base will negatively predict journalists’ relative use of 
thematic frames. The path from the percentage of the local workforce employed the oil 
industry was significant; however, the coefficient was positive: journalists in 
communities that relied more heavily on the oil industry were more likely to use thematic 
frames, the opposite of what was hypothesized (β = .138, P = .016). Thus, H5b is not 
supported. 
H5c predicted that the degree to which the community where a newspaper is based 
relies on the oil industry for its economic base will positively predict the tone of 
journalists’ stories. The path from the percentage of the local workforce employed by the 
oil industry to story tone was not significant (β = .111, P = .103). Thus, H5c is not 
supported. 
H5d predicted that the degree to which the community where a newspaper is based 
relies on the oil industry for its economic base would negatively predict journalists’ use 
of unofficial characters. The path from the percentage of the local workforce employed in 
the oil industry to unofficial characters was not significant (β = -.090, P = .088). Thus, 
H5d is not supported. 
R5 asked whether the degree to which the community where a newspaper is based 
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relies on the oil industry for its economic base would affect whether journalists focused 
their coverage on the government’s role in the BP oil spill. The path from the percentage 
of the local workforce employed in the oil industry to government linkage was not 
significant (β =.014, P = .843). 
H6a predicted that the degree of structural pluralism in the community where a 
newspaper is based will negatively predict journalists’ attitudes toward the oil industry. 
The path from structural pluralism to journalists’ attitudes toward the oil industry was 
non-significant (β = .083, P = .381). Thus, H6a is not supported. 
H6b predicted that the degree to which the community where a newspaper is based 
relies on the oil industry for its economic base will positively predict journalists’ attitudes 
toward the oil industry. The path from the percentage of the local workforce employed in 
the oil industry to attitude toward the oil industry was significant: journalists in 
communities that rely more heavily on the oil industry for local employment held more 
positive views toward the industry (β = .257, P = .001). Thus, H6b is supported. 
H7 predicted that journalists’ political conservatism would positively predict their 
attitudes toward the oil industry. The path from journalists’ political conservatism to their 
attitudes toward the oil industry was significant and positive: more conservative reporters 
held more favorable attitudes toward the oil industry (β = .308, P < .001). Thus, H7 is 
supported. 
 H8 predicted that journalists’ environmental ideologies would negatively predict 
their positive attitudes toward the oil industry. The path from journalists’ environmental 
ideologies to their attitudes toward the oil industry was significant and negative: more 
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pro-environmental reporters held more critical attitudes toward the oil industry (β = -.368, 
P < .001). Thus, H8 is supported.  
H9a predicted that journalists’ positive attitudes toward the oil industry would 
negatively predict whether they would focus their coverage of the oil spill on BP’s role in 
the crisis. The path from journalists’ attitudes toward the oil industry to BP linkage was 
not significant (β = -.034, P = .703). Thus, H9a is not supported. 
H9b predicted that journalists’ attitudes toward the oil industry would negatively 
predict their use of thematic frames. The path from journalists’ attitudes toward the oil 
industry to thematic frames was significant and negative: journalists who held more 
positive attitudes toward the oil industry were less likely to use thematic frames (β = -
.125, P = .027). Thus, H9b is supported.  
H9c predicted that journalists’ attitudes toward the oil industry would positively 
predict the tone of journalists’ stories about the BP oil spill. The path from journalists’ 
attitudes to story tone was not significant (β = .117, P = .073). Thus, H9c is not supported. 
H9d predicted that journalists’ attitudes toward the oil industry would negatively 
predict their use of unofficial characters. The path from journalists’ attitudes toward the 
oil spill to unofficial characters was not statistically significant (β = .047, P = .501). 
Thus, H9d is not supported. 
R6 asked if journalists’ positive attitudes toward the oil industry would affect 
whether they focused their coverage of the oil spill on the government’s role in the crisis. 
The path from journalists’ attitudes toward the oil industry to government linkage was 
not significant (β = .019, P = .771); journalists’ attitudes toward the oil industry did not 
significantly affect whether they focused their coverage of the BP oil spill on the 
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government’s role in the crisis. 
H10 predicted that community structure’s indirect effects — via journalists’ 
positive attitudes toward the industry — would be stronger than community structure’s 
direct effects. Table 10 shows the direct and indirect effects of the community structure 
variables on journalists’ coverage.  In every instance, the direct effects are larger than the 
indirect effects; furthermore, none of the indirect effects are significant. Thus, H10 is not 
supported.  
Group differences. The remaining research questions involve comparing 
parameters of the path model between journalists and Twitter users. Before comparing 
the two groups, it is necessary to establish that the model specified for journalists is also 
an acceptable fit for Twitter users by fitting the model to data that include only Twitter 
users (see Table 11). The chi-square was non-significant (χ2(14) = 22.580, P = .068), 
indicative of an acceptable model fit. The root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA = .018) also indicated a good model fit. The comparative fit index (CFI = .855) 
and the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI = 0.544), however, failed to meet the suggested .90 cut-
off (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Nonetheless, because the other tests of model fit indicate an 
acceptable model, the analysis proceeded, particularly since starting with a good-fitting 
baseline model that includes both groups is more important to the validity of analysis of 
group differences. The model explained 91.5% of the variance (R
2  
= .915) in Twitter 
users’ post-oil spill attitudes toward the oil industry, but only 1.7% of the variance (R2 = 
.017) in Twitter users’ use of thematic frames; 12.7% of the variance (R2 = .127) in the 
tone of their Tweets; .8% of the variance (R
2 
= .008) in their use of unofficial characters; 
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2.7% of the variance (R
2 = .027) in Twitter users’ use of BP linkages; and 9.1% of the 
variance (R
2 = .091) in Twitter users’ use of government linkages. 
To test for group differences, first the specified path model is estimated for both 
groups, allowing the model’s parameters to vary between the two groups (Model 1). As 
shown in Table 12, this baseline model was a good fit, χ2(28) = 33.190, P = .229, 
RMSEA = .014, CFI = .969, TLI =.904. Then the parameters of interest are constrained 
to be equal between the two groups: R7 and R8 are answered by constraining the groups’ 
means and thresholds
3
 to be equal (Model 2); R9 is answered by constraining the path 
coefficients to be equal between the groups (Model 3). The chi-square of the more 
constrained model is compared to a less constrained model using a chi-square difference 
test to examine if constraining the parameters results in a significant loss of goodness-of-
fit (see Table 12). A significant change in goodness-of-fit between the models indicates a 
significant difference in the constrained parameters between the two groups.  
If constraining a group of parameters, e.g. means/thresholds, significantly changes 
the model’s fit, individual constraints are relaxed in order of the absolute value of the 
largest derivatives
4
 of the individual parameters, until there is a non-significant difference 
between the more constrained and the less constrained model. The individual parameters 
that have been relaxed are significantly different between the two groups; the individual 
parameters that remain constrained are not significantly different between the two groups. 
                                                 
3
 MPlus analyzes categorical dependent variables by defining underlying continuous latent 
response variables. Thresholds are the value of the latent response variable at which cases 
transition from one category, for example, from being an episodic story to a thematic story.   
4
 For clustered data with categorical dependent variables, MPlus uses a weighted least-squares 
with mean and variance adjustment (WLSMV) estimator. Modification indices are not available 
in MPlus for estimators other than maximum likelihood estimators. However, derivatives are 
unscaled modification indices. 
96 
 
Put a different way: each parameter estimated by the path model represents a 
characteristic upon which the two groups could be judged to be either similar or different. 
When comparing groups, it is most efficient to start with the assumption that all of the 
characteristics pertinent to the researcher’s reason for making the comparison are equal. 
It is often the case, however, that a significant loss of goodness of fit signals that two 
groups are not identical based on all of their characteristics. The two groups may, 
however, be identical based on some of their characteristics, while they differ on others. 
To discover which individual characteristics differ between the two groups, one-
by-one individual characteristics that most strain the comparison, indicated by the largest 
derivative values, are “relaxed” – that is, they are no longer assumed to be equal. The 
hypothesis that is being tested becomes that the two groups are equal, except for the 
individual characteristic that is no longer assumed (i.e., constrained) to be equal across 
the groups. This hypothesis is confirmed if this revised model does not result in a 
significant loss of goodness of fit when compared to the “less-constrained” model. The 
researcher can conclude that those characteristics still constrained between the two 
groups are equal, or conversely that those characteristics that were relaxed are 
significantly different between the two groups.   
R7 asked if there were significant difference between Twitter users’ and 
journalists’ attitudes toward the oil spill. R8 asked if there were significant differences 
between Twitter users’ and journalists’ coverage of the oil spill. To answer these 
questions, the means of journalists’ and Twitter users’ attitudes toward the oil industry 
and the tone of their stories/Tweets were constrained to be equal, as were the thresholds 
for the presence of unofficial characters, and the use of thematic frames (Model 2). As 
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shown in Table 12, constraining these parameters did not result in a significant loss of 
model fit (∆χ2(8) = 10.100, P = .258. Thus, there are no significant differences in 
journalists’ or Twitter users’ attitudes toward the oil industry; there are also no 
statistically significant differences in either group’s coverage of the BP oil spill – in terms 
of the likelihood that individual journalists’ and Twitter users’ would use BP and 
government linkages, negative frames, thematic frames, or unofficial characters. 
That said, this path model uses the individual journalist or Twitter user as the unit 
of analysis. Because these individual journalists and Twitter users wrote differing 
numbers of stories and Tweets, it is possible, for example, that the total proportion of 
negative stories and Tweets differ from one another, even though the probability that an 
individual Twitter user or journalist would frame their story negatively does not differ. 
Thus, to further investigate possible differences in the aggregate coverage between the 
two groups, it is necessary to perform a series of chi-square tests between the two groups 
to see if total coverage differed between the two media using the individual stories and 
Tweets as the unit of analysis.  
As shown in Table 13, there were significant differences in the proportion of 
newspaper stories and Tweets that focused on the government’s (χ2(1, N = 2000) = 
34.326, P < .001) and BP’s (χ2(1, N = 2000)= 77.590, P < .001) roles in the disaster; the 
number of stories and Tweets framed thematically(χ2(1, N = 2000) = 26.738, P < .001); 
the proportion of stories and Tweets that focused on negative news related to the oil 
spill(χ2(1, N = 2000) = 10.130, P = .001); and the proportion of stories and Tweets that 
used unofficial characters (χ2(1, N = 2000) = 109.137, P < .001). Some of these 
differences, while statistically significant, are unremarkable; for example, only 7.1% 
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more Tweets were framed negatively. Tweets, however, are twice as likely to focus on 
BP’s role in the gulf oil spill (though less than one-third of Tweets (32.3%, N = 323) 
focus on BP); and Tweets were twice as likely to be framed thematically (though Twitter 
users still  framed a very small proportion (12.6%, N = 126) of their Tweets 
thematically); and half as likely to use unofficial characters. That said, it is also worth 
noting that, as shown in Table 5, the basic patterns hypothesized for journalists held for 
Twitter users: Twitter users focused more on the government’s role than on BP’s role in 
the disaster; they used more episodic than thematic frames; and they were more likely to 
rely on official than on unofficial characters.  
R9 also asked if there were significant differences in the social, economic, and 
political factors that shaped Twitter users’ and journalists’ attitudes toward the oil 
industry and the groups’ coverage of the BP oil spill. To answer this question, using the 
constrained model previously tested, the model’s path coefficients were also constrained 
(Model 3). Constraining the model resulted in a significant loss of goodness of fit 
(∆χ2(19) = 42.993, P = . 001). Thus, model restrictions were relaxed to see if goodness-
of-fit would improve (i.e., not result in a loss of goodness-of-fit from the model in which 
the means/thresholds were constrained).  
The largest derivative for the constrained parameters was for the path from 
attitudes toward the oil industry to thematic frames (.023). Thus, the constraint that this 
coefficient be equal between the groups was relaxed (Model 4). When compared to the 
model with means and thresholds constrained (Model 2), relaxing the constraint on the 
path from attitudes toward the oil industry to thematic frames still resulted in a significant 
chi-square difference test when compared to the model in which just the 
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means/thresholds were constrained to be equal (∆χ2 (18) = 31.504, P = .025). Thus, the 
constraint from the journalists’ attitudes toward the oil industry to government linkages 
(derivative = .012) was also relaxed (Model 5). Doing so, however, still resulted in a 
marginally-significant loss of goodness-of-fit when compared to the less-constrained 
model (Model 2) (∆χ2 (17)= 27.277, P = 0.054). Thus, the constraint with the next-largest 
derivative (.011), for the path from attitudes toward the oil industry to BP linkages, was 
relaxed (Model 6). Doing so resulted in a non-significant chi-square difference test when 
compared to the model in which only the means and thresholds were constrained to be 
equal (∆χ2 (16) = 22.134, P =.139). Thus, with the exception of those three paths for 
which the constraints were relaxed, there were no significant differences in the factors 
that shaped journalists’ and Twitter users’ coverage of the BP oil spill. 
The effect of the groups’ attitudes toward the oil industry on their use of thematic 
frames did have significantly different effects on journalists’ and Twitter users’ use of 
thematic frames. While journalists’ positive attitudes toward the oil industry made them 
significantly less likely to use thematic frames ( = -.125, P = .027), Twitter users with 
more positive attitudes toward the oil industry were more likely to use thematic frames ( 
= .135, P = .040). The groups also differed significantly in terms of how their attitudes 
toward the oil industry affected their focus on either BP’s or the government’s role in the 
oil spill crisis. Twitter users who had more positive attitudes toward the oil industry were 
less likely to focus on the role of BP ( = -.044, P = .020) and more likely to focus on the 
role of the government ( = .303, P < .001). The use of these two linkages among the 
Twitter users was significantly and negatively correlated (tetrachoric correlation = -.833, 
P < .001, see Table 8). Thus, it appears to an extent that the two linkages are substitutes 
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for one another — when writing about the failure to cap the leaking well, for example, 
Twitter users focus primarily on either BP or the government — and those Twitter users 
with more favorable attitudes toward the oil industry focus on the government’s response 
to the crisis to shift attention away from BP. Journalists’ attitudes toward the oil industry 
did not significantly affect their use of either BP (  = .-034, P = .703 or government 
linkages ( = .019, P = .771) (though BP and government linkages were also significantly 
and negatively correlated among the journalists, tetrachoric correlation = -.797, P < .001, 
see Table 8).     
CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 
As Freudenburg and Gramling (2011) wrote, the BP oil disaster is “a challenge to 
take a closer, more clear-eyed look at our [energy] policies…to respond to the oil-
darkened waters with clearer thinking…” (p. 8). To the extent to there were “lessons to 
be learned” from the BP oil spill, however, they were not likely to be found in the Gulf 
Coast journalists’ coverage that was studied as part of this dissertation. These journalists 
failed to raise the “big-picture” questions about society’s reliance on fossil fuels, 
regulation of the oil industry, and future energy policies, which Freudenburg and 
Gramling (2011) suggested are necessary if a similar disaster is to be avoided in the 
future. Nearly all (94%) of journalists’ stories were framed episodically, covering the BP 
oil spill as an isolated, episodic event, rather that as part of larger, systemic policy and 
regulatory failures to be remedied. Journalists did cover a range of topics beyond BP and 
the government’s efforts to respond to the crisis and cap the leaking well. For example, 
approximately 19% of the newspaper coverage was about the environmental and health 
risks associated with the oil spill. However, due to the disproportionate number of 
episodic stories, very few of these environmental stories (N = 189) involved coverage of 
long-term impacts of the oil spill; only 21 environmental/health risks stories, 2.1% of the 
overall coverage, were thematic stories. Coverage of environmental issues primarily 
focused on daily reports of where oil was washing ashore and its short-term 
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environmental/health effects. There was almost zero coverage of the energy or 
environmental policy issues related to the oil spill (N = 13).  
A plurality of journalists’ coverage (49.9%, N = 499) of the BP oil spill did focus 
on negative news. However, it is surprising given the scale of the disaster, the 
environmental and economic consequences of the oil spill, and the ineffective responses 
by both BP and the Coast Guard, that journalists’ coverage was not more negative. The 
lack of more critical coverage could be attributed partly to the fact that journalists 
mentioned unofficial characters, who are more likely to raise critical questions related to 
the oil spill, in only 38.6% (N = 386) of their stories (77.4%, N = 774 mentioned official 
characters). Environmental NGOs, activists, and volunteers were particularly 
marginalized in the coverage of the oil spill, mentioned in only 7% (N = 70) of the 
newspaper coverage. 
The lack of more negative coverage could also reflect a concerted effort by some 
of the journalists in this study to strive for balance in their coverage, even when the 
objective facts of the story should dictate more negative coverage. In addition to framing 
the coverage less critically than the facts of the story might dictate, journalists were twice 
as likely to focus on the government’s, rather than BP’s, role in the disaster. Journalists 
may have focused more on the government’s role in part because the government played 
a more public, transparent role in the crisis than BP, a foreign corporation. However, the 
pattern also reflects how negative attention and responsibility for the disaster were shifted 
away from BP and focused instead on the government. 
Even if the journalists in this study were inclined to do so, however, one might 
wonder if these journalists would be equipped to cover the critical questions Freudenburg 
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and Gramling (2011) suggested should be asked in the aftermath of the BP disaster. 
Seventy-four percent of journalists lacked specialized training in covering either 
environmental or energy-related issues; fewer than 13% of the journalists covered energy 
or environmental beats. Considering journalists’ training and assigned beats, it is little 
wonder there was a dearth of either thematic stories generally, or energy and 
environmental policy issues specifically. One might project that the amount of critical, 
big-picture policy coverage of similar crises in the future may even be scarcer as beat and 
investigative reporting are dismantled and more experienced journalists are laid off and 
accept buyouts to be replaced by less experienced, less expensive reporters, many just out 
of college (Walton, 2010).  
The situation is already quite bleak, however, if one accepts that journalists have a 
surveillance function and had a responsibility to raise more critical questions related to 
the BP oil spill. Given the lack of this critical coverage, it would be surprising if the 
coverage by these Gulf Coast journalists instigated substantive, systematic changes to 
future energy policies, oil industry regulations, drilling practices, effective government 
oversight, or even preparedness for future oil spills. A year following the oil spill, the 
U.S. Congress had not passed any major bills related to the BP oil spill (Jaffe & 
Parkinson, 2011).   
As expected, newspaper stories sampled in this study reflect general patterns in 
newspaper coverage of the BP oil spill more strongly than local variations based on the 
community structure of local communities. That said, however, local community 
structure still significantly predicted differences in journalists’ coverage. As 
hypothesized, journalists in more pluralistic communities were more likely to focus on 
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BP’s role in the crisis and frame their coverage critically; that is, journalists in larger, 
more heterogeneous communities, where social power is potentially more dispersed, 
appear freer to be critical in their coverage of the oil spill, including toward the oil giant, 
than journalists in less pluralistic communities.    
Journalists in communities that rely more heavily on the oil industry for local 
employment, however, were actually more likely to use thematic frames, which is 
opposite of what was hypothesized. According to Iyengar (1990; 1991; 1996) thematic 
framing is more likely to result in the audience attributing a societal problem to systemic 
failures, and Hart (2010) found that audiences exposed to thematic framing of an 
environmental issue were more likely to support additional environmental regulations. 
Thus, it was hypothesized that journalists in communities that relied more heavily on the 
oil industry for its economic bases would be less likely to frame the oil spill thematically 
(those journalists with more positive attitudes toward the oil industry were significantly 
less likely to frame the oil spill thematically). However, it could be that the oil spill is 
more salient in those communities that rely more heavily on the industry, and as a result, 
journalists in these communities are more likely to cover the big-picture, long-term issues 
associated with the oil spill than in communities where oil drilling plays a less important 
role in the local economy. Regardless, the data did illustrate that community structure 
does play a significant role in shaping newspaper coverage of the BP oil spill, consistent 
with previous studies (Tichenor et al., 1980; Donohue et al., 1985; Griffin & Dunwoody, 
1995, 1997; Hindmant et al., 1999; McCluskey et al., 2009; Watson & Riffe, 2011).  
What these previous studies have not addressed is how these community structure 
variables enter the news gathering process. This study attempted to build on the 
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theoretical understanding of this process, testing a model that suggested that as journalists 
are socialized into the local community structure, their own attitudes toward important 
social issues are molded to reflect the dominant social structure in which they are 
embedded, and that these attitudes in turn influence the stories journalists write. 
Journalists who lived in communities that relied more heavily on the oil industry for 
employment did have significantly more positive attitudes toward the oil industry 
following the BP oil spill; journalists with more positive attitudes toward the oil industry 
were also less likely to frame the BP oil spill thematically. This last finding supports the 
contention that journalists’ coverage may be to some extent biased by their personal point 
of view. This study, however, generally found small and largely non-significant patterns 
of bias in these journalists’ coverage.  
 There was also no evidence that journalists’ personal point of view mediates the 
relationship between community structure and journalists’ coverage. The indirect effects 
of community structure on journalists’ coverage via their attitudes toward the oil industry 
were non-significant, and the direct effects were stronger for all paths in the community 
structure path model. Thus, this dissertation failed to add to scholars’ understanding of 
how community structure’s influence enters the news gathering process. The process by 
which these community structure variables affect news coverage deserves further 
investigation in future studies. Community structure is particularly deserving of further 
research because this study did show that the community structure model could be 
successfully extended to explain local differences in Tweets about the oil spill. Like 
journalists, Twitter users who live in more pluralistic communities were more likely to 
focus on negative news related to the BP oil spill. 
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Though the community structure variables tested did not explain a large 
percentage of the variance in journalists’ or Twitter users’ coverage of the BP oil spill, 
social structure and economic reliance on the oil industry did not necessarily play a small 
role in shaping coverage of the BP oil spill. It is possible that adding to and improving 
those measures used in this study – for example, measuring reliance on the oil industry 
using the percentage of the GDP contributed by the oil industry and more direct measures 
of the dispersion of social power within communities – may be able to explain additional 
local variation in journalists’ and Twitter users’ coverage. Certainly, there is more 
empirical work that can be done to validate existing measures of community structure – 
measures of structural pluralism, in particular. Within the existing measures’ limitations, 
however, this dissertation makes two important points: first, census data can only be used 
to measure the potential distribution of social power; and second, measures of structural 
pluralism different researchers have used should be evaluated within the studies’ proper 
historical and community contexts. 
Beyond these individual community-level variables, however, journalists’ 
coverage also reflects patterns that were predicted based on a more routinized social 
control/social maintenance function that transcends local geography, or any individual-
level effects based on personal ideology and attitudes. It should also be acknowledged 
that these more general patterns in journalists’ newspaper stories – and Tweets, for that 
matter – are inherently conservative. Not necessarily in the ideological partisan sense – 
there was significant evidence of a very slight ideological bias in the journalists’ work – 
but in terms of reinforcing the status quo. Journalists treated the BP oil spill as an 
isolated, episodic event, relied most heavily on official characters, and were not as 
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negative about the crisis as the facts of the story should have dictated. Certainly this 
conservative social maintenance/social control function outweighed any community-level 
or individual-level effects. Thus, while improving the local community structure model, 
which from the outset was expected to explain only a small proportion of the variance in 
journalists’ coverage, may help explain additional local variance in media coverage, 
future studies should also explore those variables that shape media’s social control/social 
maintenance function using other levels of analysis. 
While this study was not able to illuminate how community structure variables 
enter the news gathering process, it was able to illustrate empirically that a crisis may 
have the positive effect of momentarily dislodging some reporting routines and 
temporarily affording an opportunity for typically marginalized unofficial and more 
critical perspectives to be represented in the news media’s coverage. Graber (2009) 
describes the initial chaos that ensues after a crisis occurs as being a particularly low 
period for journalistic reporting, marked by reporting rumors and inaccurate information. 
Tichenor et al. (1980), however, hinted that the initial chaos following a crisis, before the 
official interpretation of a disaster starts to emerge, may have the positive effect of 
momentarily opening up the public discourse to a wider range of voices and critical 
perspectives. This study tested empirically whether there are at least two distinct periods 
of crisis reporting; the first marked by the inclusion of more non-official, critical voices 
prior to officials gaining control over the crisis, and the official interpretation of the crisis 
emerging, once again limiting what voice and perspectives are viewed as being 
legitimate.  
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This study did find some empirical evidence for two distinct periods of crisis 
reporting. Prior to President Obama’s June 15, 2010, Oval Office address on the BP oil 
spill crisis, stories were slightly more likely to mention unofficial characters and to report 
negative news related to the oil spill. There was no theoretical guidance, however, as to 
which date to use to split coverage of the crisis into two periods (the Oval Office address 
was chosen from a timeline of events, simply because they represented the first major 
official comments on the oil spill and the government’s response). The shift in tone 
before and after the speech may also be attributed to the fact that news related to the oil 
spill did objectively improve in the weeks and months following President Obama’s Oval 
Office address. Nonetheless, these empirical findings suggest, while not dismissing any 
shortcomings in factual reporting that occur following crises, that these events may have 
a positive effect in terms of partially dislodging media routines and permitting, at least 
temporarily, a more inclusive discussion of society’s problems. Whether there are distinct 
periods in crisis coverage and what effects those periods have on reporting of crises 
deserves further study. 
What is most striking about this current study, however, are the similarities that 
were observed between journalists’ and Twitter users’ attitudes toward, and coverage of, 
the BP oil spill. One would expect some differences, particularly based on the content 
analysis variables, if only due to the difficulty of devising equivalent measures of content 
across stylistically very different media. However, individual journalists and Twitter 
users did not differ in their attitudes toward the oil industry, nor the likelihood that they 
would focus on BP or the government’s role in the crisis; use thematic frames; focus on 
negative news related to the spill; or use unofficial characters in their stories or Tweets.  
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There were some statistically significant differences between overall newspaper 
and Twitter coverage of the BP oil spill: Tweets were less likely to use unofficial 
characters and more likely to focus on BP’s role in the crisis, and be framed thematically. 
The latter is a bit counterintuitive: How is it that 140-character Tweets tackle more big-
picture issues than news stories? Many Tweets, however, consist of links to newspaper 
stories and other information that Twitter users found intriguing. It could be that 
thematically-framed newspaper stories are slightly more likely to be Tweeted and re-
Tweeted than are episodic stories, which would explain why a greater proportion of 
Tweets than newspaper stories were framed thematically.  
It should be emphasized, however, that these small differences aside, Twitter and 
newspaper coverage of the BP oil spill followed identical patterns. It was hypothesized, 
for example, that more newspaper stories would be framed episodically than 
thematically: 94% of newspaper stories and 87.4% of Tweets were framed episodically. 
Furthermore, the factors that shaped individual journalists’ and Twitter users’ coverage 
were also remarkably similar.  
Journalists and Twitter users did differ in how their attitudes toward the oil 
industry affected their use of thematic frames: journalists with more positive attitudes 
were less likely to use thematic frames; Twitter users were more likely to use thematic 
frames. This finding cannot be explained, except to suggest that perhaps there are real 
differences in how journalists and Twitter users frame issues that clash with their 
personal beliefs: journalists minimize these issues by treating them as episodic events. On 
the other hand, Twitter users who are more supportive of the oil industry — freer to be 
more brashly political — tie these issues to larger ideological arguments: further 
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government regulation will stunt the competitiveness of the U.S. economy; President 
Obama strong-arming BP into establishing a government-controlled escrow account to 
pay for the oil spill is only further evidence that he is a socialist; the fact that the worst 
environmental fears did not materialize following the oil spill is only further evidence 
that environmental concerns are overblown, etc. The other significant difference between 
the two groups is that Twitter users with more positive attitudes toward the oil industry 
were significantly more likely to focus on the government’s role in the oil spill, and less 
likely to focus on BP’s. Journalists’ attitudes toward the oil industry did not significantly 
influence whose role in the crisis they focused on more frequently. 
Generally speaking, however, the two groups are more similar than they are 
different, undermining any notion that, at least in the context of Gulf Coast coverage of 
the BP oil spill, that Twitter represented a counter public. Based on Fraser’s (1990) and 
Warner’s (2002) definition of counter publics, if Twitter was a counter public one would 
expect not only to observe differences in journalists’ and Twitter users’ attitudes toward 
the oil industry, their coverage of the BP oil spill, and those individual and community-
level factors that influence their attitudes and coverage, but radical differences. A counter 
public not only represents a different, often more inclusive point of view, but challenges 
those constraints that limit debate in a mainstream public, in this instance mainstream 
newspaper coverage of the BP oil spill.  
Twitter does appear to be more inclusive, evidenced by the fact that when 
compared to journalists, Twitter users’ political and environmental ideologies, as well as 
their attitudes toward the oil industry, have greater variances. These additional variances, 
however, primarily represent greater numbers of individual Twitter users at either 
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extreme. Thus, Twitter could also be said to be more polarized, which reflects 
mainstream political discourse more than it challenges it. If one believes that discourse 
concerning important societal issues, including the BP oil spill, is too politically divisive, 
newspapers, which are supposed to be less ideological and are not shaped by authors’ 
personal points of view to the same degree as Twitter users’ (journalists’ focus on either 
BP or the government’s role in the oil spill was not significantly shaped by their attitudes 
toward the oil industry), are, perhaps, an important alternative to Twitter. However, while 
there were some statistically significant differences between journalists’ and Twitter 
users’ coverage of the oil spill, none of these differences were radical enough to support a 
contention that either medium is a counter public. 
Future studies should explore at greater depth why and how journalists’ and 
Twitter users’ attitudes converge to be so similar. The current study’s data, however, do 
suggest one possible reason that these journalists and the most-followed Twitter users are 
so similar: both groups represent a very similar social stratum. The average journalist and 
Twitter user were both white, male, professionals, who are slightly left of center 
politically, and have a mild degree of concern for the environment. Twitter users were, on 
average, slightly wealthier. Both groups’ average income, however, exceeded the per-
capita income of all of the Gulf Coast states (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). That is, these 
journalists represent a privileged stratum of society, which is likely to have little 
incentive to radically challenge the status quo. These demographic similarities support 
Wu et al.’s (2011) contention that “while attention that was formally restricted to mass 
media channels is now shared amongst other ‘elites,’ information flows have not become 
egalitarian by any means” (p. 6). Future studies might investigate additional media-
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centric theories about why these journalists’ and Twitter users’ coverage are so similar, 
for example, inter-media agenda setting. However, the fact that professional journalists 
and mostly amateur Twitter users’ coverage of the BP oil spill converge to the degree 
they do, could suggest that media institutions may be ancillary to more general 
sociological processes (i.e., the same sociological processes shape conversations about 
the BP oil spill at local bars, on Twitter, and on the nightly news), contrary to the 
assumption that media institutions and routines are central to shaping public information 
and knowledge (Tichenor et al., 1980). Put another way: the media’s coverage may 
reflect social processes, specifically in regard to how that stratum of society that 
possesses more social influence relates to and reinforces power, rather than the media 
shaping those social relationships and processes. Thus, media-centric theories and 
research approaches (e.g., inter-media agenda setting), may not be the most fruitful for 
further understanding how and why newspaper journalists and Twitter users come to have 
very similar points of views on the BP oil spill.   
The findings of this study, however, should be interpreted with caution due to the 
study’s limitations, which in many ways are inevitable when studying a crisis that unfolds 
in real-time. In particular this study’s time-sensitive tasks of collecting Tweets and 
surveying journalists and Twitter users as soon after the oil spill as possible required 
having to triage the need for efficiency and valid measurement, within the constraints of 
time and limited resources.  
A significant limitation is that neither the journalists nor Twitter users in this 
study represent a scientific random sample. The Twitter users intentionally only represent 
those most-followed users that are likely to dominate discussions on the social media site. 
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But even from that list of most-followed users of the site, they were not randomly 
sampled. These users were not randomly sampled because this study relied on previously 
untested survey methods, including distributing 140-character survey invitations to the 
Twitter users via the social networking website. Because the potential response rate 
associated with using this strategy was unknown, one could not be confident that a 
random sample would yield a large enough sample of respondents and Tweets in order to 
model multivariate relationships between variables in the study (and one can use 
multivariate statistics to understand the pattern and strength of relationships between a 
study’s variables, even if one’s goal is not to make statistical inferences (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007)). Because the response rate was low (16.6%) and the sample was non-
random, one should be concerned about potential non-response bias. The problem with 
the Twitter survey data in particular is that there is not a known-population with which to 
compare the sample. The response to the journalist survey was also modest (32.3%), 
though the basic characteristics of the journalists mirrored those in Weaver et al.’s (2007) 
survey of journalists, which suggests that though this sample is also non-random, it is not 
necessarily non-representative. Both surveys, however, yielded sufficient samples to 
produce robust models of the relationships between variables within the samples. 
However, because the study uses non-scientific samples, conclusions about the 
relationships among these variables should not be generalized beyond these Gulf Coast 
newspaper journalists and most-followed Twitter users in the sample. 
Another limitation of the data is that journalists and Twitter users were surveyed 
about attitudes that are presumed to have affected their coverage of the BP oil spill 
sometime after the event. Thus, it is possible that these data do not reflect relevant 
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attitudes that could have shaped both journalists’ and Twitter users’ coverage of the oil 
spill. Journalists and Twitter users were also were not surveyed simultaneously. Thus, it 
is possible that the two groups’ attitudes differed – perhaps Twitter users initially had 
stronger, more visceral attitudes toward the oil industry – but since they were surveyed 
months later than journalists, Twitter users’ attitudes mellowed to the point that they were 
indistinguishable from journalists (given the consistent similarities between the groups, 
however, this is unlikely). 
It should also be clear that the variables that define the similarities and differences 
between these journalists and Twitter users represent only a small fraction of those 
variables that could be used to describe either group, and that the lack of precision of the 
measurement of these variables may mask meaningful differences. The complexity of the 
content variables in particular were restricted by the nature of the 140-character Tweets 
being analyzed; only so much complexity can be teased out of such short texts. It is 
possible, though, that future studies might be able to deploy coding strategies that can 
produce richer descriptions of Twitter content by looking for patterns across a large 
number of Tweets instead of coding Tweets based on the present/absence of attributes 
within individual Tweets. The complexity of the content variables in this study, however, 
was also restricted by the need to have measures that could be applied equivalently across 
two very different media, a goal that was achieved at least as measured by the inter and 
intracoder reliability associated with both the newspaper and Twitter content analyses 
variables. Simplifying the variables in order to achieve equivalency in measurement, 
however, may have masked more complex differences between the two media. 
Conceptually, a “negative” news story and a “negative” Tweet do not necessarily have 
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the same meaning. There was certainly more raw emotion and degrees of negative and 
positive tone in many of the Tweets about the BP oil spill than was captured in this study. 
Thus, future studies might try to come up with different content analysis strategies and 
other methodological approaches for exploring other possible similarities and differences 
between “new” and more established media. These comparisons are valuable because 
they can serve as a basis for understanding how changes in communication technologies 
are, and are not, fundamentally changing communication about public affairs issues.  
Another limitation of this study is the limited modeling of the mixed levels of 
analysis: reporters nested within newspapers, newspapers and Twitter users nested within 
cities, newspaper stories/Tweets nested in reporters, etc. Nested data are frequently 
analyzed using multi-level modeling, a statistical technique that allows researchers to 
model unique effects at each level of nested data, i.e., to model distinct individual-level 
and community-level affects on journalists’ and Twitter users’ attitudes toward, and 
coverage of, the BP oil spill. However, some statisticians have suggested that multi-level 
modeling requires 30 individuals per group, and at least 30 groups (Hox, 1998). More 
recently, however, Maas and Hox (2005) suggested that multi-level modeling requires at 
least 50 “level-two” groups. Regardless, the data in this study did not meet the sample-
size requirements for conducting multi-level modeling, whether the data were analyzed 
using the individual author or their newspaper/stories Tweets as the unit of analysis.  
Estimating clustered standard errors for each independent author, though, does 
control for the fact that each story does not represent an independent observation. This 
clustering of the data, however, does not control for the fact that the journalists are 
clustered by newspaper and both journalists and Twitter users are also clustered by city, 
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which also violate the assumption of independent observations. MPlus, however, only 
permits a single clustering variable for a single level analysis. Clustering, however, 
primarily affects the standard errors and estimates of statistical significance, not the 
direction or size of regression coefficients in the model, particularly when inter-cluster 
correlations are small (Julian, 2001). While this study could not account for all potential 
clustering, it did account for the clustering of articles based on author, which should have 
the largest inter-cluster correlations of all the potential clusters. Nonetheless, because the 
assumption of independence is violated, the results of this study should be interpreted 
cautiously. 
That being said, by examining newspaper coverage of the 2010 BP oil spill, this 
study illuminated the dominant interpretation of the oil spill as an isolated oil drilling 
accident, which is likely to emerge among the public that closely followed news coverage 
of the disaster in the Gulf Coast newspapers that were part of this study. Given the lack of 
“big picture” coverage, particularly of energy and environmental policies following the 
oil spill, it is not surprising that there have not been any major “lessons learned,” as has 
been reflected by the lack of Congressional action following the disaster (Jaffe & 
Parkinson, 2011).  
 This dissertation also highlighted a combination of individual-level and 
community-level factors that shaped newspaper coverage of the BP oil spill. And by 
comparing the similarities of these factors across media, this study revealed that Twitter, 
at least in the context of those Tweets authored by the most-followed users most likely to 
dominate Twitter discussions, might not be as “new” or “alternative” of a medium as 
some might assume. Not only were journalists and Twitter users demographically similar, 
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but also their coverage of the oil spill was nearly identical. Furthermore, their coverage of 
the BP crisis can be explained by identical sociological theories, including those 
community structure theories that predict differences in coverage based on differences in 
local community structure, which also challenges any notion that this online medium 
overrides the significance of local geography. These findings suggest rich avenues for 
future research comparing journalism and other “new media” as a framework for 
understanding how advances in communication technology are, or are not, changing 
communication about public issues, as well as to investigate the continued role that the 
geography in which users of these media are situated shape online discussions of these 
issues.  
Minimally, this dissertation should rekindle concern that the questions 
Freudenburg and Gramling (2011) suggested should be asked following the BP oil spill 
may not have received adequate coverage in the Gulf Coast media. Instead of raising 
these critical questions, newspaper reporters’ coverage of the BP oil spill reinforced the 
status quo. Given their lack of environmental or energy beat reporting experience or 
training on covering these issues, one might question if it was foolhardy to ever expect 
these journalists to delve into the policy problems implicated in the disaster. Furthermore, 
Twitter did not appear to represent a counter public, which could be relied upon to 
counteract the overall shortcomings in journalists’ coverage, or challenge those social and 
economic factors that conspired to restrict more critical examination of the systemic 
failures that contributed to the BP oil spill. One might hope improving journalists’ 
training and making them more aware of the system-maintenance biases prevalent in their 
coverage, along with concerted efforts to make online alternative voices more prominent 
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in the public debate, may improve coverage of future crises. One should also ask, 
however, what institutions might fulfill their surveillance function if the media fail to do 
so, and the role these institutions can play in disseminating information to shape the 
public affairs discourse 
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TABLES & FIGURES 
Table 1 
Journalists’ and Twitter Users’ Political and Environmental Ideologies  
(descriptive statistics) 
 
Journalists 
Twitter 
Users Total 
 M SD M SD M SD 
 Political Ideology 
 How would you characterize your political 
ideology, from left to right? 
3.41 1.090 3.75 1.508 3.61 1.362 
Environmental Ideology       
Humans are severely abusing the 
environment. 
3.86 .774 3.92 1.060 3.89 .954 
The balance of nature is strong enough to 
cope with the impacts of modern industrial 
nations. 
3.689 .756 3.733 1.073 3.715 .956 
The so-called “environmental crisis” has 
been greatly exaggerated. 
3.762 .906 3.738 1.281 3.748 1.142 
Humans will eventually learn enough about 
how nature works to be able to control it. 
3.756 .807 3.871 1.012 3.824 .935 
Total Environmental Ideology 3.767 .570 3.815 .860 3.795 .755 
N 164  240  404  
130 
 
 
Table 2 
Journalists’ and Twitter Users’ Attitudes Toward the Oil Industry Following  
the 2010 BP oil spill (descriptive statistics) 
 
Journalists 
Twitter 
Users Total 
M SD M SD M SD 
 Oil drilling companies are generally concerned 
with limiting their environmental impact. 
2.84 .899 2.45 1.142 2.61 1.066 
Oil drilling companies are committed to protecting 
the public. 
2.60 .856 2.35 1.091 2.45 1.009 
The government does not do enough to regulate 
the oil drilling industry. (Reverse-coded) 
2.40 .863 2.46 1.192 2.44 1.070 
The oil drilling industry generally complies with 
government regulation. 
2.82 .860 2.80 1.106 2.81 1.012 
Government regulation of the oil industry is 
adequate. 
2.38 .889 2.46 1.112 2.43 1.027 
U.S. regulators should allow continued off-shore 
drilling for oil at current levels. 
3.07 .855 3.23 1.222 3.17 1.090 
The U.S. should encourage exploration for new 
off-shore oil fields. 
3.09 .929 3.18 1.296 3.14 1.161 
Strict environmental laws and regulations cost too 
many jobs and hurt the economy. 
2.26 .782 2.44 1.229 2.37 1.073 
Government regulation of business is necessary to 
protect the environment. (Reverse-coded) 
1.99 .771 2.00 .937 2.00 .873 
U.S. energy policy should continue to encourage 
production of more domestic oil supplies. 
3.27 .902 3.48 1.124 3.40 1.044 
U.S. energy should shift attention away from fossil 
fuels to sources of renewable energy. (Reverse-
coded) 
1.96 .798 1.68 .947 1.80 .899 
The collapse of the Deep Water Horizon oil 
platform and the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico 
was a rare accident. 
3.43 .900 3.15 1.232 3.26 1.116 
Tragic as the Deep Water Horizon accident was, 
we cannot let it get in the way of developing 
domestic oil supplies. 
2.96 .942 3.04 1.327 3.00 1.185 
Total Oil Towards Oil Industry 2.68 .563 2.67 .849 2.68 .746 
N 164  240    
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Table 3 
Intercoder Reliability  – Newspaper Stories and Tweets 
 Tweets News Stories 
 Simple Krippendorff’s  Simple Krippendorff’s 
Variable Agreement Alpha Agreement Alpha 
Date 100% 1 100% 1  
Episodic/Thematic 93% .825 95% .835 
Linkage 89% .865 86% .821 
Evaluative Tone 90% .819 89% .800 
Official Characters 98% .960 92% .793 
BP 97% .940 89% .781 
Other Oil Industry 100% 1 99% .904 
Elected Government 
Official 99% .966 92% .798 
Other Government 
Official 99% .928 93% .848  
Unofficial Characters 97% .914 91% .819 
NGO/Activist/ 
Volunteer 98% .658 98% .847 
Independent Scientist/ 
Engineer 100% 1 98% .492 
Local Business/ 
Fisherman/ 
Oil Industry  
Employee 99% .853 94% .778 
Expert 1 100% 99% .853 
Other 99% .964 91% .764 
Note: Intercoder reliability is based on two independent coders’ judgments on a randomly 
selected sample of 100 newspaper stories and 100 Tweets, or 10% of the total newspaper 
stories and Tweets analyzed.
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Table 4 
Intracoder Reliability – Newspaper Stories and Tweets 
 Tweets News Stories 
 Simple Krippendorff’s  Simple Krippendorff’s 
Variable Agreement Alpha Agreement Alpha 
Date 100% 1 100% 1  
Episodic/Thematic 97% .897 95% .841 
Linkage 93% .907 91% .860  
Evaluative Tone 92% .859 93% .875  
Official Characters 95% .900 98% .944 
 BP 93% .859 98% .960 
 Other Oil Industry 100% 1 100% 1 
 Elected Government 
  Official 99% .966 96% .899 
 Other Government 
  Official 98% .847 97% .936  
Unofficial Characters 100% 1 97% .941 
 NGO/Activist/ 
  Volunteer 100% 1 100% 1  
 Independent Scientist/ 
  Engineer 100% 1 100%  1 
 Local Business/ 
  Fisherman/ 
  Oil Industry  
  Employee 100% 1 98% .926  
 Expert 100% 1 1 100 
 Other 100% 1 99% .970 
Note: Intracoder reliability is based on a primary coder’s judgments on the same randomly 
selected sample of 100 newspaper stories and 100 Tweets used to establish intercoder reliability 
at the beginning and end of data collection. 
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Table 5 
Frequency of Dichotomous Present/Absent Content Analysis Variables in Newspaper 
and Twitter Coverage of the BP Oil Spill 
Content  
Analysis Variable 
Newspaper Stories Tweets 
Present 
Frequency Percent 
Present 
Frequency Percent 
Linkage     
BP 155 15.5 323 32.3 
Government Oversight/Regulation 318 31.8 203 20.3 
Other Oil Industry 27 2.7 29 2.9 
Environmental/Health Risk 189 18.9 165 16.5 
Environmental/Energy Policy 13 1.3 14 1.4 
Economic 131 13.1 21 2.1 
Other 167 16.7 245 24.5 
Thematic Frame 59 5.9 126 12.6 
Tone     
Positive 133 13.3 99 9.9 
Negative 499 49.9 570 57.0 
Neutral 368 36.8 331 33.1 
Official Characters 774 77.4 559 55.9 
BP Official 355 35.5 394 39.4 
Other Oil Industry Official 33 3.3 11 1.1 
Elected Official 243 24.3 134 13.4 
Other Government Official 439 43.9 107 10.7 
Unofficial Characters 386 38.6 176 17.6 
NGO/Activist/Volunteer 70 7.0 19 1.9 
Independent Scientist/Engineer 81 8.1 16 1.6 
Local business/Fisherman/Oil Industry 
Employee 
140 14.0 28 2.8 
Expert Character 11 1.1 8 .8 
Other Character 71 7.1 103 10.3 
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Table 6   
Chi-Square Test of Difference in the Use of Unofficial Characters Before 
and After President Obama’s June 15 Oval Office Address on the BP Oil 
Spill 
 
Unofficial 
Character 
Oval Office Address     
Before After χ2 Ф P  
Absent 112 502 4.168 -.065 .041  
 (55.2%) (63.0%)     
Present 91 295     
 (44.8%) (37%)     
Note: Column percentages appear in parentheses below group 
frequencies. 
 
 
  
 
Table 7      
Chi-Square Test of Differences in Story Tone Before and After President 
Obama’s June 15 Oval Office Address on the BP Oil Spill 
 
 Oval Office Address     
Story Tone Before After χ2 Ф P  
Not 
Negative 
82 
(40.4%) 
419 
(52.6%) 
9.598 -.098 .002  
Negative 121 
(59.6%) 
378 
(47.4%) 
    
Not 
Positive 
184 
(90.6%) 
683 
(85.7%) 
3.430 .059 .064  
Positive 19 
(9.4%) 
114 
(14.3%) 
    
Not Neutral 140 
(69%) 
492 
(61.7%) 
3.640 .060 
 
.056  
Neutral 63 
(31%) 
305 
(38.3%) 
    
Note: Column percentages appear in parentheses below group 
frequencies. 
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Table 8         
Correlations of Major Variables for Journalists and Twitter Users (Variances On the 
Diagonals) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.) Political 
Ideology 
.125 
(2.937
) 
       
2.) Attitudes 
Toward 
the  
Oil 
Industry 
.472
c 
(.785)
 
.193 
(.876) 
      
3.) Un-
official 
Character 
.002 
(-.036) 
.053 
(-.065) 
      
4.) Enviro. 
Attitudes 
-.435
c 
(-.748)
 
-.482
c 
(-.781)
 
-.032 
(.075) 
.339 
(.970) 
    
5.) Story 
Tone 
.103
b 
(.282)
 
.073
a 
(.305)
 
-.196
c 
(.021) 
-.102
c 
(-.305) 
    
6.) Thematic 
Frame 
-.07
a 
(.121)
 
-.073
a 
(.102) 
-.007 
(-.017) 
.122
c 
(-.122) 
-.017 
(.131) 
   
7.) BP Link -.024 
(-.109) 
-.112
c 
(-.100) 
-.062
a 
(-.133) 
-.039 
(.172) 
.162
c 
(-.186)
 
.085 
(-.044) 
  
8.) Gov. 
Link 
-.038 
(.229) 
.027 
(.266) 
-.553
c 
(-.447) 
-.043 
(-.280) 
.071 
(.159) 
.095
b 
(.038)
 
-.797
c 
(-.833)
 
 
Note: Values for Twitter are in parentheses; correlations are tetrachoric correlations because 
some bivariate relationships are between two dichotomous variables; 
a
 P < .05; 
b
 P < .01; 
c
 P < 
.001. 
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Table 9 
Coefficients of Path Model (Journalists), labeled by research question or hypothesis 
 Path Estimate 95% CI  
 From To (Std. Est.) SE LL UL P 
R4 Structural 
Pluralism 
Government 
Link 
-1.132 (-.066) 1.001 -3.094 .830 .258 
H4a  BP Link 2.652 (.150) 1.043 .608 4.696 .011 
H4b  Thematic 
Frames 
-0.986 (-.057) 0.977 -2.901 .928 .313 
H4c  Story Tone -2.228 (-.128) 1.030 -4.247 -.209 .031 
H4d  Unofficial 
Characters 
.609 (.035) 1.185 -1.714 2.931 .608 
R5 % Workforce in 
Oil Industry 
Government 
Link 
.024 (.014) .112 -.215 .263 .843 
H5a  BP Link .217 (.121) .117 -.013 .446 .064 
H5b  Thematic 
Frames 
.243 (.138) .101 .045 .441 .016 
H5c  Story Tone .197 (.111) .121 -.040 .434 .103 
H5d  Unofficial 
Characters 
-.158 (-.090) .093 -.341 .024 .088 
H6a Structural 
Pluralism 
Attitudes 
Toward Oil 
Industry 
.648 (.083) .740 -.802 2.098 .381 
H6b % Workforce in 
Oil Industry 
Attitudes 
Toward Oil 
Industry 
.205 (.257) .063 .080 .329 .001 
H7 Journalists’ 
Political 
Conservatism 
Attitudes 
Toward Oil 
Industry 
.132 (.308) .031 .072 .192 .000 
H8 Journalists’ 
Pro-
Environmental 
Attitudes 
Attitudes 
Toward Oil 
Industry 
-.288 (-.368) .048 -.382 -.194 .000 
R6 Attitudes 
Toward Oil 
Industry 
Government 
Link 
.042 (.019) .144 -.240 .323 .771 
H9a  BP Link -.077 (-.034) .202 -.472 .318 .703 
H9b  Thematic 
Frames 
-.277 (-.125) .125 -.523 -.031 .027 
H9c  Story Tone .260 (.117) .145 -.024 .543 .073 
H9d  Unofficial 
Characters 
.104 (.047) .155 -.199 .408 .501 
Note: χ2(10) = 11.173, P = .672, RMSEA=.000, CFI=1.000, TLI=1.033; statistically significant 
paths are in bold. 
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Table 10 
Direct and Indirect Effects — via Journalists’ Positive Attitudes Toward the Oil 
Industry — of Community Structure on Journalists’ Coverage of the BP oil spill 
Path 
Effects 
Estimate 
SE 
95% CI  
From To (Std. Est.) LL UL P 
% of workforce 
in oil industry 
BP 
linkage 
Direct 
.217 
(.121) 
.117 -.013 .446 .064 
 
 Indirect 
-.016 
(-.009) 
.041 -.097 .065 .705 
Structural 
Pluralism 
BP 
linkage 
Direct 
2.652 
(.150) 
1.043 .608 4.696 .011 
 
 Indirect 
-.050 
(-.003) 
.126 -.297 .197 .693 
% of workforce 
in oil industry 
Thematic 
Frames 
Direct 
.243 
(.138)       
.101 .045 .441 .016 
  
Indirect 
-.057 
(-.032)       
.033 -.121 .007 .083 
Structural 
Pluralism 
Thematic 
Frames 
Direct 
-.986    
(-.057)    
.977 -2.901 .928 .313 
  
Indirect 
-.180    
(-.010)    
.227 -.625 .266 .429 
% of workforce 
in oil industry 
Story 
Tone 
Direct 
0.197  
(.111)      
.121 -.040 .434 .103 
  
Indirect 
0.053 
(.030)       
.035 -.015 .122 .128 
Structural 
Pluralism 
Story 
Tone 
Direct 
-2.228 
(-.128)       
1.030 -4.247 -.209 .031 
  
Indirect 
0.168 
(.010)       
.223 -.269 .606 .451 
% of workforce 
in oil industry 
Un-
official 
Characters 
Direct 
-0.158 
(-.090)       
.093 -.341 .024 .088 
  
Indirect 
0.021 
(.012)  
.032 -.041 .083 .500 
Structural 
Pluralism 
Un-
official 
Characters 
Direct 
0.609 
(.035)       
1.185 -1.714 2.931 .608 
  
Indirect 
0.068 
(.004)       
.112 -.153 .288 .548 
Note: Effects in bold indicate the larger of the direct or indirect effect, regardless of significance 
of the overall P value. 
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Table 11 
Coefficients of Path Model (Twitter users) 
Path Estimate  95% CI  
From To (Std. Est.) SE LL UL P 
Structural 
Pluralism 
Government 
Link 
-.149 (-.008) 1.135 -2.375 2.076 .895 
 BP Link .644 (.035) 1.082 -1.477 2.764 .552 
 Thematic 
Frames 
-.862 (-.047) 1.447 -3.699 1.975 .552 
 Story Tone -2.165 (-.118) .995 -4.114 -.215 .030 
 Unofficial 
Characters 
.264 (.014) .954 -1.605 2.132 .782 
% Workforce in 
Oil Industry 
Government 
Links 
.001 (.000) .107 -.209 .210 .996 
 BP Links -.071 (-.044) .100 -.267 .126 .481 
 Thematic 
Frames 
-.105 (-.065) .123 -.346 .136 .393 
 Story Tone .010 (.006) .095 -.175 -.175 .915 
 Unofficial 
Characters 
-.064 (-.040) .087 -.234 .106 .459 
Structural 
Pluralism 
Attitudes 
Toward Oil 
Industry 
1.690 (.097) 1.632 -1.507 4.888 .300 
% Workforce in 
Oil Industry 
Attitudes 
Toward Oil 
Industry 
.530 (.345) .219 .101 .959 .016 
Twitter Users’ 
Political 
Conservatism 
Attitudes 
Toward Oil 
Industry 
.164 (.291) .110 -.052 .379 .137 
Twitter Users’ 
Pro-
Environmental 
Attitudes 
Attitudes 
Toward Oil 
Industry 
-.625 (-.643) .165 -.948 -.302 .000 
Attitudes 
Toward Oil 
Industry 
Government 
Links 
.318 (.303) .057 .205 .430 .000 
 BP Links -.152 (-.044) .065 -.280 -.023 .020 
 Thematic 
Frames 
.140 (.135) .068 .006 .274 .040 
 Story Tone .370 (.352) .051 .270 .470 .000 
 Unofficial 
Characters 
-.069 (-.066) .049 -.165 .027 .157 
Note: χ2(14) = 22.580, P = .068, RMSEA=.018, CFI=.855, TLI=.544; statistically significant 
paths are in bold.  
139 
 
Table 12 
Fit Indices and Chi-Square Difference Tests for Nested Models Examining 
Differences Between Journalists and Twitter Users 
 χ2 df P RMSEA CFI TLI ∆χ2 df P 
Model 1 
(Unconstraine
d) 
33.190 28 .229 .014 .969 .904    
Model 2 
(Equal 
thresholds/ 
means) 
41.924 36 .229 .013 .965 .915 10.100 8 .258 
Model 3 
(Equal 
thresholds/ 
means and 
coefficients) 
82.318 55 .010 .022 .839 .742 42.993 19 .001 
Model 4 
(Equal 
coefficient for 
oil attitudes to 
thematic 
frames 
relaxed) 
71.825 54 .053 .018 .895 .829 31.504 18 .025 
Model 5 
(Equal 
coefficient for 
oil attitudes to 
government 
link relaxed) 
67.383 53 .090 .017 .915 .859 27.277 17 .054 
Model 6 
(Equal 
coefficient for 
oil attitudes to 
thematic 
frames 
relaxed) 
62.513 52 .151 .014 .938 .895 22.134 16 .139 
140 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13 
Chi-square tests of differences in overall newspaper and Twitter coverage of the 
BP oil spill 
Content Analysis Variable 
News 
Story Tweet χ2 Ф P 
BP Link Absent N 845 677 77.590
a
 .197 .000 
% 84.5% 67.7%    
Present  N 155 323    
% 15.5% 32.3% 
   
Government Link Absent N 682 797 34.326
a
 -.131 .000 
  % 68.2% 79.7%    
 Present  N 318 203    
  
% 31.8% 20.3%    
Thematic Frame Absent N 941 874 26.738
a
 .116 .000 
  % 94.1% 87.4%    
 Present  N 59 126    
  
% 5.9% 12.6%    
Negative Tone Absent N 501 430 10.130
a
 .071 .001 
  % 50.1% 43.0%    
 Present  N 499 570    
  
% 49.9% 57.0%    
Unofficial Character Absent N 614 824 109.137 -.234 .000 
  % 61.4% 82.4%    
 Present  N 386 176    
  % 38.6% 17.6%    
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Figure 1  
Structural Equation Model: How Community-Level Variables and Authors’ Personal 
Attitudes Bias Their Coverage of the BP Oil Spill 
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Figure 2 
Significant Paths: How Community-Level Variables and Authors’ Personal Attitudes 
Bias Their Coverage of the BP Oil Spill 
 
 
Path 
Journalists Twitter Users 
Estimate 
(Std. Est.) 
Estimate 
(Std. Est.) Ho From To 
H4a Structural Pluralism BP Link 2.652 (.150)
*
 .644 (.035) 
H4c Structural Pluralism Story Tone -2.228 (-.128)
 *
 -2.165 (-.188)
 *
 
H5b % Workforce in  
Oil Industry 
Thematic Frames .243 (.138)
 *
 -.105 (-.065) 
H6b % Workforce in  
Oil Industry 
Attitudes Toward Oil 
Industry 
.205 (.257)
 **
 .530 (.345)
 *
 
H7 Authors’ Political 
Conservatism 
Attitudes Toward Oil 
Industry 
.132 (.308)
 ***
 .164 (.291) 
H8 Authors’ 
Environmental 
Attitudes 
Attitudes Toward Oil 
Industry 
-.288 (-.368)
 ***
 -.625 (-.643)
 ***
 
H9b Attitudes Toward 
Oil Industry 
Thematic Frames -.277 (-.125)
 *
 .140 (.135)
 *
 
 Attitudes Toward 
Oil Industry 
BP Link -.077 (-.034) -.152 (-.044)
 *
 
 Attitudes Toward 
Oil Industry 
Government Link .042 (.019) .318 (.303)
 ***
 
 Attitudes Toward 
Oil Industry 
Story Tone .260 (.177) .370 (.352)
 ***
 
Notes: Bold paths significant for both journalists and Twitter users; non-bold paths significant 
only for Twitter users; dashed-paths are non-significant for either group.
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Figure 3 
The Distribution of Journalists’ and Twitter Users’ Political Attitudes 
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APPENDIX 
Coding Protocol 
Coverage of the Gulf Oil Spill 
 
V1: Story/Tweet number (assigned on list of stories/Tweets to code) 
 
V2: Newspaper’s name (Leave blank for Tweets) 
 
V3: Reporter’s name/Twitter username  
 
V4: Story/Tweet Date (mm/dd/yyyy)  
 
V5: Episodic Versus Thematic Frames 
 
Frames in news stories should be coded based on the first four consecutive 
paragraphs of each story that are substantially about the oil spill (Example: a story’s 
lead may say that a candidate visiting town A fielded tough questions about the 
economy, bank bailouts, and the BP oil spill. This paragraph is not substantially about 
the oil spill, because it only makes brief mention of the story. You should code those 
paragraphs later in the story that actually discuss the questions the politician fielded 
about the oil spill).  
 
Code any portion of the Tweet that is substantially about the oil spill.  
You can use hyperlinked sources in Tweets for additional contextual clues, but 
coding decisions must be made based on the contents of the Tweet. 
 
Code only the first mention of a frame in each news story or Tweet. You must choose 
either/or. 
 
An episodic frame “focuses on specific events or particular cases” (single event 
stories). For example, a story that reports on specific seafood safety test results 
following the spill should be coded as having an episodic frame. Thematic frames 
puts issues “and events in some general context” (trend stories). Put another way: 
“Episodic framing depicts concrete events that illustrate issues, while thematic 
framing presents collective or general evidence.” 
 
For example, a story that discusses the general threat of the BP oil spill to coral reefs 
should be coded as a thematic story (if the threat is described only in terms of a 
specific reef  — i.e., a particular case — the story should be coded as being episodic).  
Another example: A story that talks broadly about the impact of the oil spill on the 
fishing industry, or confidence on seafood safety, should be coded as thematic. 
However, if such a story is event based (i.e., the result of a report, survey, etc. being 
released), the frame should be coded as being episodic, even if the story also raises 
thematic concerns.  
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If it is not clear from the story/Tweet that the story is thematic, code it as being 
episodic. 
 
V6: Linkages  
 
Linkages should be coded based on the first four consecutive paragraphs of each 
story substantially about the oil spill. (Example: a story’s lead may say that a 
candidate visiting town A fielded tough questions about the economy, bank bailouts, 
and the BP oil spill. This paragraph is not substantially about the oil spill, because it 
only makes brief mention of the story. You should code those paragraphs later in the 
story that actually discuss the questions the politician fielded about the oil spill). Code 
any portion of the Tweet that is substantially about the oil spill. Code only the first 
linkage mentioned (i.e., the primary linkage). 
 
You can use hyperlinked sources in Tweets for additional contextual clues, but 
coding decisions must be made based on the contents of the Tweet. You can also use 
an Internet search engine to help identify individuals/organizations/legislation, etc., 
mentioned in the story in order to help you correctly categorize the linkage. 
 
A linkage is a reference in the story that links the BP oil spill to another specific 
issue. For example, a story about the impact of the oil spill on seabirds would be 
coded as having an environmental/health linkage.  
 
BP Linkage 
 
Focuses on the connection between the oil spill and BP, including BP 
responsibility for the spill; BP response to the spill; the impact of the spill on BP 
(cost, share prices, etc.). Do not code BP as a linkage if BP is not explicitly 
mentioned; be careful not to code BP as a linkage if BP is only referenced as part 
of the identifying name of the oil spill, as in the “2010 BP Oil Spill,” of if a 
hashtag or @BP reference is only used as a label and not in place of the 
company’s name as part of the subject of the Tweet.  
 
Other Oil Industry Linkage 
 
Focuses on the connection between the oil spill and broader industry beyond BP 
(increased scrutiny/regulation, loss of public support, etc.). Linkages to specific 
regulatory action, such as the moratorium on offshore drilling, should be coded as 
a “Government/Regulation/Oversight.” 
 
Environmental/Health Risk Linkage 
 
Focuses on the connection between the oil spill and the impact on the 
environment (including, for example, oil washing up – or not washing up – on 
beaches, or on the impacts on human health of the spill, or spill clean-up, for 
example the mental health effect on fisherman, or the effects of the oil on clean-
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up crews’ health. If the story is primary about a policy issue – i.e., the need for 
more support for renewable energy – the story should be coded as having an 
environmental/energy policy linkage. 
 
Environmental/Energy Policy Linkage 
 
Focuses on the connection between the oil spill and long-term energy and/or 
environmental policy, such as the country’s reliance on fossil fuels. If the story 
focuses primarily on short-term responses to the spill, including the government’s 
short-term moratorium on offshore oil drilling, the story should be coded as 
having a government/regulation/oversight linkage. 
 
Economic Linkage 
 
Focuses on the connection between the oil spill and businesses, employment, real 
estate, either at the local, state, or national level, including impact on local, state, 
and national economies. If the economic linkage only focuses on the fishing 
industry, see “Fishing/Seafood.” 
 
Government/Regulation/Oversight Linkage 
 
Focuses on the government’s responsibility for and response to the oil spill, 
including government-lead clean-up efforts, government hearings, government 
meetings convened to discuss the oil spill, etc., as well as discussion of 
government oversight/regulation as it relates directly to the BP oil spill (more 
long-term regulation/oversight issues should be coded as “environmental/energy 
policy linkage). Covers all levels of government: international, national, state, 
county, local, etc.  
 
Other Linkage 
 
Includes any linkage that does not fit clearly into one of the above categories. 
Provide a succinct one-sentence description of the linkage so that it can be 
appropriately categorized. 
 
V9: Evaluative Tone 
 
Stories should be coded positive, negative, or neutral based on the first four 
paragraphs of the story that are substantially about the oil spill. Code any portion of 
the Tweet that is substantially about the oil spill. 
 
Positive stories are those that portray events as being desirable: progress capping the 
well; better-than-expected reports about the ecological impacts of the spill; fishermen 
getting back to work; tourists returning to the Gulf, etc., or events portrayed as 
advantageous for BP or other parties responsible for causing the BP oil spill — 
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primarily Haliburton and Transocean — or for those with responsibility for cleaning 
up the oil spill.   
 
Negative stories focus on undesirable outcomes: set-backs for BP’s efforts to cap the 
well, ecological damage due to the spill, negative impacts on tourism and local 
business due to the spill, etc., or events portrayed as being disadvantageous for BP or 
other parties responsible for causing the BP oil spill — or for those with 
responsibility for cleaning up the oil spill.   
 
Stories that do not meet either of these two previous descriptions, or those stories that 
mention both positive and negative outcomes in the “same breadth” — for example, 
“BP made progress capping the well today, but the worst of the environmental 
damage has already likely been done”  —  should be coded as being “neutral.” Code 
only the first event mentioned. 
 
As a secondary method of classifying the stories/Tweets, code stories/Tweets as being  
either positive or negative if the tone is obvious from language used in the story or 
Tweet, even if it’s not possible to discern tone based on the above rules (though these 
rules should take precedence). Another example: A Tweet that said, “I’m so damn 
pissed about the oil spill,” should be coded as being negative, even though it doesn’t 
involve a specific outcome. 
 
However, Tweets that use negative/angry language in such a way as to defend/protect 
BP – or its protectors – from criticism, should be coded positively. Additionally, 
obvious irony should be coded accordingly (i.e., a Tweet that said, “Wow! In latest 
genius move, BP’s Tony Hayward has decided to go yachting this weekend,” should 
be coded as being negative. 
 
Only code tone as it relates to the oil spill. For example, a Tweet that said, “Check out 
John Smith’s amazing article about the oil spill,” should be coded as being neutral, 
because there is no indication about how the author feels about the oil spill. 
“Negative” words such as disaster, spill, accident, etc., that are used to describe the 
spill, but not express a clear evaluation of the spill, should not be coded as negative. 
For example, “Obama will appear in the Rose Garden at 12 p.m. to comment on the 
BP disaster,” should not be coded as being negative. However, a Tweet that says, 
“BP’s response to the oil spill is such a disaster,” should be coded as negative. 
 
V10: “Characters” 
 
In this section you should record whether a character falling in one of the specified 
categories was mentioned in the first four consecutive paragraphs of a news story or 
Tweet substantially about the oil spill. You can use an Internet search engine to help 
identify individuals/organizations/legislation, etc., mentioned in the story in order to 
help you correctly categorize a given character. 
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Do not count organizations/institutions as characters if specific individuals also 
represent the organization in the text. Also, be careful not to count 
individuals/organizations twice in the instance that both a generic reference and 
specific name refer to the same individual/organization. However, count all 
individuals as separate characters, even if they belong to the same 
organization/institution. 
 
Do not count general references to non-specific group of individuals: “Gulf Coast 
residents,” “business owners,” “crewmembers,” etc. However, count generic 
references to specific groups of individuals: “11 crew members died,” “protesters 
gathered at the beach, Monday,” etc. Always count references to groups of 
individuals, such as in these preceding examples, as a single character. Again, do not 
count groups as separate characters if individual members of the group are also 
mentioned. 
 
For example, in the following paragraphs there are only two characters: The plaintiff 
(Luke Boudreaux) and the defendant, Craig Creppel (Creppel is a representative of 
the DRC Group, thus it is not counted as being a separate character). 
 
“An oil spill cleanup worker has filed a lawsuit against his 
employer after he suffered respiratory failure as a result of 
exposure to oil products. 
 
Luke Boudreaux filed the lawsuit against Craig Creppel and the 
DRC Group on Dec. 29, 2011 in federal court in New Orleans. 
The alleged incident occurred on Sept. 28, 2010 as Boudreaux was 
employed by the defendants as a crewmember of the vessel 
Captain Matt. 
 
The vessel and its crewmembers were conducting BP oil spill 
cleanup operations in the Gulf of Mexico. Boudreaux claims that 
he suffered acute hypoxic respiratory failure and bipolar 
pneumonia as a result of his exposure to toxic oil products being 
remediated by the vessel.” 
 
Only code characters that are the subject of the news story/Tweet. For example, if the 
Tweet was “NYT: Tony Hayward says, ‘I would like my life back,’” the New York 
Times is not the subject of the Tweet. Only Tony Hayward, BP’s disgraced former 
CEO, would be coded as a character. 
 
Do not count @reply or RT Twitter handles as characters; do count Twitter handles 
and/or hashtags (#) if they’re clearly used in place of an individual/organization’s 
name that is relevant to the oil spill. Example: “@BP are a bunch of jackasses.” In 
this instance, BP should be coded as a “BP Official” source. 
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Also, do not code first-person references as being characters. For example, a Tweet 
that said, “Check out our amazing gallery of BP oil spill photos,” should be coded as 
having zero characters (in this context BP is referenced only in terms of the name of 
the oil spill). 
 
First decide if a character is an “Official Character” or “Unofficial Character.” Then 
try to categorize the character further. 
 
Official Characters 
 
Official characters are government and corporate officials, employees, and 
contractors, who have some degree of official involvement in/jurisdiction over the BP 
oil spill and related issues. 
 
BP Official 
 
Includes any official representative of BP, including BP contractors; excludes 
individual employees who are not officially representing the company’s point of 
view (though it includes company representatives that might comment officially, 
even if they are not authorized by the company to do so). Includes engineers, 
scientists, etc., who work for and/or are under contact with (includes research 
grants) BP. 
 
Other Oil Industry Official 
 
Includes any official representative of an oil company, other than BP, including 
contactors, as well as those in related supply businesses; excludes individual 
employees who are not officially representation the companies’ point of view 
(though it includes company representatives that might comment officially, even 
if they are not authorized by the company to do so). Includes engineers, scientists, 
etc., who work for and/or are under contact with (includes research grants) an oil 
company or industry group other than BP. 
 
Elected Government Official 
 
Includes elected officials — local mayors, state representatives, U.S. 
Congressmen, etc. Also includes references to elected bodies, such as the 
Louisiana Senate, local town councils, etc. Includes individuals running for 
elected office. 
 
Regulatory/Enforcement Official 
 
Includes those institutions/organizations and affiliated individuals with primary 
responsibility for regulatory issues related to the oil spill and oil industry more 
generally, such as the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management. Does not include 
those individuals/organizations with responsibility for 
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environmental/health/science issues, such as the Environmental Protection 
Agency or the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (see “Government 
Official (Environmental/Science Related”). Includes contractors. 
 
Environmental/Health/Science Related Government Official 
 
Includes any official government agency (local, state, national) that has primary 
responsibility for environmental, health, or science topics, including local, state, 
and national environmental protection or wildlife agencies, including the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the National Marine Fisheries Service, etc. 
Excludes governmental agencies participating in the environmental cleanup, 
which don’t have direct responsibility for the environment, such as the Coast 
Guard (see “Response Official”). Includes engineers, scientists, etc., who work 
for and/or are under contact with (includes research grants) an environmental 
agency. Includes contractors. 
 
Other Government Official 
 
A government official, government contractor, or governmental body that does 
not fit one of the previous descriptions of governmental officials above.  
 
Other Official Character 
 
An official character that does not meet one of the preceding definitions. Please 
provide a detailed one-sentence description in the open-ended response section so 
that these characters can be appropriately categorized. 
 
Unofficial Characters 
A character that does not have any official involvement in/jurisdiction over the BP oil 
spill. 
 
Environmental/Health Organization/Activist 
 
Includes any non-governmental agency/volunteer group, etc., that is participating 
in, and/or commenting on environmental clean-up or some other aspect of the oil 
spill, such as Greenpeace, the Sierra Club, etc., or individuals who are explicitly 
identified as being environmentalists or activists (such as those boycotting BP or 
participating in some other protest action). Also includes health organizations, 
such as those providing mental health care to those adversely affected by the spill, 
as well as non-profit science organizations commenting on the spill. 
 
NGO 
 
Includes other non-governmental agencies/non-profits that do not fit the 
description of an environmental/health/science characters, such as those 
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organizations that provided financial counseling and/or job training/re-training in 
the wake of the oil spill. 
 
Volunteers 
 
 Includes individual clean-up or other response volunteers who do not clearly 
belong to an organization meeting the description of an “Environmental/health 
organization/activist” or an “NGO.” 
 
Independent Scientist/Engineer 
 
Includes any scientist or engineer (or scientific or engineering organization) not 
compensated by BP or the oil industry (including as a contractor) who is 
commenting on the oil spill based on their professional expertise, such as 
university researchers (don’t worry about grants and other forms of compensation 
from the industry that are not mentioned in the story).  
 
Local Business Owner/Employee 
 
Includes any person explicitly identified as the owner and/or employee of a 
specific, non-oil or fishing-related business. Includes those who work for 
restaurants, hotels, etc. who are commenting on the spill based on their capacity 
as either a business owner or employee, for example discussing the spill’s impact 
on business. 
 
Local Fisherman/Fishing Organization 
 
Includes individual fishermen and those who work for related businesses, as well 
as others representing the interest of fishermen,  
Oil Industry Employee 
 
Includes employees of BP and the oil industry more generally (including related 
industries), which are commenting in non-official capacities, nor at the behest of 
the oil industry or BP (for example, at a press conference). Includes BP 
contractors, including clean-up workers, who are mentioned in non-official 
capacities. 
 
“Expert” 
 
Includes any individual/organization who based on their professional 
expertise/background are asked to comment on aspects of the BP oil spill, but are 
not themselves involved in the issue. Would include, for example, legal 
commentators not directly involved in legal action (or potential legal action) 
related to the oil spill. 
 
Other Local Citizen or Visitor 
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Includes individuals that do not fit into one of the above categories; a “man on the 
street” interview. 
 
Other Unofficial Character 
 
Includes any character that does not fit one of the above definitions. Please 
provide a detailed one-sentence description in the open-ended response section so 
that these characters can be appropriately categorized. 
